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"If we don't do something to simplify the tax system, we're going
to end up with a national police force of internal revenue agents."1
"[The Tax Code] is a monstrosity and there's only one thing to do
with it. Scrap it, kill it, drive a stake through its heart, bury it and
hope it never rises again to terrorize the American people.",
2
"Our income tax system has been destroyed by complexity - a
complexity caused largely by well-meaning efforts to achieve
theoretical purity, eliminate every real and imagined 'abuse,' and
address nontax policy objectives."'3
2 Id. at 236 (alteration in original) (quoting Steve Forbes, former Presidential
candidate).
3 Id. at 238 (quoting Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., former Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Simplification of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) has long
been a mantra for reformers," but the cause has historically lacked
serious support.5  Voters may rightly be suspicious of political
candidates promising to simplify the Code. After all, few (if any)
major tax bills have achieved overall simplification of the Code in any
sense of the word.6 The number of words, the number of legislative
and interpretive regulations issued by the Treasury Department, and
the number and length of tax forms from the Internal Revenue
Service (Service) all continue to grow.7 In some cases, proposals for
simplifying the Code appear to be mere rhetorical diversions that
conceal other, more controversial objectives. Proponents of the flat
tax, for example, argued that applying one rate to all forms of income
4 See Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusions of Tax
Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 319, 320-22 (1994). See generally id. at
322-34 (describing historical developments that led to the rise in tax complexity).
5 See, e.g., JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 372 (1985); Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification,
1990 Wis. L. REV. 1267, 1307 (1990) (observing that "simplicity lacks a consensus").
6 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, is the most
notable exception. By broadening the tax base, eliminating various loophole and tax
shelter opportunities, and unifying the tax rates applicable to ordinary income and
capital gains, the 1986 Act achieved some meaningful degree of simplification. See,
e.g., Daniel Halperin, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium Tax Reform
Perspectives: Fundamental Tax Reform, 48 EMORY L.J. 809, 810 (1999); Joseph A.
Snoe, Tax Simplification and Fairness: Four Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform,
60 ALB. L. REV. 61, 69 (1996). But see Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Toward Adding
Further Complexity to the Internal Revenue Code: A New Paradigm for the
Deductibility of Capital Losses, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1083, 1137 (1999) (arguing that
the goal of simplification in the 1986 Act "failed miserably"); Michael J. Graetz, 100
Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J.
261, 275 (2003) (concluding that the 1986 Act promised simplification "but failed to
deliver"). Perhaps ironically, many of the simplification measures contained in the
1986 Act were short lived. See, e.g., infra note 324.
7 The Code contains approximately 1,395,000 words, and the United States
Treasury Department has issued nearly 20,000 pages of regulations containing more
than 8 million words. 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TESTIMONY OF
THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION AT A HEARING OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEES ON OVERSIGHT AND SELECT REVENUE MEASURES OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS CONCERNING COMPLEXITY OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE 2 (Joint Comm. Print 2001). Compliance with the Code and
Treasury Regulations requires many forms. For 1999 alone, the Internal Revenue
Service issued 649 forms, schedules, and instructions. Imbedded within those
instructions were a total of 159 worksheets. Id. For more on the meaning of tax
complexity and simplification, see infra Part V.A.
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would significantly ease taxpayer and administrative burdens.8
However, cutting the number of tax brackets and eliminating
preferential rates for certain types of income does little to make the
computation of tax any easier.9 Tax computation is but one line on
the income tax return, and most taxpayers consult tax tables prepared
by the Service that already simplify the calculation.'0 As other
authors have suggested, the subtle objective of the flat tax proposal is
to undermine the progressivity of the income tax.1'
Lately, however, Congress has shown signs that tax simplification
may be more than an empty political pick-up line. Section 8022(3)(B)
of the Code requires the Joint Committee on Taxation 12 to report at
least once each Congress "on the overall state of the Federal tax
system, together with recommendations with respect to possible
simplification proposals and other matters relating to the
administration of the Federal tax system as it may deem advisable."' 3
In April 2001, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation released a
three-volume report on the state of the tax system and its
recommendations for simplification, its first since the July 22, 1998,
8 See, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995);
John Linder, The Code Must Go!, 92 TAX NOTES 851 (Aug. 6,2001).
9 See William G. Gale, Tax Simplification: Issues and Options, 92 TAX NOTES
1463, 1478-81 (Sept. 10, 2001) (noting the complexities inherent in a flat tax). But see
Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The Dubious Link Between Rate and
Base, 85 TAX NOTEs 1177, 1184-85 (Nov. 29, 1999) (conceding that a proposed flat tax
model "would be simpler than current law" because of the change in the individual
tax base, not because of the elimination of graduated tax rates).
10 I.R.C. § 3(a); see also Gale, supra note 9, at 1468; Jerome Kurtz, Two Cheers
for the Income Tax, 90 TAX NOTES 811, 812 (Feb. 5, 2001).
" See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, The Flat Tax is Not a Fair Tax, 20 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 285, 288-91 (1996); John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax,
Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States: A Tax Policy
Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095, 2129-30 (2000);
Richard A. Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 TAX NOTES 731, 735 (Feb. 5, 1996).
1 The Joint Committee on Taxation consists of five members of the Senate
Committee on Finance (three from the Senate's majority party, two from the
minority party) and five members of the House of Representatives Committee on
Ways and Means (three from the House's majority party, two from the minority
party). I.R.C. § 8002(a). The committee has significant powers to obtain data related
to its duties. I.R.C. §8 8021(a), 8023.
13 I.R.C. § 8022(3)(B).
14 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF
THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,




effective date of Section 8022(3)(B). The Joint Committee Report
contains no less than 127 recommendations for simplifying the Code."
The tax simplification movement has continued to gain
momentum." Former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill routinely• 17
listed simplification as a top tax policy objective. Current Treasury
• 18
officials have echoed O'Neill's call for simplification. In 2001, a
15 The Joint Committee Report suggests 127 specific revisions to the Internal
Revenue Code and the repeal of more than 100 "deadwood" provisions that are
outdated or superceded. See 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF
THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986, at 10-33.
16 See Robert L. Ashby et al., TEI, ABA, and AICPA Continue to Call for
Simplification, 94 TAX NOTES 777 (Feb. 11, 2002); Heather Bennett, Lawmakers,
White House Officials Debate Tax Reform, Simplification, 92 TAX NOTES 586 (July
30, 2001); Mortimer M. Caplin, Caplin Calls for Fairness and Simplification in New
Tax Legislation, 90 TAX NOTES 1413 (Mar. 5, 2001); Samuel J. Dimon, Simplification
of the Internal Revenue Code, 95 TAX NOTES 575 (Apr. 22, 2002); Robert Goulder,
ABA Tax Section Meeting - Panel Ponders Simplification of U.S. International
Regime, 91 TAX NOTES 1230 (May 21, 2001); Amy Hamilton, Taxpayer Advocate
Ruminates on New Approach to Code Complexity, 95 TAX NOTES 644 (Apr. 29, 2002);
Amy Hamilton, Treasury Releases First White Paper on Simplification, 95 TAX NOTES
490 (Apr. 22, 2002); Amy Hamilton, Portman Drafting Income Tax Simplification
Bill, 94 TAX NOTES 1082 (Mar. 4, 2002); Philip J. Harmelink & William M.
VanDenburgh, An Analysis of the Treasury's First Proposal for Tax Simplification, 95
TAX NOTES 1824 (June 17, 2002); Kurtz, supra note 10, at 817; Joseph LiPari, The Flat
Tax: Is It Time to Reconsider?, 97 TAX NOTES 1744 (Dec. 30, 2002); Nat'l Ass'n of
Bond Lawyers, Tax Simplification Recommendations to Treasury on Exempt Bonds,
96 TAX NOTES 965 (Aug. 12, 2002); Patti Mohr, Specialists Discuss Simplification in
Light of Bush's Tax Plan, 91 TAX NOTES 867 (May 7, 2001); Pecarich et al., ABA,
AICPA, and TEI Offer Simplification Suggestions, 90 TAX NOTES 1247 (Feb. 26,
2001); Gene Steuerle, What Next if Not Simplification?, 91 TAX NOTES 1755 (June 4,
2001); Tax Code Must Be Simplified, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 23, 2001, at 20; Tom
Herman, Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2001, at Al (quoting Sen. Max Baucus,
chair of the Finance Committee, who said that the simplification is "clearly needed"
because "[t]ax complexity itself is a kind of tax"); Richard W. Stevenson, Bush, After
Gaining Tax Cut, is Taking Aim at Tax Code, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2001, at A-1.
17 See Amy Hamilton, O'Neill Fights For IRS, Simplification, 91 TAX NOTES 716
(Apr. 30, 2001); Stevenson, supra note 16; Press Release PO-209, Office of Public
Affairs, U.S. Treasury Department, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill to the Economic
Club of New York (Apr. 19, 2001), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
po209.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003); Press Release PO-233, Office of Public
Affairs, U.S. Treasury Department, Treasury Statement on the Joint Committee on
Taxation Study on Tax Simplification (Apr. 25, 2001), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po223.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
18 Press Release PO-3701, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Treasury Department,
U.S. Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Pam Olson Remarks to the Tax
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panel of prestigious tax scholars shared thoughts on simplification for
a tax policy workshop sponsored by the New York University School
of Law and Tax Analysts, a leading publishing service for tax
practitioners." The National Taxpayer Advocate cites complexity of
20the tax laws as the most serious problem affecting taxpayers. In the
2002 midterm elections, tax simplification became a significant
rallying cry.21 Indeed, it appears that tax simplification is more en
vogue now than ever before.
Like pet rocks and Cabbage Patch dolls, one can only hope that
this fad, too, shall pass. While the federal tax laws (or any laws, for
that matter) should be no more complex than necessary, this article
will demonstrate that tax complexity is not as bad as political rhetoric
leads us to believe. Specifically, this article advances four arguments.
First, the forces comprising tax complexity are either inevitable or net
beneficial, so calls for simplification are ultimately pointless. 2 Part II
discusses the components of tax complexity and demonstrates thatS 23
complexity is not only inevitable, as others have claimed, but also a
desirable trade-off for other, more important goals, namely fairness
and efficiency.
Second, the alleged harms of tax complexity are either unproven
or overstated, so the need for simplification is questionable. Part III
Executives Institute, New York City, New York (Dec. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po3701.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
19 See Christopher Bergin, Academics Ponder Inequities in Tax Code and What
to Do About Them, 90 TAX NOTES 996 (Feb. 19, 2001).
20 To emphasize the seriousness of the concern over tax complexity, the
National Taxpayer Advocate ranks complexity both first and second in the list of top
twenty taxpayer concerns. Individual tax complexity ranks first and business tax
complexity ranks second. See Amy Hamilton, Tax Law Complexity Ranks 1st - and
2nd - Among Taxpayer Problems, 90 TAX NoTEs 140 (Jan. 8, 2001); News Release
#1R-2001-02, Internal Revenue Service, National Taxpayer Advocate Releases
Annual Report to Congress (Jan. 4, 2001), available at http://www.unclefed.com/Tax-
News/2001/nr01-02.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
21 See Patti Mohr & Warren Rojas, Elections Boost GOP Tax Cut Agenda, 97
TAX NOTES 727 (Nov. 11, 2002); Robert J. Wells, Making the Case for the Keys to the
Car, 97 TAX NOTES 437 (Oct. 28, 2002).
22 The same has been said of simplification proposals in other areas of the law.
See, e.g., R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the
Law Can't Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 718 (2000).
23 Chief among these commentators is Stanley S. Surrey, Complexity and the
Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 673 (1969); see also WITrE, supra note 5, at 370-73; Rob Bennett,
Complexity Happens, 45 TAX NOTES 781 (Nov. 6, 1989); Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform
and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (1974).
[Vol. 22:645
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develops this argument. Like the first argument, however, it depends
upon a critical but simple (pun intended) assumption: that the federal
24tax laws have become more complex over time. In terms of volume,
the mere size of the Code and of regulations promulgated by the
Treasury Department has increased steadily over time,25 and the
number of tax forms and the total amount of lines on these forms
have likewise increased. There have been an increasing number of
taxpayers, which invites more unique cases clamoring for exceptions
from seemingly unfair general rules. Further, as the American
economy has become more global, the Code has become more
26
complicated in response. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 200127 (2001 Act) also contributed to overall tax
complexity, even while simplifying definitional issues with respect to
the earned income tax credit and the income-based phaseout
• . 28
provisions. The assumption of increased tax complexity does not
state that the increased complexity from year to year has been linear
or exponential - such algebraic precision is highly unlikely. It will be
sufficient for purposes of this article that tax complexity increases
over time, no matter the rate of growth.
Third, significant proposals for simplification are flawed because
they either ultimately result in increased complexity or because they
overcorrect for the perceived problem. Part IV examines three
specific proposals contained in the Joint Committee Report: repeal of
the alternative minimum tax, reform of the rules related to the
taxation of capital gains, and repeal of several income-based phaseout
provisions. Part IV concludes that the proposed repeal of the
alternative minimum tax would represent abandonment of important
policy considerations in the name of simplicity. The proposed
restructuring of the capital gains rules, on the other hand, would fail
to achieve simplification and actually increase tax complexity. Only
the proposed repeal of income-based phaseout provisions merits
24 Other commentators use this assumption, which supports its validity. See,
eg., Gale, supra note 9, at 1463; Pollack, supra note 4, at 352.
25 See supra note 7.
26 Subchapter N of the Code, sections 861-999, relates to the U.S. taxation of
nonresident alien individuals and foreign business entities, as well as the U.S. taxation
of its citizens, residents, and domestic entities doing business (or having investment
income from) abroad. See infra Part II.C.2.
27 Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
28 Gale, supra note 9, at 1468. For a more detailed discussion of income-based
phaseouts, see infra Part IV.C. Indeed, perhaps the added complexity brought on by
the 2001 Act represents the dubious lip service Congress gives to simplification.
2003]
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serious consideration, but not because of simplicity. Congress should
eliminate these phaseouts because they cause improper distortions in
vertical equity.
Fourth, simplicity is an overrated policy objective. This
argument, set forth in Part V, goes against the consensus among
scholars that the three most important criteria for evaluating any tax
system (or a particular rule or set of rules within a tax system) are
equity, efficiency, and simplicity.29 Equity and efficiency are laudable
goals, but simplicity is not itself virtuous. Simplicity may be good or
bad, depending upon what results from a simple rule; however, equity
and efficiency are always good. Simplification merely for the sake of
simplicity is neither inherently good nor bad; consequently, simplicity
is at best a questionable policy objective. Further, simplicity is
perhaps best understood as a component of efficiency, another
29 Judge Sneed identified seven qualities of a just tax: (1) adequacy of revenue,
meaning that the tax generates significant revenues and causes taxpayers to pay the
tax sooner rather than later; (2) practicality, his term for simplicity and
administrability; (3) horizontal equity, meaning taxpayers with similar incomes are
taxed alike; (4) stability, meaning that revenues from the tax grow at a constant rate
and do not over-tax in times of recession or under-tax in times of inflation; (5)
reduced economic inequality, his term for "vertical equity," the notion that taxpayers
with more income bear a heavier burden than taxpayers with less income; (6) free
market compatibility, meaning that the tax is relatively unobtrusive in taxpayer
decision models; and (7) political order, a reminder that good tax laws are
constitutional and cognizant of the need for separation of powers. Joseph T. Sneed,
The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 568 (1965). Judge
Sneed himself assigns greatest weight to equity and practicality. Id. at 601.
Other commentators have used all or some of Judge Sneed's criteria in their
own analyses. See, e.g., Gordon T. Butler, The Line Item Veto and the Tax Legislative
Process: A Futile Effort at Deficit Reduction, but a Step Toward Tax Integrity, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 72 (1997); Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 747 (1995); Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and
Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAx L. REV. 265, 273-
77 (1995); David G. Duff, Disability and the Income Tax, 45 McGILL L.J. 797, 804
(2000); Barry M. Freiman, The Japanese Consumption Tax: Value-Added Model or
Administrative Nightmare?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1265, 1283 (1991); Malcolm Gillis et
al., Indirect Consumption Taxes: Common Issues and Differences Among the
Alternative Approaches, 51 TAx L. REV. 725, 727 (1996); Mona L. Hymel, Tax Policy
and the Passive Loss Rules: Is Anybody Listening?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 631 (1998);
Eric A. Lustig, Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax Provisions -
Middle Class Panacea or Placebo? Continuing Problems and Variations on a Theme,
31 AKRON L. REV. 229, 266 (1997); John K. McNulty, supra note 11; H. David
Rosenbloom, From the Bottom Up: Taxing the Income of Foreign Controlled
Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 1525, 1527 (2001); George K. Yin, The Future
Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 141,153 (1999).
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criterion often used in evaluating a tax. By elevating simplicity as a
separate criterion on par with efficiency, simplicity receives too much
attention and other important elements of efficiency do not receive
enough attention. Too much emphasis on one component of
efficiency also minimizes the importance of the components of equity.
The unifying theme of these four arguments is that just as
simplicity is not necessarily good, tax complexity is not necessarily
bad. The objective of this article is not to dismiss all simplification
proposals. Indeed, a number of proposals in the Joint Committee• 30 3
Report are appealing, as are those from other scholars." Instead,
this article trumpets the perspective that complexity may be better
than we believe. No one likes hard laws, but we dislike unfair,
inefficient laws even more. To the extent that many tax simplification
proposals would undermine more legitimate objectives, it is right to
question the need for simplicity.
II. THE COMPONENTS OF TAX COMPLEXITY
The tax laws are complex for a variety of reasons. In some cases,
the causes of complexity are inherent in the economic or political
process. Other components of complexity represent a trade-off for
30 For example, the Joint Committee Report identifies more than 100
"deadwood" provisions of the Code that, while obsolete, have never been deleted
from the Code. 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986, at 579-93 (Joint Comm. Print 2001). As there is no benefit to
retaining outdated laws, Congress should follow the Joint Committee Report's
recommendation to repeal these provisions. In addition, Congress should seriously
consider recommendations that attempt to reconcile conflicting authorities. For
instance, the Joint Committee Report recommends that stock redemptions triggered
by divorce should be taxable to the surviving shareholder unless the parties
specifically agree to tax the redeeming spouse instead. Id. at 265. The
recommendation reconciles conflicts that have emerged between various courts that
have handled the issue. Id. at 263-65. Subsequent to publication of the Joint
Committee Report, Treasury issued proposed regulations that generally adopt the
Joint Committee Report's recommendation. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-2, 66
Fed. Reg. 40,659 (Aug. 3, 2001).
31 See, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, Capitalization: Complexity in Simplicity, 91 TAX
NOTES 1357 (May 28, 2001) (recommending additional official guidance on the
meaning of the term "capital expenditure"); Deborah H. Schenk, Simplification for
Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121 (1989)
(advocating, among other things, a single "support allowance" in lieu of personal
exemptions, the standard deduction, the child credit, and the earned income tax
credit).
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other benefits that outweigh the alleged costs of a more complicated
system. These components of tax complexity make the cries for
simplification ring hollow, despite their intuitive appeal., This part
will address the several components of tax complexity.
A. Inherent Causes of Tax Complexity
Tax complexity is inevitable. There are at least seven
components of tax complexity that will always be present. Some are
the by-product of the American political process and the separation
of powers, while others are a reflection of the complex forces that
produce and shift wealth. To the extent these factors will always
complicate the federal income tax, comprehensive simplification is an
unrealistic aspiration.
1. Using the Tax Laws to Affect Behavior
The federal tax laws do more than raise revenue. It is no secret
that they also influence taxpayer behavior. The many "tax
expenditure" provisions within the Code have little to do with raising
12
revenue or determining the proper tax base. Tax expenditures serve
as indirect subsidies. Congress is willing to forego a portion of the tax
revenues by providing tax benefits as a reward for certain behaviors.
One of the most significant examples, from a revenue standpoint, is
the deduction for "qualified residence interest. ,33  Allowing a
32 The phrase "tax expenditure" is generally attributed to Professor Surrey, who
first conceived that many tax preferences were in fact the equivalent of direct
government payments to the affected taxpayer. See generally STANLEY S. SURREY &
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985). The term is something of a
lightning rod among tax scholars, however, principally because there is no consensus
as to the definition or measurement of tax expenditures. See, e.g., William D.
Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972);
Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS
L.J. 343 (1989); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation
of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986). The debates continue today with as
much fury as ever. See, e.g., Herman P. Ayayo, Tax Expenditures: Useful Economic
Concept or Budgetary Dinosaur?, 93 TAX NOTES 1152 (Nov. 26, 2001); Bruce
Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?, 92 TAX NOTES 413 (July
16, 2001). Without taking sides in these debates, this article uses the term "tax
expenditure" in a most general way: as a reference to any Code provision offering an
exclusion, deduction, or credit as an incentive to engage in (or refrain from) certain
behaviors or transactions.
33 I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D). The Joint Committee estimates that the home
mortgage interest deduction will cost approximately $384.9 billion during the years
[Vol. 22:645
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deduction for interest paid on indebtedness secured by the taxpayer's
principal residence34 is antithetical to the general rule prohibiting
deductions for personal, living, or family expenses.35 Still, the
36deduction is a sacred cow, politically speaking. The express
intention of the deduction is to encourage home ownership,37 and the
national economy reaps the collateral benefits." Another significant
incentive provision is the deduction for charitable contributions.39
2003-2007. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2003-2007, at 20 (Joint Comm. Print 2002). In
other words, if the section 163(h) deduction did not exist, federal revenues would be
increased by $384.9 billion over this five-year period. Again, some scholars would
argue that section 163(h) is not a "tax expenditure" as that term is understood by
them. For purposes of this article, however, the provision is well within the broad
scope of this term. See supra note 32. Others agree that section 163(h)(2)(D) is a
"tax expenditure" provision. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1278.
34 Interest paid on indebtedness used to acquire, construct, or substantially
improve a "qualified residence" is deductible to the extent the amount of such
"acquisition indebtedness" does not exceed $1 million. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D),
(h)(3)(A)(i), (h)(3)(B). Interest paid on indebtedness secured by a "qualified
residence" but not used for acquisition, construction, or substantial improvements is
also deductible to the extent the amount of such "home equity indebtedness" does
not exceed the taxpayer's equity in the qualified residence, or, if less, $100,000.
I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D), (h)(3)(A)(ii), (h)(3)(C). A "qualified residence" means the
taxpayer's principal residence and one other dwelling used as a residence by the
taxpayer. I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A). Thus, mortgage interest with respect to a taxpayer's
regular home and a vacation home may be deductible, provided both homes meet the
statutory definition of a residence.
35 I.R.C. § 262(a). Section 163(h)(1) generally disallows a deduction for
"personal interest," but section 163(h)(2)(D) expressly excepts qualified residence
interest from the definition of personal interest. Because of its specificity to interest,
there is no question that the section 163(h)(2)(D) allowance trumps the general rule
in section 262(a). See generally BORIS I. BITrKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 22-1 (3d ed. 2002).
36 David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L.
REV. 499, 535 (2000).
37 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 263-64 (Joint Comm. Print 1987).
38 Increased home ownership stimulates housing development, which employs
developers, architects, construction workers, and other professionals. It also creates
better job opportunities for real estate agents, title insurance companies, mortgage
officers, and others. See infra note 449 and accompanying text.
39 I.R.C. § 170. The deduction for charitable contributions is also a major tax
expenditure item. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the deduction for
contributions to educational institutions will cost $38.3 billion in lost revenues from
2003-2007. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2003-2007, at 23 (Joint Comm. Print 2002).
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These contributions clearly represent the type of consumption
expenditures that are normally nondeductible, but the charitable
contribution deduction serves to encourage restrained philanthropy.
40
If the Code did not contain these and other tax expenditure
provisions, there is no doubt that it would make more sense and be
simpler to understand and to enforce.41 Tax expenditure provisions
not only contradict fundamental tax principles but in many cases also
require additional computations and additional sets of records. In
order for an individual to claim a charitable contribution deduction,
for example, the individual must compute the applicable
"contribution base" limit 42 and must be able to substantiate
contributions in excess of a de minimis amount.43
There is considerable debate about whether tax expenditures
represent sound tax policy.44 They are hardly efficient in terms of
market neutrality since their very purpose is to influence behavior.
Others have also shown equitable flaws in tax incentive provisions.45
But the propriety of tax expenditures is somewhat beyond the point.
Contributions to health organizations will cost another $27.4 billion. Id. at 25.
Contributions to charities other than educational institutions and health
organizations will cost $182 billion. Id. Therefore, the total projected cost of the
section 170 deduction is $247.7 billion.
40 Because the deduction is limited to a percentage of a taxpayer's "contribution
base" (which for most individuals equates to "adjusted gross income"), I.R.C.
§ 170(b), the deduction encourages limited (but not full-tilt) philanthropy.
41 See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1274; Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Income Tax
Simplification: The Political Process, 34 TAX L. REV. 27 (1978); Pollack, supra note 4,
at 321.
42 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1). Deductions for contributions to certain types of charitable
organizations are allowed to the extent the total amount of such deductions does not
exceed 50% of the taxpayer's "contribution base," generally defined as the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income computed without regard to any net operating loss carrybacks
to the year. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A), (F). Contributions to other charitable
organizations are allowed only to the extent they do not exceed 30% of the
contribution base (or, if less, 50% of the contribution base minus the amount
deductible for payments to charities described in the preceding sentence). I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(1)(B). These percentage limitations are further reduced (from 50% to 30%
and from 30% to 20%) if the contributed property is "capital gain property" and was
held by the donor for more than one year prior to the contribution. I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(1)(C)(i), (b)(1)(D).
43 I.R.C. § 170(f)(8).
44 See supra note 32.
45 For one thing, tax expenditures in the form of deductions benefit those in the
higher tax brackets, meaning that wealthier taxpayers essentially capture the benefits.
See Griffith, supra note 32, at 352-53.
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The fact is that Congress does use the Code to achieve certain social
policies, and this result is almost inevitable. Is there a more effective
way, for instance, to encourage charitable contributions than through
an income tax charitable contribution deduction? Congress could
become extreme and mandate contributions, a state-sanctioned
tithing program. While forced extraction could enhance total
46
charitable contributions, it also may produce an inefficient allocation
of contributions, to say nothing of the political unpopularity that
forced extraction would foster. The charitable income tax deduction,
on the other hand, encourages voluntary contributions without force.
Congress loses some revenues, but Congress bets that charities will
receive more in the form of taxpayer contributions than the financial
support that Congress could otherwise provide to charities. The
amount of deductible charitable contributions over the last several
years suggests that Congress is winning the bet.47  Indeed, to the
extent that the tax deduction is a more effective means to encourage
contributions, we can count on Congress using the Code for other
social policy purposes. In short, tax expenditures are inherent in the
present system because they are effective in altering taxpayer
behavior. Little good results from complaining of the contributions of
tax expenditures to tax complexity because Congress considers
underlying social policy more important than overall tax simplicity.
While it may be politically impossible to eliminate tax
expenditures, it is quite possible to simplify them. The Joint
Committee Report only recommends one relatively minor proposal
for simplifying the tax expenditures:4 adopting a uniform definition of
46 Those not giving now would be forced to give, and taxpayers giving small
amounts might be forced to give larger amounts.
47 In 1999, individuals that itemized deductions claimed $125.8 billion in
deductible charitable contributions. David R. Francis, Debating Change to Rules on
Charitable Deductions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2001, at 17. Given that
total contributions for 2000 amounted to $203 billion, id., it is fair to conclude that the
charitable deduction is likely a significant factor in deciding whether (and how much)
to contribute to charity. Private contributions are essential to the operations of most
charities, as federal subsidies alone would be insufficient. See Community Solutions
Act: Hearing on H.R. 7 Before the House Subcomm. on Human Res. and Subcomm.
on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong.
(2001) (statement of Sara Melendez, President and CEO of Independent Sector),
available at 2001 WL 21756086.
48 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 126
(Joint Comm. Print 2001).
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"qualified higher education expenses" for purposes of the various
education tax incentives,' 9 qualified state tuition programs, ° and
educations IRAs." Current proposals for simplification do not mean
that the Joint Committee sees no possibility for the simplification of
tax expenditures. The Joint Committee purposefully avoided any
simplification proposals that would affect the policies underlying the
52
current rule. The absence of significant recommendations to
simplify tax expenditures suggests that Congress cannot simplify them
without impacting their effectiveness. There is no doubt that the
present tax expenditures reflect a careful balance of budget
reconciliation, the positive externalities sought by proponents,
political compromise, and other factors. Simplifying these rules for
the sake of simplicity will likely upset this balance. Since tax
expenditures work,53 this source of tax complexity is not only
49 There are two nonrefundable tax credits for "qualified tuition and related
expenses:" (1) the Hope Scholarship Credit (a credit of up to $1500 annually per
student for such expenses paid for the first two years of the student's post-secondary
education in a degree or certificate program); and (2) the Lifetime Learning Credit (a
credit equal to 20% of such expenses paid on behalf of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's
spouse, or any dependents, but not to exceed $2000). I.R.C. § 25A. In lieu of these
credits, a taxpayer can deduct up to $3000 of such expenses, provided the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income does not exceed $65,000 (or $130,000 in the case of a married
couple filing a joint return). I.R.C. § 222.
50 I.R.C. § 529. Qualified state tuition programs allow participants to purchase
tuition credits or certificates on behalf of a designated beneficiary. These credits or
certificates may then be exchanged by the beneficiary for a waiver of qualified higher
education expenses. Alternatively, participants in a qualified state tuition program
can make contributions to a savings account plan that will be used to pay such
expenses of the designated beneficiary. Contributions to a qualified state tuition
program are not deductible, but earnings on such contributions are not taxed until
withdrawal, if at all.
51 I.R.C. § 530. A trust or custodial account created in the United States
exclusively for the purpose of paying qualified higher education expenses of a
designated beneficiary will be treated as an "education IRA." Contributions to the
education IRA are not deductible and may not exceed $2000 annually per beneficiary
except in limited cases involving rollovers. The $2000 limit is subject to an income-
based phaseout. No contributions are allowed with respect to a designated
beneficiary that has attained age 18. To the extent amounts distributed from an
education IRA do not exceed the beneficiary's qualified higher education expenses,
such distributions are not subject to income taxation.
52 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 9.
53 And those that do not work can be made to work (through modification and
amendment) or eliminated. For instance, when Congress determined that
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inevitable but also acceptable.
2. Frequent Changes to the Tax Laws
Every time the Code changes, both taxpayers and the Service
must adapt to the change. For a taxpayer, this means learning the
new law (or paying a professional to learn the new law), analyzing its
impact on the taxpayer's own situation, adjusting recordkeeping
procedures as necessary, and altering planning decisions as
warranted 4 For the Service, it means retraining employees, adapting
computer software, and revising forms and publications made
available to taxpayers.55 All of these adaptations require the use of
important resources, usually time and money. If the tax laws did not
change frequently, compliance with (and enforcement of) the federal
tax laws would be much easier. 6
The tax laws, however, do change quite rapidly. In the last forty-
seven years, Congress has enacted more than 500 public laws that
made one or more significant changes to the Code.57 The relevant
question, therefore, is whether change is endemic. If so, then the
complexity caused by frequent change is also endemic and unsolvable.
The Joint Committee Report notes that the rate of Congressional
accelerated depreciation deductions provided an insufficient stimulus to purchase
depreciable assets, Congress provided the bonus depreciation rule of section 179. See
generally BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (3d ed.
1964) at 296-97. Under section 179, a taxpayer can automatically expense (up to a
prescribed limit) the cost of acquiring tangible, depreciable property used
predominantly in the taxpayer's trade or business.
54 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 103-
08. These costs are exacerbated when Congress retroactively repeals a new Code
provision, as when section 89, introduced in 1986, was repealed in 1989 and the repeal
was made retroactive to 1986. Id. at 64; see also Linda A. Schwartzstein, Smoke and
Mirrors: Tax Legislation, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 61, 67-68 (1996).
55 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 110-
111.
56 See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1277.
57 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,





changes has been relatively constant since 1954 . Such a steady rate
of change suggests that constant tinkering with the Code is an
accepted procedure.
In theory, frequent changes to the tax laws are not inevitable.
Congress could exercise more restraint in amending the Code if it
chose. Given the significant turnover in Congress every two years
and an economic climate that has only known rapid change, 9 it is
unlikely that any Congress could resist implementing reforms that in
its judgment will improve the Code in some way. More cynically, one
might conclude that Congress regularly tinkers with the Code to keep
campaign contributions flowing.60 With respect to tax legislation, the
old axiom is true: the only constant is change. Congress will never
cure the complexity caused by change.
3. Complexity in the Economy
It is often said that the Code is complex because American
society and its economy are complex. 6' A simple Code would be
ineffective for more than 200 million taxpayers engaged in a wide
variety of business, investment, and personal activities. 62Similarly,
since the federal income tax raises such significant revenues, one
should expect complex rules. Professor Deborah Paul theorized that
as a tax produces more revenues, complexity increases. She
demonstrated this link by showing that states with the highest tax
revenues have a higher volume of tax laws. 6' At the federal level,
individual and corporate income taxes (which comprise about 89% of
total federal tax revenues 64) consume a far greater volume of law than
excise taxes, customs duties, and wealth transfer taxes. The Code is
58 Id.
'9 See infra Part II.A.3.
60 Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 926-45 (1987).
61 See Sheldon S. Cohen, Taming the Tax Code, 68 TAX NOTES 1495 (Sept. 18,
1995); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 465, 519 (1987); McCaffery,
supra note 5, at 1275; Pollack, supra note 4, at 335-36; Surrey, supra note 23, at 686.
62 See Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws: The
Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV.
403, 408-09 (1997).
63 Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can
Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151,173-74 (1997).
64 Id. at 175. This percentage is based upon total tax revenues for 1993.
65 Id. at 173-75.
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complicated because of the significant revenues it produces. No set of
general rules will come as close to achieving equity and efficiency as
the current Code, even if the current Code is a far cry from the ideal.
As long as society changes and the economy becomes more
sophisticated, so too should the Code.66
4. The Certainty Trade-Off
It is fair to demand certainty from the tax laws. Uncertain tax
laws can unreasonably delay or even prevent efficient transactions in
the marketplace. Uncertain tax laws are also easier to manipulate,
which can work to the detriment of the government or taxpayers,
depending on which side does the manipulating. Tax advisers are
especially hungry for certainty and guidance because their mistakes
can be quite costly. Even the government benefits from certainty
because certain laws are easier to administer.
Certainty comes at the cost of complexity. If Congress wants to
create certainty, it must write lengthy, technical statutes. If Congress
wants the Treasury Department to provide certainty, it authorizes
legislative regulations, and even when Treasury promulgates
clarifying regulations, they can be lengthy and technical.68 Also, when
66 For the opposite viewpoint, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
COMPLEX WORLD 21 (1995).
67 In too many cases, "when" should be replaced by "if." Treasury is generally
slow to promulgate legislative regulations. For example, section 736(b)(1) generally
provides that payments received by a partner in exchange for the partner's interest in
the partnership will be treated as distributions and not as guaranteed payments or
distributive shares. Under section 736(b)(2), however, such payments allocable to
goodwill or to unrealized receivables of the partnership are not subject to the general
rule. In 1993, Congress added section 736(b)(3) to the Code. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13262(a), 107 Stat. 312, 541. This
provision limited the (b)(2) exception to those cases where capital is not a material
income-producing factor for the partnership and where the retiring or deceased
partner was a general partner. Treasury has long planned to issue regulations
regarding the latter requirement (that the retiring or deceased partner be a general
partner), but to date has not done so. Geologically speaking, of course, ten years is
the equivalent of a blinking eye, but over these ten years, taxpayers and their advisers
can only guess at Treasury's likely application of this limitation. This, too,
contributes to complexity.
68 For example, the legislative regulations pursuant to section 1502 (relating to
consolidated returns filed by an affiliated group of corporations) consume 218 pages
of single-spaced, dual-column text in 4 FEDERAL TAX REGULATIONS 1049-267 (West
2002) (containing Treasury Regulations 1.1502-0 to 1.1502-100). Even interpretive
regulations promulgated under the general authority of section 7805 can be lengthy
and technical. See, e.g., 3 FEDERAL TAX REGULATIONS 559-630 (West 2002)
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Treasury issues proposed regulations, taxpayers and tax professionals
sometimes demand additional clarity.
Consider this recent example. Section 121 of the Code allows
taxpayers to exclude up to $250,000 of realized gain from the sale of a
residence. 69 The statute imposes two requirements for this exclusion:
first, the taxpayer claiming the exclusion must have owned and used
the property as the taxpayer's principal residence for two of the five
years prior to the sale;70 and second, the taxpayer may not claim the
exclusion more than once every two years.71 Nonetheless, the statute
confers a partial exclusion to taxpayers who do not meet the
requirements for the full exclusion but who sell their homes because
of "a change in place of employment, health, or, to the extent
provided in regulations, unforeseen circumstances.7 2 When Treasury
issued proposed regulations for Section 121 in October 2000,"3
however, the proposed regulations gave no indication as to what
would constitute "unforeseen circumstances," saying only that the
Service would apply the term as defined "in forms, instructions, or
other appropriate guidance including regulations and letter rulings."74
Not surprisingly, many public comments and other correspondence
filed with Treasury have asked for more certainty on the definition of
"unforeseen circumstances."75
(containing interpretive Treasury Regulations 1.704-1 to 1.704-4, detailing partner's
distributive share of partnership tax items and spanning seventy-one pages of single-
spaced, dual-column text).
69 I.R.C. § 121(a). Married taxpayers filing a joint return can in many cases
exclude up to $500,000 of realized gain from the sale of their residence. See I.R.C.
§ 121(b)(2).
70 I.R.C. § 121(a).
71 I.R.C. § 121(b)(3).
72 I.R.C. § 121(c).
73 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1 to 1.121-4, 65 Fed. Reg. 60,136 (Oct. 10, 2000),
corrected by 66 Fed. Reg. 14,512 (Mar. 13, 2001).
74 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(a), 65 Fed. Reg. 60136, 60140.
75 See, e.g., ABA Tax Section Members Suggest Changes to Proposed Regs on
Excluding Gain from Sale of Principal Residence, 91 TAx NOTES 1242 (May 21, 2001)
(ABA Tax Section suggesting inclusion of several unspecified personal situations as
examples of "unforeseen circumstances"); Change in Marital Status Should Be an
'Unforeseen Circumstance,' CPA Says, 90 TAx NOTES 595 (Jan. 29, 2001) (seeking
"change in marital status" generally to qualify as unforeseen change in
circumstances); Divorce is an 'Unforeseen Circumstance,' Writer Says, 90 TAX NOTES
52 (Jan. 1, 2001) (requesting addition of divorce); Professor Asks for Clarification of
Proposed Residence Sale Regs, 90 TAX NOTES 1320 (Mar. 5, 2001) (seeking general
clarification of "unforeseen circumstances"); Realtors Suggest Expanding 'Unforeseen
Circumstances' Test of Home Sale Exclusion Regs, 90 TAx NOTES 750 (Feb. 5, 2001)
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Here we come to one of the great dilemmas of tax complexity. In
response to the voluminous comments seeking more certainty, the
Treasury Department had two options: define the term "unforeseen
circumstances" in the final regulations in an attempt to achieve
certainty or continue with the phrasing in the proposed regulations.76
If it clarified the definition in the final regulations, the regulations
would be more complex. Such complexity we can call "mass
complexity" because it would add to the burden of many taxpayers;
since the regulations would be longer and more technical, taxpayers
would have to spend additional time determining whether and to
what extent the additional provisions apply.77 Many tax professionals
would read the regulations due to the demand on professionals to stay
current with the tax laws. Even less diligent tax professionals would
encounter the final regulations as their clients sell their homes.
Conversely, if Treasury stuck with the language in the proposed
regulations, the lingering uncertainty would create what we can call
"specific complexity," since the complexity of the proposed
regulations would affect only those taxpayers who face a specific
situation that may or may not be an "unforeseen circumstance."
Those taxpayers would have to seek a ruling,78 often at significant
(seeking to include health of a family member as "unforeseen circumstance" in
addition to divorce and unemployment); Writer Asks for Residence Gain Exclusion
Help for Newlyweds, 90 TAX NOTES 1622 (Mar. 19, 2001) (requesting "unforeseen
circumstance" rule for newlyweds who each sell homes because of marriage); Writer
Questions Applicability of Regs on Excluding Gain from Sale of Principal Residence,
92 TAX NOTES 1408 (Sept. 10, 2001) (questioning whether voluntary changes in
employment qualify for partial exclusion); Writer Seeks Clarification of Proposed
Residence Sale Regs, 91 TAx NOTES 907 (May 7, 2001) (asking Treasury to include
divorce and unemployment as "unforeseen circumstances"); Writers Seek Changes to
Proposed Residence Sale Regs, 90 TAX NOTES 320 (Jan. 15, 2001) (suggesting military
service away from home as yet another unforeseen circumstance). This battle for
certainty between practitioners and the Treasury Department is what Professor
McCaffery calls "dynamic complexity." See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1275-76.
76 Professor Miller calls the first option the "elaboration approach" to rule
making and the second option the "social context approach" to rule making. John A.
Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the
Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1993). Miller observes that the
elaboration approach is the "modern trend in rule making." Id. at 17. Nevertheless,
he finds the social context approach preferable. Id. at 77-78.
77 See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1291.
78 Taxpayers can receive an advance ruling from the Service with respect to the
federal income tax treatment of a certain transaction. These "private letter rulings"
do not bind the Service with respect to other taxpayers and may not be cited as
precedent before the United States Tax Court. GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND, FEDERAL
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cost,79 for certainty. If those taxpayers do not obtain a ruling and
claim the partial exclusion, they run a risk that the Service will assess
a deficiency and force the taxpayer to spend extra resources to defend
the claimed exclusion. If the taxpayer loses before the Service and
even the courts, the taxpayer would pay interest on the deficiency
so
and also, in some cases, a penalty. 8'
So what should Treasury have done? Should it have clarified the
term "unforeseen circumstances" in the final regulations and created
mass complexity, or should it have left the term undefined and
created specific complexity? The normative answer is beyond the
scope of this article.8 In fact, Treasury chose both options.
Temporary regulations issued in December 2002 offer a general rule
that an unforeseen circumstance is "an event that the taxpayer does
not anticipate before purchasing and occupying the residence."'83 The
general rule preserves specific complexity. Taxpayers selling a home
due to a change in circumstances will have to determine whether the
general rule will grant them a partial exclusion of the gain resulting
from the sale. The temporary regulations then list seven specific
events that the Treasury will deem to be unforeseen circumstances for
purposes of the partial exclusion. 4  These events include: the
involuntary conversion of the residence; casualties resulting from
disasters, acts of war, or terrorism; divorce or separation; and even
multiple births resulting from the same pregnancy.85 By adding these
safe harbors, the regulations also create mass complexity, for the
regulations are longer and introduce additional terms that might
become the source of further ambiguity.
This is just one example. In practice, Treasury often alternates
TAx RESEARCH 62 (4th ed. 1990). If the Service decides to issue a ruling binding on
all taxpayers, it will disguise the name of the taxpayer and other private facts and
issue its conclusion as a "revenue ruling." Id. at 59.
'9 See Rev. Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1 IRB 1, 60 app. A (fee charged depends upon
type of request and affluence of taxpayer, and can range from $275 to $6000 for a
single ruling).
so See I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6621, 6622.
81 See I.R.C. § 6662 (accuracy and negligence or disregard of rules and
regulations penalty); see also I.R.C. §§ 6651 (delinquency penalty), 6663 (civil fraud
penalty), 6672 (attempt to evade tax penalty), 6673 (penalty for delay or frivolous
court proceedings).
For one answer to this question, see Miller, supra note 76, at 22-23 (favoring
specific complexity).
83 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3T(e)(1) (2002).
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3T(e)(2).
85 id.
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between specific complexity and mass complexity, and sometimes (as
here) manages to infuse both forms of complexity. The preference
for one model over another is certainly worthy of further discussion.
The more important point here is that both certain laws and uncertain
laws will add to tax complexity. Certain laws will create mass
complexity, and uncertain laws will create specific complexity. That
Treasury uses both mass complexity and specific complexity perhaps
only shows that both are undesirable. Yet one or the other is
inevitable. Proponents of simplification must concede that by
86
reducing one type of complexity, they are enhancing the other.
5. Judicial Gloss
Like every other body of law, the Code and regulations are
subject to judicial construction. In construing the Code and
regulations, courts necessarily create new rules. When, for instance,
the Code simply defines gross income as "all income from whatever
source derived,, 87 the courts must determine what constitutes
"income" and then apply that working definition to the cases before
them. The judiciary thus becomes another source of primary
authority, adding to tax complexity. Our bias for the common law
tradition, however, persuades us to accept this component of
complexity gladly.
6. The Tax Base
An income tax is inevitably complex because there is no simple
definition of "income" and no simple way to measure it. As a result,
the actual tax base always reflects a "second-best" approach, and
further attempts to conform the tax base to any ideal model produces
more rules that further complicate the law. 88 A common definition
states that income is the sum of a person's consumption and the
increase in that person's net worth over a certain period.89 However,
86 Professor Miller argues that mass complexity creates "indeterminacy" in the
federal tax laws to the extent that it actually sacrifices fairness and undermines the
overall certainty of the Code. Miller, supra note 76, at 27.
87 I.R.C. § 61(a). The syntax and diction in section 61(a) mirrors that of the
Sixteenth Amendment, which authorizes the federal income tax. By using the same
phrasing, Congress intends to exercise the full capacity of its power to tax income.
Paul, supra note 63, at 163; Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be
Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1109 (1980); see also Gale, supra note
9, at 1465.
89 This is the so-called "Haig-Simons" definition of income. See Robert M.
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simple bases for measuring terms like "consumption" and "net
worth" are insufficient.
Currently, the Code indirectly measures "consumption" by
adding most receipts into the tax base and subtracting most
nonconsumption expenses. 9° The excess roughly resembles amounts
consumed. Several authors have criticized this imperfect approach,91
but any feasible measurement method will have flaws. We could, for
instance, measure consumption based on credit card charges. This is
a reasonable standard from a vertical equity standpoint assuming
high-volume consumers incur more credit card charges than low-
volume consumers. Credit card charges would be an easy
measurement standard - such charges are relatively simple to trace
and to verify.92 For obvious reasons, the use of credit card charges is a
poor measure of consumption. For one thing, not all high-volume
consumers use credit cards. Also, more affluent consumers might be
able to pay with cash more easily than poorer consumers - thus
shifting more of the tax burden to less affluent taxpayers. Less
affluent taxpayers may be more likely to use credit cards than wealthy
taxpayers because they lack the resources to make immediate
payment on purchased items. Further, a tax measured by credit card
charges would tend to cause taxpayers to use credit cards less
frequently in order to reduce their tax burdens. In order to be
effective, consumption would have to account for other payment
systems - necessarily increasing the complexity of the measurement.
To the extent the standard for consumption is easily avoided by a
Haig, The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS'N,
READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S.
Shoup eds., 1959); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE
DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).
90 See I.R.C. §§ 61(a) (gross income defined as "all income, from whatever
source derived"), 161 (permitting only deductions specifically authorized), 162(a)
(allowing deduction for expenses paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business),
212 (allowing deduction for expenses paid or incurred in the production or collection
of income, or for the maintenance of property held for the production or collection of
income, or for the determination or refund of any tax), 262 (disallowing deductions
for personal, living, or family expenses).
91 Most prominent among these authors is probably William D. Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1128-
1140 (1974); see also Warren, supra note 88, at 1109-1120.
92 Indeed, the federal government could even withhold tax on every credit card




change in taxpayer behavior (paying with cash or check instead of
credit card), the standard would have to change to make sure that
revenues from the tax were constant. As others have argued,




As hard as it is to define "consumption" in a satisfactory way, it is
even more difficult to find an adequate measure for the change in a
taxpayer's "net worth," the other component of income.94
Theoretically, increases in net worth are subject to measurement. For
taxpayers with assets other than cash and marketable securities,
measuring change in net worth would require annual appraisals. The
annual appraisal method is too burdensome, although an annual
mark-to-market for all assets might be conceptually easier to
comprehend. It is also flawed because it would force taxpayers with
illiquid but appreciating assets to dispose of the illiquid assets in order
to pay the resulting tax liability. Further, the need for several
appraisals could promote disputes between taxpayers and the
Service." To increase convenience and liquidity, the taxpayer may
defer payment of tax liability until the appreciated illiquid asset is
sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed. Practitioners know this as the
rule of "realization." To use the vernacular, no income from
appreciating assets occurs until the gains are realized. RealizationS 96
was at first a constitutional requirement. Over time, though, the
93 See Paul, supra note 63, at 164-169. The need to complicate the laws in order
to make them consistent with their true intent is reflected in the alternative minimum
tax. See infra Part IV.A.
94 This explains why some commentators advocate the substitution of a pure
consumption tax for the current income tax. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 4, at 352-55.
A consumption tax would be simpler than the current income tax in the sense that
there would be no need to compute the change in a taxpayer's net worth.
95 In the estate and gift tax arena, valuation disputes are quite common. For
recent examples, see, e.g., Gross v. Commissioner, 272 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2002);
Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner, 267 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2001); Knight v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. 506 (2000); Estate of Strangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478
(2000), rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002); Estate of Weinberg v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1507 (2000); Estate of Dunn v. Commissioner, 79
T.C.M. (CCH) 1337 (2000), rev'd, 301 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2002); Estate of Smith v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 745 (1999); Estate of Hendrickson v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 322 (1999); Kaufman v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1779 (1999), rev'd sub nom. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 243 F.3d 1145 (9th
Cir. 2001); Estate of Mellinger v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 26 (1999); Estate of
Simplot v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 130 (1999), rev'd, 249 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2001).
96 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (stock dividend is not gross income
to a shareholder because the dividend adds no wealth and the shareholder has no
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Supreme Court itself realized that realization was not a constitutional
prerequisite to income. 97  Eventually, the Court completely
diminished the constitutional significance of realization, referring to it
as a mere rule of "administrative convenience.,
98
The rule of convenience is well entrenched in the modern Code.
Congress codified the realization rule with respect to all sales and
exchanges of property.99 Congress then added several exceptions to
the realization requirement.'0 These "nonrecognition" rules provide
amnesty from taxation even though there is concededly a measurable
increase in the taxpayer's net worth and even though the liquidity
notions supporting deferral are absent.01 Consequently, the "rule of
convenience" has made the measurement of net worth at least as
severable benefit). The specific holding of Macomber is codified in section 305(a),
but is subject to several statutory exceptions. See I.R.C. § 305(b).
97 Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (tenant improvements to property
are income to landlord upon repossession). Bruun was overruled by Congress
through the enactment of section 109. Section 109 excludes the value of the tenant
improvements from the landlord's gross income. Ultimately, however, the
improvements are taxed to the landlord upon a taxable sale or exchange of the
improved property, because section 1019, enacted at the same time as section 109,
prevents the landlord from adding the value of the improvements to the landlord's
basis in the property.
98 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940) (interest coupons from
negotiable bonds gifted to child were taxable income to parent).
99 I.R.C. § 1001.
100 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 121 (exclusion of up to $250,000 of gain - $500,000 for
couples filing a joint return - on sale of personal residence), 351 (no gain or loss
recognized on transfer of property to a corporation in exchange for stock, so long as
transferor(s) control the corporation immediately after the exchange), 721 (no gain
or loss recognized on the transfer of property to a partnership in exchange for an
interest in the partnership), 1031 (no gain or loss recognized on exchange of "like-
kind" property), 1033 (no gain or loss recognized on an exchange caused by an
involuntary conversion such as condemnation, casualty, or theft), 1041 (no gain or
loss recognized on property transfers between spouses, or between ex-spouses if the
transfer is incident to the divorce).
101 If a taxpayer sells an asset to a willing buyer, liquidity is not a concern. If the
buyer pays with another illiquid asset, the taxpayer could be forced to sell the new
asset to pay tax. But this forced sale occurs in most cases because the taxpayer was
willing to trade the original asset. If the taxpayer has adequate notice that the
exchange will be taxable, the need to liquidate the acquired asset will be a bargaining
point between the taxpayer and the buyer. For example, the taxpayer may insist on
additional liquid consideration in order to pay the tax resulting from the exchange.
This analysis does not apply to the involuntary conversion of an asset because of
condemnation, casualty, or theft. In those cases, nonrecognition of gain - subject to
the limitations already set forth in section 1033 - is proper because in theory the
taxpayer was never a willing party to the exchange.
2003] Tax Simplification
complicated conceptually as the original concept that would require
periodic appraisals.
102
Measurement methods for both components of income
(consumption and increased net worth) have proven to be inexact at
best. Complexity is necessary to find the appropriate balance
between feasibility and the ideal definitions of both components.
Even where simplicity triumphed over equity, as with the realization
concept, subsequent refinements to the rule have added complexity.
Thus, the resulting complexities are inevitable.
7. The Legislative Process
Legislators are human, susceptible to influence and far from
omniscient. Special interests, therefore, can capture some tax laws.
There is no other way to explain some of the distinctions contained in
the Code. Farmers disposing of livestock can in some cases qualify
the resulting gains for preferential tax rates, but similar dispositions of
poultry can never qualify. °3  As previously discussed, taxpayers
engaged in certain business activities receive preferential treatment
with respect to many tax items.1'04 Other tax laws not captured by
102 See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 6, at 818 (noting the many complexities caused
by the realization doctrine, including loss restrictions, disparate treatment of capital
gains, constructive sale rules, and nonrecognition rules); Anthony P. Polito, Fiddlers
on the Tax: Depreciation of Antique Instruments Invites Reexamination of Broader
Tax Policy, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 87, 100-101 (1996) (depreciation deductions
complicated by realization doctrine); Snoe, supra note 6, at 75-76 (taxpayers' ability
to manipulate realization doctrine has created complicated loss limitation, carryover,
and characterization rules); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and
Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1633-1637 (1999) (noting
complexity realization causes for policymakers). But see Edward A. Zelinsky, For
Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable
Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. .861, 947-956 (1997) (arguing that application of
traditional realization doctrine would simplify the taxation of new financial
instruments).
103 I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3). If a taxpayer holds cattle or horses for draft, breeding,
dairy, or sporting purposes for twenty-four months or more, gain from the sale or
exchange of the cattle or horses may qualify for the preferential tax rates applicable
to long-term capital gains. I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). With respect to other livestock
(but not poultry) held for similar purposes, the holding period to obtain preferential
tax rates is only twelve months. I.R.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
104 See supra Part II.A.1. Other facially neutral statutes may have an impure
origin. Professor Graetz notes that certain taxpayers obtained tax benefits in years
when related political action committees made significant contributions or gifts for
the benefit of members of the congressional tax-writing committees. MICHAEL J.
GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX: WHAT IT IS, How IT GOT THAT WAY, AND WHERE
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special interests are sometimes poorly written because legislators lack
the time and expertise required to write a law that serves its
immediate purpose and coordinates with other Code provisions.'0 5 As
a result, Congress or Treasury must routinely correct for technical
errors and sometimes amend new provisions after enactment to
harmonize old and new laws.' 6 The complexity resulting from
interest group capture and poor drafting cannot be cured by any
proposals for simplification. Even where special interests have not
entirely captured a tax benefit, legislators must strike compromises
that balance the needs of the special interests against opposing forces,
and this too makes tax laws more complicated)°7
This cause of tax complexity may not be as significant as the
others, for the political process can create both simpler and more
complex rules. For example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 has been
described as logrolling between special interests seeking low tax rates
and those seeking a more comprehensive tax base.' ° If that is true,
then to the extent the 1986 Act simplified the Code (by reducing the
number of tax brackets and eliminating many tax preferences) and
made it more complex (by enacting restrictions on the deductibility of
passive losses, for instance), the logrolling process is no more likely to
produce complex laws than simple laws. 0 9
WE GO FROM HERE 289-90 (1999).
105 See Roger A. McEowen, Recent Developments in Estate Planning Impacting
Farmers and Ranchers, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 57, 58 (2000) (describing the need for
technical corrections to the exclusion for "qualified family-owned business interests,"
now codified as a deduction - not an exclusion - in section 2057).
106 See Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and
Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L. REV. 413, 429 (1999) ("Bear
in mind that technical correction legislation is always possible to cure unintended
consequences of legislative inadvertence or sloppy drafting.").
Indeed, technical correction legislation is quite common. For just a few of the
many examples, see, e.g., Tax Technical Corrections Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§§ 6001-24, 112 Stat. 685, at 790-826; Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342; Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365 (1983).
107 McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1300.
108 Id. at 1304.
109 Of course, the use of logrolling to simplify the tax laws assumes that there is a
constituency rolling the log to achieve simplification. Until recently, this constituency
was thought to be absent. See WITrE, supra note 5, at 372; McCaffery, supra note 5,
at 1307. Most likely, simplification could be achieved only by a similar union of
simplification and tax cut proponents. Gale, supra note 9, at 1469; Warren Rojas,
Simplification Still Not a Priority, Panelists Say, 91 TAx NOTEs 1211 (May 21, 2001).
As noted earlier, however, much of the simplification achieved by the 1986
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In addition, Congress lacks the ability to test Code provisions
before enactment. Instead, taxpayers serve as testers, and many of
them search for loopholes and other structural defects in the Code to
exploit. If the resulting tax schemes succeed, then Congress must
legislate once again to solve the problem. This, in turn, adds to the
complexity of the income tax. n° For instance, many of the corporate
income tax rules in Subchapter C of the Code are reactions to
successful taxpayer plans to thwart double taxation,"' the signature
feature of the corporate income tax regime."' If taxpayers did not
seek out and exploit bugs in the Code, then legislative patches would
be unnecessary. Due to the high stakes frequently involved,
taxpayers have an incentive to enter into transactions designed only
to avoid or reduce tax liabilities."' Increasing audit rates might deter
some taxpayers from engaging in tax avoidance schemes,"4 but even
in the past when audit rates were higher, many taxpayers were
content to take their chances in the "audit lottery..'".5 Simplification
Act was lost in a few short years. For example, preferential rates for net capital gains
were restored in 1990. See infra Part IV.B.
110 See generally Gale, supra note 9, at 1466; McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1276,
1278.
i Corporations are taxable entities subject to federal income tax on their
"taxable incomes." I.R.C. § 11. After-tax distributions of corporate earnings and
profits are included the gross incomes of shareholders. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c)(1).
Thus, corporate earnings and profits are typically taxed twice: once at the corporate
level and a second time upon distribution to shareholders. If the corporation
liquidates, assets received by the shareholders in exchange for their stock are also
included in gross income. I.R.C. § 331. Thus even the death of the corporation
cannot evade the double-tax regime. For more on double taxation, see BORIS I.
BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS T 1.03 (7th ed. 2001).
12 See generally McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1276-77 & n. 37. Of course, the
current President Bush has proposed elimination of the double tax by excluding most
dividends paid from previously-taxed earnings. See Kristi O'Brien, Challenges and
Changes Keep Big Money Practices in the Bank, CHI. LAWYER, Apr. 2003, at 8. To
the extent this effort succeeds, subchapter C will lose its uniqueness.
113 See Miller, supra note 76, at 13-15.
14 For the arguments in support of increasing audit rates, see Jay A. Soled,
Unmasking and Deterring Congressional and Taxpayer Opportunism, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 205 (1998). See also Sheldon S. Cohen, The Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before
the Annual Meeting of the American College of Tax Counsel (Jan. 10, 1997), in 14
AM. J. TAX POL'Y 113, 117 (1997).
11 Several of the "fixes" in the corporate tax arena came into the Code in an era
of relatively high enforcement rates. Current audit rates for corporations are at
record low levels. In 2001, 0.89% of all corporate tax returns were audited, compared
to 1.07% in 2000, 1.51% in 1999, 2.04% in 1998, and 2.62% in 1997. See
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proponents must consider possible bugs in their proposals; otherwise
they will inevitably cause the return (and likely growth) of
complexity.
B. Complexity in the Name of Net Efficiency
Strange as it sounds, complexity can facilitate efficiency.
Sometimes laws that are difficult to understand can prove easier to
apply and to enforce than simple rules. Complex statutes and the
delegation of quasi-legislative powers to Treasury and the Service can
enhance the overall administrability of the tax laws.
1. Difficult Statutory Provisions
One cannot pick up the Code and, like a summer novel, gain an
understanding by thumbing through its pages from start to finish.
There is no question that the Code makes for slow reading (and in
many cases, re-reading). 6  Yet the calls to make the Code more
reader-friendly" 7 forget that the Code's intended audience is not the
lay taxpayer. Congress does not write any statute, tax or otherwise,
with the intention that every person affected by the statute will read
and comprehend it. 1 8 Congress knows that legal professionals will
most likely be the persons to read the text and interpret it for their
clients. As a result, Congress can make limited use of technical jargon
for purposes of brevity and to avoid both redundancy and excessive
use of cross-references. For example, the Code contains the phrase
"trade or business," one that must seem redundant to the untrained
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Syracuse University, IRS District
Audits of Federal Income Tax Returns Filed by Corporations, at http://www.trac.syr.
edu/tracirs/findings/national/audpctcompare-corp.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
Although there appears to be no similar data prior to 1992, scholars have noted
significantly higher audit rates in the 1960s and 1970s. See generally Jeffrey A. Dubin
et al., Penny-Wise and Pound-Foolish: New Estimates of the Impact of Audits on
Revenue, in SELECTED READINGS ON TAX POLICY: 25 YEARS OF TAX NOTES 387
(Charles Davenport ed., 1997).
116 See 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL
STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 59-
60 (Joint Comm. Print 2001). But the same can be said of many great literary works.
Has anyone breezed through Beowulf, The Canterbury Tales, or War and Peace?
117 See Pollack, supra note 4, at 358; Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some
Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (1992) ("The Internal Revenue
Code is probably the leading example of technical rules.").
118 See Miller, supra note 76, at 36.
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reader, in 321 different sections."9 Since it appears so often, the
attentive (though untrained) reader eventually realizes that the
phrase must have some unique meaning. When the reader searches
the Code for a definition of "trade or business," however, the result is
fruitless. Even the Treasury Regulations fail to provide a definition
of the term. Tax professionals, though, understand what "trade or
business" implies, as the concept has been litigated fairly
extensively.' 20 Tax experts know, for instance, that in order for an
activity to constitute a "trade or business," the taxpayer must have a
profit motive and be engaged in the activity on a regular basis.' Tax
experts also realize that because the term is undefined, Congress does
not intend to give it sharp boundaries. 122  Thus, an activity may
123
constitute a trade or business to one taxpayer but not to another.
Similarly, an activity may start as something other than a trade or
124business but over time evolve into a trade or business. If tax experts
119 LEXIS, Fedtax Library, Code File (searched on Jan. 14, 2003). See
Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987) (noting that the term appeared
"in over 50 sections and 800 subsections and in hundreds of places in proposed and
final income tax regulations" at that time). A search in the Westlaw database found
the phrase "trade or business" in only 265 Code sections. Westlaw Search, database
"USC," query "PR, CA ("Title 26") and TE ("Trade or Business")" (searched on
Jan. 14, 2003). The discrepancy between the LEXIS and Westlaw searches is a
concern, but regardless of which is more accurate, the point remains that the phrase
"trade or business" is quite common in the Code.
120 For a comprehensive discussion of the many cases analyzing whether the
taxpayer was engaged in a "trade or business," see James Edward Maule, Trade or
Business Expenses and For-Profit Activity Deductions, [1999] 505-2 Tax Mgmt.
(BNA) at A-3 to A-13.
121 Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35-36; see also Gajewski v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d
1062 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 818 (1984).
2 See, e.g., Scagliotta v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1187 (1996); West v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 589 (1986); Lemmen v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1326
(1981); Spermacet Whaling & Shipping Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 618 (1958),
aff'd, 281 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1960).
123 While the taxpayer in Groetzinger was held to be in the trade or business of
gambling, the Service declared that a recreational gambler with no expectation of
profit was not in the trade or business of gambling. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-08-002 (Feb.
20, 1998). Likewise, a blood donor with sufficient proof of profit motive and regular
activity was held to be in the trade or business of donating blood. Green v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980). Most blood donors, of course, lack either a
profit motive or the regularity required to claim that donations are part of the
donor's trade or business.
124 And similarly, an activity that starts as a trade or business may become a
hobby or some other nonbusiness activity. See, e.g., Kartrude v. Commissioner, 56
T.C.M. 500 (1988), rev'd in part on other grounds, 925 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1991).
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are the primary readers of tax legislation, and they are, then it makes
sense sometimes for Congress to use the jargon that is largely
understood by the primary audience.
The proper place for reader-friendly text with diagrams and
examples is the publications and instructions published by the Service.
These materials, intended for ordinary taxpayers as well as tax
professionals, offer helpful interpretations of the Code and Treasury
126Regulations. Since they contain flowcharts, worksheets, and
127
examples, they are quite lengthy. Still, these materials provide the
untrained expert with access to the tax laws. Some might argue that a
simpler Code would eliminate the need for Service publications and
instructions, thus saving resources. The Service is better-equipped to
provide helpful explanations than Congress. Although Congress
should be as clear as possible in its legislation, structural pressures
force Congress to write legislation for the trained professional and not
for the lay reader. These pressures include the frequent need to enact
legislation promptly and the constant need to devote attention to
areas other than taxation. Simply put, members of Congress lack the
time to carefully re-draft legislation into reader-friendly prose. Of
course, members of Congress rely upon their staff members to draft
legislation, but the job of informing taxpayers about the effects of
legislative change belongs to the executive branch and not the
legislative branch.
125 Professor Miller observes that the limitation of the general deduction for
business expenses in section 162(a) only to those that are "ordinary and necessary" is
similarly indeterminate, although tax professionals can sense the contours of this
term based on its application in prior cases and rulings. Miller, supra note 76, at 35-
37.
126 The Service has prepared a helpful packet for individual and corporate
taxpayers that explains the many rules related to deductions for business expenses.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, PUBLICATION 535[:]
BUSINESS EXPENSES (2002) [hereinafter PUBLICATION 535]. In addition, the Service
has published six other general guides, seven guides for employers, and twenty-five
specialized guides for various types of business activities, including farming,
commercial fishing, and foreign business entities. Id. at 58. The total number of
Service publications and notices available to taxpayers in 2003 stood at 340 as of
January 15, 2003. See Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury, Forms
and Publications, at http://www.irs.gov/formspubs/lists/0,,id=97819,00.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2003).
127 PUBLICATION 535, supra note 126, for example, is sixty-two pages in length.
But that is not the longest Service publication: the tax guide for farmers consumes
127 pages. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
PUBLICATION 225[:] FARMER'S TAX GUIDE (2002).
128 Surrey, supra note 23, at 703-710.
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If Congress were to draft tax legislation in a manner accessible to129
the general populace, like Australia's new tax code, Congress would
have to write more text, not less. This would be a problem, for
although the Code contains sentences that would make a high school
English teacher blush, 30 it is also true that the Code generally makes
good use of word economy."' Word economy itself is good because a
reader knows that every word has meaning. In virtually every case,
one could not draft a more succinct statement of the rule without
132
changing the substance of the rule. Of course, one could draft
clearer statements of the rule if one is willing to lengthen the Code.
Remember, however, that proponents of simplification point to the
fact that the Code is already approaching 1.4 million words.' If
length breeds complexity, then more elaborate statements of the law
in the Code will not help the cause. Further, if every word has
meaning, then adding more words necessarily adds more meanings,
which can cause further ambiguity and complication.
The Code is not readily accessible to the average taxpayer, but
that conclusion sounds much worse than it is. Even if Congress could
create an efficient and equitable Code that would be within the easy
grasp of most taxpayers, there is little to suggest that the average
taxpayer would read it. Congress knows that tax professionals are the
129 Australia recently completed a significant overhaul of its tax laws with the
enactment of the "Income Tax Assessment Act" in 1997. One of the principal
objectives of this reform effort was to make the tax laws more accessible to taxpayers.
To achieve this, the new Australian tax laws replace references to "the taxpayer"
with "you." The statute also includes diagrams, extensive purposive statements at the
beginning of major sections, and several examples. Critics charge that these efforts to
convert technical tax laws into the statutory equivalent of a Denny's menu have
produced text that is condescending and unavoidably different than what was in place
before reform. See 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986, at 115 (Joint Comm. Print 2001); see also Donald R. DeGlopper,
Australia, in id. app. D at D-183.
130 The classic example of a sentence gone awry is section 341(e)(1), a single
sentence containing 342 words and five parenthetical comments (and, strangely, no
footnotes).
131 See generally Michael A. Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code:
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 827-28
(1991).
132 As explained already, the Code makes use of technical jargon in order to
keep the statement of the rules brief. See supra notes 119-125 and accompanying
text. This facilitates word economy.
133 See supra note 7.
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primary readers of tax legislation, and Congress has too many other
concerns to devote excessive resources into re-wording the laws. For
these reasons, tax legislation should and will always be technical.
2. Temporary Rules
Both the Code and the Treasury regulations contain a number of
temporary rules that will either expire on a specified date stated in the
rule' 34 or by general operation of law."' In some cases, Congress or
Treasury simply extends the expiration date. Other times, expired
provisions remain in the Code or regulations as deadwood.
According to the Joint Committee Report, temporary rules
contribute to tax complexity because taxpayers must decide whether a
provision is still in effect and, if so, whether it will apply to aS136
transaction that may extend beyond the stated expiration date.
There are two problems with this argument. First, the Joint
Committee Report offers no empirical evidence of increased errors or
lost resources attributable to temporary rules. Second, and more
important, it ignores the fact that all federal tax rules are temporary.
Congress can always add to, subtract from, or otherwise alter the
provisions of the Code. In that sense, rules with fixed expiration
dates are nothing special. Clearly, Congress should remove
deadwood provisions from the Code and regulations, for professional
publishing services can preserve their only value - historic reference -
by transferring them from the Code and regulations to other volumes
accessible to scholars. Yet the elimination of deadwood does not
solve the problem of the supposed complexity brought on by
134 Code provisions expiring in the years 2002-2010 are set forth in JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS 2002-2010
(Joint Comm. Print 2003). For example, so-called "Archer medical savings
accounts," authorized and described in section 220, will expire on December 31, 2003,
unless earlier extended or made permanent by Congress. JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 108TH CONG., LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS 2002-2010, at
4. In sum, fifty-seven Code provisions are set to expire in the years 2002 through
2010. Id.
135 All of the revisions to the Code set forth in the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, are set to expire
on December 31, 2010, because of budget reconciliation rules. See infra Part II.B.4.
In that sense, the entire 2001 Act is "temporary."
136 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 63
(Joint Comm. Print 2001).
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temporary rules. Even if temporary rules do complicate the Code,
there is no suggestion for reform except for the elimination of
deadwood provisions. 137  Thus, the complexity attributable to
temporary rules is either insignificant or unsolvable.
3. Congressional Delegation of Authority
One person's convenience is another person's inconvenience.
This clich6 certainly applies to the Code. When Congress creates a
new tax law, it often assigns to Treasury the task of creating
additional rules to enforce the new law. By expressly delegating
authority to Treasury, the resulting regulations receive the same
deference as if Congress had written them directly into the legislation.
138This method of legislative drafting is efficient for Congress, but it is
an added burden for Treasury and an inconvenience for taxpayers. 3 9
For one thing, taxpayers must wait several months (sometimes years)
for Treasury to promulgate the regulations in proposed form.' 4 Then,
taxpayers must look not only at the statute but also at the regulations
for a definitive rule. At a minimum, the cross-referencing burden
wastes time. More importantly, though, is the risk that a legislative
regulation might either conflict with the statute or be hard to
reconcile with the statute. There is nothing to suggest that Congress
would seriously consider curtailing its delegation of authority to
137 The Joint Committee Report advocates repeal of more than 100 deadwood
provisions in the Code. 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986, at 579-93.
138 Indeed, Congress has flexed this muscle on several occasions. Since 1991,
Congress has specifically granted regulatory authority over some aspect of the tax
laws on no less than 237 occasions, and this figure does not include authority for
studies, inflation adjustments, and form development. Memorandum from Marrie B.
Morris, Congressional Research Service, to the Joint Committee on Taxation, Re:
Frequency of Grants of Regulatory Authority to Internal Revenue Service in Past
Ten Years (Feb. 5, 2001), in 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF
THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986, app. D at D-94 to D-129.
139 For more complaints of the complexity of regulations, see Martin J.
McMahon, Jr., Reflections on the Regulations Process: 'Do the Regs Have to Be
Complex' or 'Is Hyperlexis the Manna of the Tax Bar?', 51 TAX NOTES 1441 (June 17,
1991); Miller, supra note 76, at 8.
140 See Thomas F. Field et al., The Guidance Deficit[] A Statistical Study, 69 TAX
NOTES 1023 (Nov. 20, 1995).
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Treasury so the added complexity from Congressional delegation is
inevitable. Fortunately, Congressional delegation is also desirable.
Again, Treasury has greater expertise in the details of tax
administration and tax policy than Congress does. 41 Congress should
defer to this expertise regularly to ensure better coordination of the
tax laws. Since Treasury must explain the laws to taxpayers and
enforce those laws, it is sensible to confer limited rulemaking powers
on Treasury, even though it burdens tax advisers with added cross-
references and there is risk of conflict with Congressional expression
or intent.
4. Budget Reconciliation
Any significant change to the Code will impact the amount of
revenues derived from the tax. In order to comply with balanced
budget rules, Congress cannot simply create, extend, or broaden a tax
benefit without finding some way to offset the resulting revenue
loss. 42  Consequently, in order to change one rule, Congress must
143
often change other rules to compensate for the first rule change.
This necessity to offset contributes to tax complexity) 44
Compliance with budget reconciliation rules resulted in
significant tax complexity with respect to the 2001 Act. It provides
that all amendments to the Code made by the 2001 Act shall
terminate on December 31, 2010.14' At that time, the Code applies as
if the 2001 Act were never enacted. 46 Congress added the "sunset"
provision to avoid triggering section 313 of the Congressional Budget
141 See supra Part II.B.1.
142 For an excellent summary of the budget reconciliation rules, see Cheryl D.
Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Process, 43
B.C. L. REV. 863 (2002).
143 In times of revenue surplus, Congress can extend tax benefits without the
need to find additional, offsetting revenues. Of course, surplus can only be drained
for so long, so Congress must either cause the tax benefit to expire or find offsetting
revenue sources prior to depletion of the surplus. If Congress opts to terminate the
tax benefit, the complexity of temporary rules, discussed supra Part II.B.2., is
enhanced. If Congress ultimately decides to generate offsetting revenues, the
complexity from budget reconciliation remains.
14 Professor Block contends that "the budget rules are even more complex than
the Tax Code." Block, supra note 142, at 871.
145 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.




Act of 1974,147 the so-called "Byrd rule.' 48 The Byrd rule permits a
Senator to raise a point of order against "extraneous" provisions
contained in a reconciliation bill. If the presiding officer sustains the
point of order,'49 the extraneous provision disappears unless three-
fifths of the Senate membership (sixty votes, assuming no vacant
seats) vote to waive the rule with respect to that provision. Any
provision that would increase or decrease revenues in a year beyond
those covered by the reconciliation measure is an "extraneous"
measure.5 Consequently, all of the provisions in the 2001 Act had to
expire at the end of the reconciliation period, ten years, or else they
would be subject to a "point of order" on the Senate floor. Some
aspects of the 2001 Act appeared to lack the sixty votes required to
save a provision from the Byrd rule so the Senate added a
comprehensive sunset rule to protect the final legislation from
procedural challenge.
This preemptive strike against the Byrd rule leaves taxpayers with
a new set of laws that will lose all force approximately ten years after
enactment unless Congress extends the sunset date or makes the 2001
Act changes permanent. Thus, planning decisions become more
difficult, especially for taxpayers making long-range decisions like
estate planning. The 2001 Act causes the gradual repeal of the
federal estate tax and the federal generation-skipping transfer tax.
15 1
112Final repeal occurs at the end of 2009, but then the repeal expires
with respect to decedents dying after December 31, 2010.153 Assuming
no modification or extension of the 2001 Act in the interim, then,
147 Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 93 Pub. L. No. 344, § 313, 88 Stat. 297,
amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 13214, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2001)).
148 The principal sponsor of the permanent extension of section 313 was Senator
Robert C. Byrd of Virginia.
149 Any Senator can appeal the ruling of the presiding officer, and if the appeal is
successful, the ruling is overturned.
150 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1) (2001). Other types of "extraneous" provisions are those
that: (1) do not affect outlays or revenues, (2) violate the instructions assigned to the
sponsoring committee, (3) violate the jurisdiction of the sponsoring committee, (4)
produce revenue changes that are "merely incidental" to the nonbudgetary aspects of
the provision, and (5) recommend changes to Social Security. Id.
151 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 501(a), 115 Stat. 38, 69. The 2001 Act retains a modified form of the federal
gift tax beginning in 2010. Id. at § 511, 115 Stat. 38, 70.
152 I.R.C. § 2210(a).




estate tax repeal will last for only one year. As the year of repeal is
far off, one can jokingly dismiss this possible result as legislation that
will encourage massive patricide in 2010. Yet, in all seriousness,
individuals with taxable estates"' must plan for a number of
contingencies in the short term: death before repeal, death during
repeal, and death after repeal. Each of these contingencies might
produce different estate plans, significantly complicating the estate
planning burdens of the wealthiest taxpayers.
Even less affluent taxpayers face more complicated planning
decisions because of the 2001 Act's tentative sunset, though these
decisions will not occur until the years just before the sunset. The
2001 Act expands the scope of the deduction for interest paid on
student loans in two ways: first, it increases the income levels at which
the benefit of the deduction is phased out; and second, it eliminates
the sixty-month limitation on the period of time for which a deduction
is available. As with the rest of the 2001 Act, these provisions expire
at the end of 2010. Unless and until Congress makes these rules
permanent before the sunset date, taxpayers considering how to
finance future higher education expenses should have two alternate
plans: one that assumes the continued deductibility of student interest
under the new, broader rules; and another that contemplates the
effects of returning to prior law.155
The complexity resulting from budget reconciliation is clearly not
insurmountable.1 6 Frankly, the trade-off for this complexity, long-
term budget reconciliation, is not as defensible as other trade-offs
considered herein. Given the frequency with which the tax laws
change, to say nothing of the uncertainty of long-term economic
forecasts, it is somewhat silly for Congress to force itself to reconcile
revenues for ten full years. Congress is effectively constraining itself
15 An estate faces liability for federal estate taxes if the taxable estate (defined
under sections 2051 and 2053 as the gross estate less allowable deductions) exceeds
what remains of the decedent's "applicable exclusion amount" under section 2010(c).
For decedents dying in 2001, the applicable amount, assuming no lifetime taxable
gifts, is $675,000. The exemption grows to $1 million for 2002 and 2003, then to $1.5
million in 2004 and 2005, then again to $2 million in 2006, 2007, and 2008, and finally
to $3.5 million in 2009. I.R.C. § 2010(c).
15' Arguably, a taxpayer wanting to finance future higher education costs ought
to have alternate funding plans even if the 2001 Act rules were not scheduled to
sunset. After all, Congress can always change the rules and taxpayers, knowing this,
should be prepared in case such changes occur. But the likelihood of change seems
much greater when rules have a scheduled expiration date.
156 See Block, supra note 142, for more on the "gimmickry" of budget
reconciliation and its impact on federal tax policy.
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by longshot estimates of future revenues and expenses. Sound fiscal
policy certainly requires some effort at reconciliation, but why not
limit the budget horizon to a more reasonable time frame, like three
to five years? The response to this query, seemingly, is that it would
be politically unfeasible for a subsequent Congress to take away
benefits given to taxpayers by a prior Congress. Recent history,
however, shows that this is not the case. Both President Clinton and
the first President Bush approved tax increases that took away some
117of the benefits provided to taxpayers by Congress in the 1980s.
Ultimately, budget reconciliation is neither inherent nor especially
useful. Thus, simplification proposals aimed to eliminate budget
reconciliation complexities are justified. Of course, traditional
simplification proposals are not concerned with reformation of budget
reconciliation rules so this justification for simplification will rarely
apply.
C. Complexity in the Name of Equity
Tax complexity is also a necessary cost to provide an equitable
taxing system. Congress has often sacrificed simplicity for the cause
of equity, an implicit recognition that fair laws are more desirable
than easy laws.
1. Deference to State Laws
The federal tax laws often defer to applicable state laws to
determine the interests and rights of taxpayers,"" especially for
federal estate and gift purposes. For example, the decedent's
property interests under applicable state law govern the interestsincldedin adecden's goss • .159
included in a decedent's gross estate. A decedent's estate in a
157 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, lowered tax
rates and compressed the number of tax brackets. See supra note 6.
158 At least 116 Code sections contain one or more references to state law. See
Congressional Research Service, Tax Simplification Project, in 1 JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION
8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, app. D, at D-151. In most
cases, according to the Congressional Research Service, these references have little
measurable effect on tax complexity. Id.
159 I.R.C. § 2033; Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940); see also
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (Federal courts should
follow decisions of State's highest court with respect to property rights and should
give "proper regard" to decisions of lower State courts).
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community property state, for example, will include only one-half of
the value of all community property since under state law the
decedent owned (and can only transfer at death) an undivided one-
half interest in the community property.1 60
Deference to community property laws is also present in the
federal income tax. In a community property state, the law deems
each spouse to earn one-half of the community income. As a result,
spouses in community property states paid less total tax because each
spouse made use of the lower tax brackets. The deference to
community property laws thus created inequity between spouses in
community property states and those in separate property states.
Rather than accept the inequity for the sake of simplicity, however,
162Congress responded by creating the joint return, where spouses in
separate property states could also pool income and obtain a tax
163benefit similar to spouses in community property states. Since both
spouses sign the return,' 64 the joint return then caused the need for
relief provisions for innocent spouses.16 Both the joint return and the
innocent spouse relief rules contribute to the Code's complexity. In
many cases, the Code contains separate rules for taxpayers filing a
joint return. To name but a few examples, taxpayers filing a joint
return use different tax tables, have a different standard deduction,
and are entitled to double the maximum exclusion from gain on the
160 RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFr TAXATION
4.05[5][a] (8th ed. 2002).
161 To illustrate, suppose that a married couple living in New York (a separate
property state) earned $100,000 and that all of this income was earned by one spouse.
Until 1948, each spouse filed a separate return, so the earning spouse would report
and pay tax on the $100,000. The non-earning spouse would have no income and pay
no tax. A similar couple living in Texas (a community property state), however,
would have a different result. Each spouse in the Texas couple would report and pay
tax on $50,000 of income. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Because of
progressivity, the total tax paid by two persons with income of $50,000 is less than the
total tax paid by one person with $100,000 of income.
162 I.R.C. § 6013(a).
163 Since the tax brackets for married couples filing a joint return are not double
those for unmarried taxpayers, though, the joint return was generally a worse result
for residents of community property states. To obtain overall equity, therefore,
spouses in community property states were forced to relinquish some of their benefit
in order to share the overall benefit of pooled income with spouses in separate
property states.
16 I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) makes both spouses jointly and severally liable for any
deficiencies assessed on a joint return.
165 I.R.C. § 6015.
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sale of a principal residence.' 66 Moreover, the innocent spouse relief
rules, while recently overhauled, 67  continue to add to tax
complexity.
168
The Code is not entirely deferential to state law, and such
inconsistent deference to state law also has been cited as a cause of
1 See I.R.C. §§ 1(a) (statutory tax table for married couples filing joint returns),
63(c) (standard deduction), 121(b)(2)(A) ($500,000 exclusion for joint return filers
meeting certain additional requirements). It borders on understatement to note that
many of these differences are controversial. So-called "marriage penalties" (and the
often overlooked "marriage bonuses") are collateral effects of the different
deduction amounts and rate tables applicable to taxpayers filing joint returns. Under
the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38, Congress purports to mitigate marriage penalties in several Code
provisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1(f)(8) (marriage penalty relief for income tax tables
beginning in 2005), 63(c)(7) (relief for standard deduction amounts, also beginning in
2005). For more on marriage penalties and marriage bonuses generally, see Larry
Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994).
167 See I.R.C. § 6015 (originally enacted as Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201(a), 112 Stat. 685,
734). Section 6015 applies to joint and several liability on a joint return outstanding
on (or arising after) July 22, 1998. Under section 6015, an innocent spouse can claim
relief from joint and several liability using any of three separate methods. First, an
innocent spouse is entitled to relief if he or she can establish that: (1) a joint return
was filed; (2) an understatement of tax is attributable to an error of the other spouse;
(3) in signing the return, the innocent spouse had no knowledge or reason to know of
the understatement; and (4) it is inequitable to hold the innocent spouse accountable
under the facts and circumstances. I.R.C. § 6015(b). Second, if the innocent spouse
can prove how the deficiency should be allocated between the spouses, each spouse
will be held liable only for that portion allocable to him or her. I.R.C. § 6015(c). This
apportionment scheme is available only where the spouses are divorced or legally
separated and, even then, only if the spouses did not share the same household for
the twelve months prior to the date when the innocent spouse filed for relief. Id.
Finally, if relief under the first two avenues is not available, the innocent spouse can
argue for "equitable relief" under section 6015(f).
168 See, e.g., Kari Smoker, Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act
of 1998: Expanded Relief for Innocent Spouses - At What Cost? A Feminist
Perspective, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2045 (1999); Jessica Luby Angney, Note, It's New But Is
It Improved?: The New "Innocent Spouse" Provision, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603
(1999). Courts are also grappling with the new law. See, e.g., Grossman v.
Commissioner, 182 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 1999); Mlay v. Internal Revenue Service, 168 F.
Supp. 2d 781 (S.D. Ohio 2001); In re Hinckley, 256 B.R. 814 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000);
Alt v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 306 (2002); Maier v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 267
(2002); Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106 (2002); Mueller v. Commissioner, 82
T.C.M. (CCH) 190 (2001); Vetrano v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 272 (2001); King v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 198 (2001); Miller v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 582 (2000);
Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183 (2000); Corson v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
354 (2000); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276 (2000).
Virginia Tax Review
• . 169
complexity. For instance, federal tax liens can attach only to
interests in property defined under state law, but state law homestead
exemptions are generally disregarded for this purpose. 170 The
deference federal tax laws give to state laws should vary, even if it
forces taxpayers and their advisers to perform more research. A rule
of blanket deference to state laws would be challenged on equity
grounds. Eventually, as with the joint return, Congress would create
inconsistencies to address the problems, quickly returning to the
status quo. At the other extreme, wholesale disregard of state laws
would present different equity concerns and would force Congress,
now unable to cross-reference state laws for convenience, to write
even more detailed legislation. The inconsistent application of state
law is not only inevitable but is the most equitable rule to apply. The
increased complexity that results is acceptable.
2. Applicability of Foreign Laws
U.S. taxpayers with activities in other countries must deal with
multiple tax regimes, an inherent complexity that U.S.-based reform
can only alleviate to some extent. While the Code makes several
references to foreign laws,"' those references do not create much
complexity. Instead, complexity stems from the various income tax
treaties between the United States and other countries. The federal
government has made some effort to simplify tax treaties by
promulgating a model income tax treaty174 that the United States uses
169 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 75-
87 (Joint Comm. Print 2001).
170 Herndon v. United States, 501 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1974).
171 The Internal Revenue Code contains 123 references to laws of other
countries. Congressional Research Service, Complexity Attributable to Statutory
References in the Internal Revenue Code to Foreign Laws or Attributable Generally to
Treaties with Foreign Countries, in 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG.,
STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, app. D, at D-164.
172 See id.
173 See id. at D-172.
174 Department of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention of
September 20, 1996, available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/treaties.htm
(last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
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as a discussion draft."' Of course, the final treaties are a product of
negotiation, and no two treaties will be identical for this reason. The
added complexity of tax treaties burdens taxpayers engaged in
business activities outside the United States, but in many cases those
.• 176
same taxpayers receive benefits under the treaties. Taxpayers with
income activities in more than one country outside the United States
also face multiple tax treaties, but generally speaking these taxpayers
can afford the additional burdens imposed by multiple treaties.
171
Again, to the extent that tax treaties operate to benefit taxpayers by
mitigating instances of double taxation, taxpayers should easily
tolerate the complexity resulting from the application of foreign
178laws.
3. Absolute and Relative Rules
The Code makes liberal use of both situational rules and absolute
rules, and the combination of the two increases complexity." 9
Situational rules are those that require a factual determination before
the rule can be applied. For example, the Code requires a
shareholder to recognize gain on the transfer of encumbered property
to a corporation if the transfer is principally motivated by tax
• 180
avoidance. In order to apply this rule, the taxpayer must first make
175 For detailed information on the income tax treaty negotiation process, see 2
PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE & SAMUEL A. DONALDSON, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION:
CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL §§ 13.01-13.03 (4th ed. 2003).
176 Income tax treaties often confer relief from potential double taxation by the
United States and one or more other countries, and they often provide for reduced
tax rates on business or investment income. See BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 66.3, at 66-35 (2001).
177 See, e.g., Bruce Anderson, Strategic Choice Taxation: A Solution to the Federal
Revenue Crisis, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 281, 331 (1995); Pollack, supra note 4, at
356.
18 With respect to U.S. taxation of foreign persons and of foreign-source
income, however, many commentators have bemoaned the complexity of the Code
and regulations. See, e.g., CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 24-25 (2d. ed. 2001); JOSEPH ISENBERGH,
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 8 (2000). In contrast, this part of the article relates to a
different matter: how the reliance on foreign laws increases tax complexity. The
actual complexity of the Code's subchapter N (international taxation) is beyond the
scope of a section devoted to trade-offs in tax complexity and not to a list of those
provisions which are complex.
179 See generally Richard J. Kovach, Bright Lines, Facts and Circumstances Tests,
and Complexity in Federal Taxation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1287 (1996).
180 I.R.C. § 357(b).
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the determination that the transfer was so motivated. Another, more
common example (though not one written into the Code) involves the
exclusion from gross income for gifts received from another. T8 The
Supreme Court accidentally defined a "gift" as a transfer made on
account of "detached and disinterested generosity," an action made
from "affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses.,
182
Again, application of the Court's rule depends upon the uniqueS183
circumstances giving rise to the transfer.
Absolute rules, by contrast, make broad conclusions that require
no factual determination and seemingly leave no room for exception.
For example, an individual taxpayer may claim a child age twenty-
four or over as a "dependent" on the taxpayer's federal income tax
return - and thus claim a dependency exemption attributable to the
dependent - only if the child's gross income is less than the claimed
exemption amount and if the taxpayer provides more than half of the
child's total support.' 84 If the child has -gross income in an amount
that equals or exceeds (even by only one dollar) the exemption
amount, there is no dependency exemption even where the taxpayer
furnishes all of the child's support on top of the child's gross income.
Absolute rules are defensible on the grounds of administrative
convenience. They also allow for more certainty in planning and, if
unchallenged, reduce the amount of disputes between taxpayers and
the Service.
Herein lies the problem. Since the Code makes extensive use of
both situational and absolute rules, the effectiveness of both types of
rules becomes hampered."' Taxpayers are more apt to' challenge
absolute rules when the Code contains other situational rules than
when it does not. After all, they might suppose, if Congress or the
181 I.R.C. § 102(a).
182 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). It is proper to term
the Court's test as an "accidental" one because the Court specifically stated that it
wanted to avoid announcing a test because of the fact-intensive nature of the gift
inquiry. Id. at 284-85.
183 See, e.g., Goodwin v. United States, 67 F.3d 149 (8th Cir. 1995), affg 870
F.Supp. 265 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (special occasion donations to pastor from congregation
were compensation, not gifts, because such donations were paid from the
congregation as a whole and were routinely paid according to a fixed method);
Runyon v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 208 (1984) (payments to taxpayer from
shareholders of corporation for which taxpayer performed services were excludable
as gifts because taxpayer was fully compensated for services by the corporation and
shareholders expected nothing more in exchange for their payments).
184 I.R.C. § 151(c)(1).
185 See Kovach, supra note 179, at 1300-06.
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courts are willing to consider the factual circumstances in applying
one rule, they will also consider the circumstances in applying other
rules. Likewise, taxpayers fighting against the application of a
situational rule are more apt to argue that an absolute rule should
resolve the inherent uncertainty of a situational rule. 1 6 Simply put, if
the Code contained exclusively situational rules, no one would waste
time arguing that the rule is uncertain. Likewise, if the Code
contained only absolute rules, no one would bother arguing for
exceptions based on the unique circumstances. Either extreme might
further simplicity.
Yet no one wants a Code that consists solely of situational rules.
Taxpayers are willing to lose on some minor points in favor of some
absolute rules that offer some degree of certainty. When the absolute
rules are grossly unfair, the taxpayer can fight for change, either in the
courts or through the legislative process. If the rules are only slightly
unfair, the taxpayer may be willing to let the inequity slide, knowing
that other absolute rules may favor the taxpayer without having to
make a factual showing to obtain the claimed benefit. The other
extreme - a Code filled with only absolute rules - is equally
unappealing. Only taxpayers grossly harmed by the resulting
inequities (or those with sufficient resources and desire to challenge
less harmful inequities) will have sufficient interest to challenge the
absolute rules.18 If taxpayers respect the absolute rules, they must
consistently lose regardless of where the equities may lie. Here again
we must prefer the inevitable complexity, this time because
complexity stems from having both situational and absolute rules, the
preferred result.
186 On occasion, the Service accommodates this request. For example, section
305(b)(2) states that a stock dividend is taxable to the recipient shareholders if, in the
same or a related distribution, other shareholders receive cash or other property.
The determination of whether any two distributions are "related" involves
application of a situational rule. In the regulations, Treasury relented to taxpayer
requests for guidance, providing a presumption that any two distributions within
thirty-six months will be presumed "related" absent additional evidence. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.305-3(b)(4) (1995). Treasury's presumption is an example of an absolute rule
used to clarify a situational rule.
187 Professor Miller notes the geographic constraint on moving expenses is
"patently unfair," and argues that excessive use of bright-line rules undermines the
legitimacy of the tax law. Miller, supra note 76, at 43-44.
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4. Special Treatment of Certain Taxpayers
188-.. 189
Public utilities, life insurance companies, and other taxpayers
subject to federal and/or state regulation' 9° often receive special tax
treatment, usually because compliance with other federal and/or state
regulations forces these taxpayers to act differently than otherwise
similarly-situated taxpayers. Likewise, taxpayers involved in
191 192 193farming, T9 the oil and gas industry, the timber industry, or other
special business activities also receive preferential treatment through
188 Regulated public utilities, as defined in section 7701(a)(33), are subject to
many special rules. For example, a regulated public utility may, in general, use the
accelerated cost recovery deductions applicable to other taxpayers if the utility also
applies a "normalization method of accounting," whereby accounts for tax, book, and
ratemaking purposes are harmonized by having the utility create a reserve for
deferred federal income taxes when tax depreciation exceeds book depreciation. See
I.R.C. § 168(f)(2), (i)(9)-(10); see also 4 STANDARD FEDERAL TAX REPORTER (CCH)
11,070.031 (2001). Regulated public utilities also have special rules for the
capitalization of unclassified labor costs. See Internal Revenue Service, Coordinated
Issue[] Utilities Industry[,] Capitalization of Costs - Unclassified Labor Costs, at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-isp/ut-263ar.pdf (Sept. 30, 1998); see also I.R.C. § 247(a)
(special deduction for dividends paid on certain preferred stock issued prior to
October 1, 1942); Treas. Reg. § 1.244-1 (1960) (special dividends-received deduction
for corporations receiving dividends on such preferred stock from a public utility).
189 See I.R.C. §§ 801-848 (special rules for taxation of life insurance companies).
190 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 581-587 (special rules for banking institutions); 851-855
(special rules for regulated investment companies).
'9' See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 77 (special elections with respect to loans from the
Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation), 126(a) (exclusion of
certain cost-sharing payments received under state and federal programs), 175
(deduction of soil and water conservation expenditures), 451(d) (election to defer
income from crop insurance and federal disaster payments until next year if damaged
crops would have sold that year), 453(l)(2)(A) (special exception from limitation on
use of installment method for dealers), 464 (limited use of cash method for prepaid
feed, seed, fertilizer, and similar farm supplies).
'92 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 43 (credit for 15% of taxpayer's enhanced oil recovery
costs), 59(e) (exemption from alternative minimum tax treatment of certain
deductions if taxpayer elects to amortize said deductions ratably over periods up to
ten years), 611-613A (depletion deduction), 616 (deduction for development of mine
or other mineral deposit), 617 (deduction for mining exploration costs with
subsequent recapture upon reaching production stages).
193 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 48(b) (10% regular investment tax credit on reforestation
costs), 194 (election to amortize up to $10,000 of reforestation expenditures over
eighty-four months), 611 (depletion deduction), 631(a) (election to treat cutting of
timber as hypothetical sale or exchange eligible for preferential tax treatment equal
to that received for sale of standing timber), 1231(b)(2) (timber gains and losses
eligible for special characterization under section 1231(a)).
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special rules, exceptions, and exemptions. In these cases, Congress
determined that application of the general rules to these taxpayers
would either give them incentives to engage in inefficient behaviors
or, in some cases, force them out of the business activity entirely.
Preferential rules for specific groups of taxpayers obviously
complicate the Code because taxpayers must determine whether they
are eligible for the preferential rule and, if so, exactly what benefit
they can obtain under the special rule. In many cases, professionals
devoted to one industry can charge high fees to provide advice to
taxpayers in that industry - a cost borne by the very taxpayers
Congress hoped to benefit. Complaints from taxpayers within the
special industries rarely cry for simpler rules - what they usually seek
are broader rules with easier eligibility requirements. Apparently, as
long as special rules confer benefits, their complexity is not a
significant problem.
Even if the target beneficiaries of a preferential rule are satisfied,
the Code is still more complicated as a result of these special rules.
94
These special rules are certainly not inevitable, at least in theory -
Congress could restrain itself or write general rules that do not need
special exceptions. The former suggestion, Congressional restraint, is
simply a hallucination, for elected officials will always seek to provide
special benefits for their constituents.'9  The latter suggestion,
drafting legislation that eliminates the need for special exceptions,
might cost too much revenue. For example, the Code could extend
the special use valuation rules for farmers' 96 to all estates, but if the
Service measures all real property by actual use and not its highest
and best use, as required by current law,197 Congress loses revenue
and encourages inefficient behavior. A special exception for farmers
is acceptable to make sure that most farmland remains as such.
The final query is whether taxpayers actually use the special rules.
If not, Congress should revise or eliminate the preference. For
example, if only a few taxpayers make use of the estate tax deduction
,,198 . th rfor "qualified family-owned business interests, either there are too
194 See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1284-85.
195 Id. at 1301; see also Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 60.
196 I.R.C. § 2032A. For more on so-called "special use valuation," see STEPHENS
ET AL., supra note 160, at 4.04.
197 Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(a) (1981). See also STEPHENS ET AL., supra note
160, at 4.02[3][b].
198 I.R.C. § 2057. This deduction is scheduled to terminate with respect to
decedents dying after December 31, 2003. I.R.C. § 20570). The scheduled
termination is likely a result of the scheduled increase in the "applicable exclusion
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few taxpayers in the class, the requirements are too tough, or the
special rule is not desired by those affected.
III. THE ALLEGED HARMS OF TAX COMPLEXITY
So with the limited exception of budget reconciliation, all of the
components of tax complexity are either inherent, non-unique, or net
beneficial. A complex system is not necessarily a bad one.
Simplification proponents routinely cite five disadvantages of tax
complexity: (1) it undermines taxpayer faith in the system; (2) it
jeopardizes the integrity of the voluntary assessment system; (3) it
increases the government's cost in collecting revenues, thus reducing
the efficiency of the tax; (4) it increases the compliance burden to
taxpayers; and (5) it promotes disputes between taxpayers and the
Service. The arguments supporting these alleged drawbacks,
however, do not withstand careful scrutiny.
A. Complexity Undermines Faith
A popular rhetorical argument posits that a complex system
breeds distrust by taxpayers. The Joint Committee Report adopts
this argument, citing four ways in which complexity fosters perceived
unfairness by taxpayers:
First, ambiguity in the tax laws can result in disparate
treatment of similarly situated taxpayers and can lead
individual taxpayers to believe that they bear a
disproportionate tax burden. Second, taxpayers may believe
that complexity creates opportunities for manipulation of the
tax laws by other taxpayers, and confers an advantage for
taxpayers who are willing and able to obtain professional
advice on reducing their tax liabilities. Third, taxpayers may
become disillusioned with tax policy that appears to be
amount" in 2004 for all decedents to $1.5 million, which would exceed the combined
$1.3 million effective exclusion amount available through use of the section 2057
deduction. In other words, the $1.5 million exclusion amount would make the
current deduction for qualified family-owned business interests moot, so Congress
decided to terminate the deduction.
Treasury has not issued formal statistics indicating whether a large number of
estates eligible to claim the deduction have done so. This is because the deduction
has only been in effect since 1997. For a critique of the deduction, see generally Neil
E. Harl, The Family-Owned Business Deduction: Still in Need of Repairs, 4 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 59 (1999).
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inconsistent because of the uncertainty that emanates from
complex tax laws. In addition to causing inadvertent
noncompliance, complex and confusing tax laws can instill
cynicism among taxpayers, which ultimately can lead to
intentional noncompliance. 99
Dealing with these points in order, assume for a moment that
ambiguous tax laws do indeed cause disparate treatment among
similarly situated taxpayers. There is nothing to link ambiguity to tax
complexity. As previously discussed,200 complex laws are not
necessarily ambiguous. Indeed, one of the greatest complexities in
taxation is the need to comb through highly-detailed regulations.
These voluminous regulations, while immensely difficult, are hardly
ambiguous. Likewise, simple laws are not unambiguous. In fact,
simple laws are probably more ambiguous that complex ones.20' Even
if complex laws are more ambiguous, the Joint Committee Report
offers no examples of a situation where ambiguity caused the
unintentionally disparate treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. If
such a case ever occurs, taxpayers can turn to the legislative or
judicial branches of government for a remedy. If the disparate
treatment is indeed unintentional, those branches are equipped to
cure the inequity. The Joint Committee Report offers no reason for
questioning the relief provided by these other branches. If the
disparate treatment is intentional, however, the disadvantaged
taxpayer can either accept the result or advocate reform.
As for the argument that complexity invites manipulation, we
have already seen that taxpayers have incentives to find and exploit
202loopholes whether the tax rules are simple or complex. Other
taxpayers will envy any taxpayer with the ability to hire professionals
to exploit the rules as much as possible, which would occur even
under a "simpler" tax regime. Further, the Joint Committee Report
offers no indication of the impact of taxpayer jealousy. Apparently, it
has no effect on taxpayer compliance. 203 Absent some indication of
the problem with taxpayer jealousy, it is enough to note its inevitable
199 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 109
(Joint Comm. Print 2001).
200 See supra Part II.A.4.
201 See supra Part II.B.1.
202 See supra Part II.A.7.
203 See infra Part III.B.
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The next argument, that taxpayers become disillusioned when
they encounter complex laws that are seemingly contradictory to
established tax policy, is simply unfounded. It is idealistic to believe
that taxpayers as a whole understand (and care about) each of the
core aspects of federal tax policy.205 They know that the government
will withhold a certain percentage from each paycheck and they think
that amount is too much. 206 They understand that the withheld
amounts are used to pay for federal programs, but they think these
programs suffer from extensive mismanagement and waste.2 0 If
asked, taxpayers might well have informed (at least semi-informed)
opinions on some high-profile tax policy issues ranging from the
marriage penalty to progressivity to the preference for capital gains.2°8
Taxpayers, however, may not easily grasp (or even care about) other
basic tenets of tax policy, including capitalization, deductions for
personal consumption expenditures, and the like. It is highly
doubtful, therefore, that taxpayers are frustrated with inconsistent tax
204 Professor McCaffery says the perception that the rich and intelligent are
given an edge under a complex tax regime "may well violate welfarist, utilitarian,
pragmatic, process-oriented, natural rights-based or virtually any other definition of
equity." McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1281. But Professor McCaffery does not explain
how this facial inequality translates into an identifiable harm, nor does he necessarily
assert that the facial inequality itself is a harm.
205 There is evidence, however, that taxpayers will alter their behaviors as tax
policy decisions are implemented. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1308 n.196
(citing Whittington et al., Fertility and the Personal Exemption: Implicit Pronatalist
Policy in the United States, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 545 (1990)).
206 A Gallup survey conducted from April 6 to April 8, 2001, found that 65% of
Americans considered their own federal income tax liabilities to be "too high," while
only 31% said their tax liability was "about right." See The Gallup Poll, available at
http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2003). Only twice
before, in 1969 and 1998, have more Americans concluded that their tax liability was
too high. In most years, about 60% felt that their tax liabilities were too high. Id.
207 In one survey of 1043 adults conducted by ABCNews.com from April 10 to
April 14, 2002, respondents concluded that out of every dollar the federal
government collects in taxes, forty-seven cents is wasted. See ABCNews.com Poll,
available at http://www.pollingreport.com/ budget.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
208 In an Associated Press poll of 1008 adults conducted from March 22 to March
26, 2002, respondents were asked whether they would be willing to give up some
deductions to make the tax system simpler. Of the respondents, 36% were so willing,
but 53% were not. The remainder consisted of those with no opinion (10%) and
those who volunteered that they did not pay taxes (2%). The fact that the reported
percentages do not add to 100% is likely due to rounding. See Associated Press Poll,
available at http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
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policy.209 Even if disillusionment was pervasive, there is no
measurable harm that results.
The last argument, that complexity breeds cynicism, has merit.
That cynicism then breeds intentional noncompliance, however, is an
unsupported conjecture. As will be seen21 compliance rates have
remained steady in the face of increased complexity. Some might
argue that the last link in the chain is unnecessary, that it is bad
enough that complex laws inspire skepticism among taxpayers. If tax
complexity is required to advance other important objectives,
widespread skepticism is much more tolerable. Like the minimal
harms of taxpayer jealousy and disillusionment, skepticism does not
outweigh the benefits of tax complexity. While these minor harms are
unattractive, they are acceptable.
B. Complexity Jeopardizes the Integrity of Voluntary Assessment
This argument, a close relative of the previous one, suggests that
if taxpayers do not understand a law, compliance with the law is
virtually impossible. Taxpayers do not necessarily intend to cheat the
system; instead, frustrated taxpayers simply throw up their collective
. 211
arms at a difficult rule, not even trying to understand its application.
Such frustration in turn risks the integrity of the voluntary assessment
system.
Voluntary assessment is an important feature of the federal
212income tax. If there is a perception that voluntary compliance does
209 One commentator argues that taxpayers complain more of tax complexity
than the amount of taxes they pay. Gale, supra note 9, at 1465. But even if this is
true, it does not necessarily follow that taxpayers are frustrated with inconsistent
policies, as the Joint Committee Report claims. 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH
CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2001).
210 See infra Part III.B.
21 See Eugene Carlson, Tax Compliance by Small Businesses Eroded in the '80s,
WALL ST. J., June 27, 1991, at B2 (quoting former Service Commissioner Fred T.
Goldberg, Jr., as stating "most noncompliance is unintentional. Much of it is due to
the complexity of the tax laws."); Gale, supra note 9, at 1465; McCaffery, supra note
5, at 1290.
2 Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960) (the income tax system is
"based upon voluntary assessment"); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335
(1973) (tax system largely depends upon self-reporting); see also S. REP. No. 94-938,
at 317 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3740, 3747 (discussing amendments to
taxpayer confidentiality provisions in section 6103 as designed to protect integrity of
voluntary assessment, a cornerstone of the federal income tax).
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not work, those that do pay taxes will question the need for continued
213
compliance. But there is no proof that complexity is affecting
voluntary compliance. To be fair, there is no proof of any kind
regarding voluntary compliance since 1988, although the Service's
214National Research Program intends to remedy this fairly soon. The
absence of more recent proof is due to the Service's abandonment of
211the Taxpayer Compliance Management Program. If one assumes
that the Code has become more complex over time, the Service data
up to 1988 suggested that increasing complexity had no measurable
effect on voluntary compliance. Although the "tax gap," the excess of
the amount of income tax owed by taxpayers in a given year over the
amount of income tax voluntarily reported and paid by taxpayers in
that same year, grew somewhat steadily over the years measured, the
growth was "due in large part to the growth of income tax liabilities
through real expansion of the economy and through inflation.
2 16
Further, the Service attributes variances in the voluntary compliance
rate of individual taxpayers to changing economic conditions. In
years of economic prosperity, voluntary compliance is higher; in years
217
of economic recession, voluntary compliance suffers. Interestingly,
the Service predicted in 1988 that voluntary compliance would
improve by 1992 due to reduced tax rates brought about by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 since that same legislation repealed or limited
many deductions, "thereby minimizing the possibility for taxpayers to
overstate these income offsets., 218 No mention of the complexity of
213 The headline of a 2001 magazine article on taxpayer cheating says it all: Janet
Novack, Are You a Chump?, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122. The cover of the
magazine enticed readers in large print: "How to Cheat on Your Taxes."
211 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: STATUS OF IRS' EFFORTS TO DEVELOP MEASURES OF VOLUNTARY
COMPLIANCE 3 (2001); see also News Release #IR-2002-05, Internal Revenue Service,
IRS Moves to Ensure Fairness of Tax System; Research Program Works to Increase
Compliance Program Effectiveness, Reduce Burdens on Taxpayers (Jan. 16, 2002),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/newsrelease-ir-02-05.pdf (announcing
intention to reestablish research on taxpayer compliance).
21 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: STATUS OF IRS' EFFORTS TO DEVELOP MEASURES OF VOLUNTARY
COMPLIANCE 4 (2001).
216 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 7285: INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE
RESEARCH, GROSS TAX GAP ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1973-1992, at 7
(1988).
217 Id. at 8.
218 Id. One could argue that the result of complexity is a high number of
deductions available to taxpayers. This creates more opportunities for understating
income (by overstating the benefit of these deductions), which in turn reduces
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the tax laws arises.
In a 1995 report, however, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) listed tax law complexity as a factor contributing to the tax
gap. 9 Other factors listed in the report included collection of the tax
from several sources, lack of information provided to taxpayers, and
220delay in resolving compliance disputes. In a 1997 statement before
the National Commission on Restructuring the Internal Revenue
Service, one GAO official acknowledged the existence of Service data
showing that the overall compliance rate has remained more or less
constant.21  All of this information suggests one of two mutually
exclusive conclusions. The first possible conclusion is that any degree
of complexity will cause a relatively fixed amount of noncompliance
by taxpayers. After all, the compliance rate has remained constant,
and one can hardly say that the same degree of complexity has
afflicted the Code over the years at issue. The other possible
conclusion is that complexity does not affect compliance. If one
accepts the premise that the tax laws must necessarily be somewhat
complex given the large number of taxpayers and the nature of the
222
various tax bases, then either conclusion suggests that simplifying
the tax laws will have little effect on the rate of voluntary
223
compliance.
taxpayer compliance. This syllogism assumes that taxpayers will falsely claim
deductions "because they are there." It is just as plausible to assume that a taxpayer
will understate income regardless of the number of deductions available for the
taking.
21 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REDUCING
THE TAX GAP - RESULTS OF A GAO-SPONSORED SYMPOSIUM (1995).
220 Id.
221 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, TAXPAYER
COMPLIANCE: ANALYZING THE NATURE OF THE INCOME TAX GAP (1997).
222 See supra Parts II.A.3., II.A.6.
223 At least one commentator suggests that increasing audit rates will do more to
increase taxpayer compliance rates. See Cohen, supra note 114, at 117.
There is evidence, however, that simplification measures already
incorporated into the Code have inadvertently increased the overall taxpayer
compliance rate. According to a recent report by the GAO, more than 500,000
taxpayers claimed the standard deduction in 1998, when in fact those taxpayers would
have reduced their income tax liabilities by itemizing their deductions instead of
claiming the standard deduction. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, ESTIMATES OF TAXPAYERS WHO MAY HAVE OVERPAID
FEDERAL TAXES BY NOT ITEMIZING (2001). Congress introduced the standard
deduction to simplify the burden of taxpayer compliance. See Robert S. McIntyre &
Michael J. McIntyre, Fixing the "Marriage Penalty" Problem, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 907,
916 (1999). Apparently, then, half a million taxpayers are content to pay extra tax
2003]
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C. Complexity Increases Administrative Costs
Taxpayers are not the only parties that have to spend money to
cope with new and complex laws. With every significant change in
the Code, the Service must retrain employees, change its computer
224programs, and, sometimes, change forms and publications. Further,
Treasury often must publish regulatory guidance to assist taxpayers•• 225
and their advisers in applying a complex Code provision.
Combined, these administrative costs make tax collection less
efficient than would be the case if tax laws were simpler. The Joint
Committee Report also argues that complexity may be a cause of
requests for higher budgets and personnel levels at the Service.226 It
further suggests that tax complexity accounts for the lower-than-
expected accuracy rates in Service responses to technical questions
from taxpayers.2
There can be no doubt that complexity does increase
because they either do not want to take the time to itemize deductions or because
they lack sufficient documentation to support such deductions. Even the Joint
Committee Report acknowledges that the compliance rate may be enhanced (albeit
unintentionally) by a rule designed to simplify the tax reporting process. 1 JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO
SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 102 (Joint Comm.
Print 2001). This is a damning indictment of the standard deduction, and proof that
simplification can sometimes create the desired end (increased compliance) through
the wrong means (tricking taxpayers into claiming a lesser amount of deductions).
The Joint Committee Report also suggests that tax complexity inadvertently
boosts the compliance rate because intimidated taxpayers are more likely to take
overly conservative reporting positions in order to avoid a potential dispute with the
Internal Revenue Service. Id. But unlike the empirical evidence condemning the
standard deduction, the Joint Committee Report lacks evidence to prove this claim.
If the Joint Committee Report is correct, however, then perhaps simple and complex
tax laws may wrongly increase overall compliance rates, in which case there is still no
reason to prefer simplification.
224 See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1291; supra Part II.A.2.
225 See supra Part II.B.3.
226 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OFTHE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 110.
227 Id. (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
TAX ADMINISTRATION: ASSESSMENT OF IRS' 2000 FILING SEASON 10-14 (2000)). The
GAO report states that taxpayers received accurate information from the Service
73.8% of the time for the 1999 filing season and 71.9% of the time for the 2000 filing




administrative costs, but one must be careful not to overstate its
impact. Perhaps more than complexity, frequent change in the tax
law impedes efficient administration. 228 Every significant change in
the tax law - whether it simplifies or complicates the Code - requires
internal change at the Service. Imagine the amount of work facing
Treasury and the Service if Congress actually enacted all 127
recommendations for simplification offered in the Joint Committee
Report! If the tax law were to remain constant for a meaningful
period of time, then simpler laws would reduce the overall
administrative burden.
As for the burden of supplying taxpayers with more information,
it appears that the overall amount of guidance provided by Treasury
and the Service has been relatively stable for the past decade.
Consider the amount of guidance furnished to taxpayers from 1990 to
1998, set forth below in Table One.
TABLE ONE
GUIDANCE PROVIDED TO TAXPAYERS BY TREASURY AND IRS,
1990-1998229
Type of Guidance 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Revenue Rulings 112 70 112 94 82 85 65 57 62
Revenue Procedures 67 74 108 53 81 58 66 61 65
Notices 75 44 61 60 103 67 68 77 67
Treasury Decisions 47 54 74 49 72 58 58 52 50
Proposed Regulations 48 83 67 57 53 49 49 46 53
Announcements 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 114
Private Letter Rulings 3456 2586 2273 2211 2068 2036 2022 2052 2222
Technical Advice Memos 124 201 253 173 161 153 154 149 119
Field Service Advice 195 150 399 491 397 300 220 292 258
Total 4124 3262 3347 3188 3017 2806 2702 2786 3010
Table One suggests no link between complexity and the amount of
guidance furnished by the government to taxpayers. If tax complexity
has been increasing over time, and if there is a link between tax
228 See supra Part II.A.2.
229 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
INFORMATION ON THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM, in 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH
CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL' STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, app. C, at C-1, C-36 to C-37.
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complexity and the amount of guidance the government must supply
to taxpayers, one would expect to see the total amount of guidance
increase over time. Instead, the amount of guidance has varied
considerably from year to year. Several reasons may account for the
variance, including different budgets and personnel appropriations, as
well as different administrative policies regarding the scope of advice
given to taxpayers. Treasury has perhaps decided it is wiser to make
• • /I- 230
fewer of its internal decisions public.
If tax complexity has grown over time and causes taxpayers to
seek more guidance from the government, one would expect the
231
number of private letter rulings to increase from year to- year.
Again, as with other categories of guidance, the number of private
rulings has varied from year to year.232 Such variance suggests that tax
complexity does not significantly affect the amount of guidance the
government furnishes to taxpayers. Thus, the alleged administrative
burden is not as great as one would expect.
D. Complexity Increases the Recordkeeping Burden and Compliance
Costs to Taxpayers
The burden of complexity to taxpayers is often expressed in terms
of time and dollars. As the tax laws become more complicated,
230 The Service's Income Tax and Accounting branch decided to end its practice
of issuing field service advice because these publicly available documents often
revealed the Service's case strategies and other information that it did not want to be
made public. The field service advice document has been replaced with a more
conservative "background advice memorandum" (BAM) that contains only a general
description of the legal questions present in the case at issue. Confidential
information will be issued in a "strategic advice memorandum" (SAM), which the
Service does not intend to publish for the general public. See John Almeras &
Heather Bennett, TEI Conference: TAM, SAM, BAM - The New IRS?, 97 TAX
NOTES 198 (Oct. 14, 2002).
231 Private letter rulings are the method by which taxpayers can get advance
rulings on various transactions. The Service refuses to offer private letter rulings on
certain issues. Rev. Proc. 2003-3, 2003-1 I.R.B. 113. Taxpayers seeking a private
letter ruling typically pay a user fee. Rev. Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1 I.R.B. 1 app. A
(general fee of $6000, but fee is reduced to $500 for requests involving either a
personal tax issue from an individual with gross income of less than $250,000 or a
business tax issue from a person with gross income of less than $1 million). Private
letter rulings bind the Service only as to the requesting taxpayer; other taxpayers may
not rely on a private letter ruling as authority, and private letter rulings may not be
cited as precedent before the United States Tax Court. Rev. Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1
I.R.B. 1; see also I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (written determinations not precedent).
232 See Table One accompanying supra note 229.
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taxpayers need to spend more time keeping proper records, learning
about the law, preparing the proper forms and returns, and sending
required documents to the Service.2 3 Additionally, taxpayers need to
spend more and more money for the advice of tax professionals,
including accountants and lawyers specially trained in matters of tax
compliance and planning. These burdens on taxpayers receive
criticism because they are inefficient and likely to breed
234
noncompliance.
The Joint Committee conceded that measuring the burden of
235
complexity on taxpayers is an inexact science. In support of its
assertion that complexity requires more and more time of taxpayers,
the Joint Committee Report cited 236 the Service's estimates of the
time required for individuals to file the most common return for
individuals, Form 1040. 237 The Joint Committee Report does not,
however, consider how the estimated time burden has changed over
the last several years. Table Two sets forth the Service's estimated
time required to prepare, complete, and file the Form 1040 for each of
the last several years.
233 For the argument that expanding tax withholding rules to include interest,
dividends, and other taxable distributions from institutional payors would exempt
50% to 80% of taxpayers from filing returns, see Snoe, supra note 6, at 111-15.
234 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1297-98; Pollack, supra note 4, at 352-53
& n. 124, 356 & n. 135; Schenk, supra note 31, at 166-67.
235 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 6,
103 (Joint Comm. Print 2001).
23 Id. at 103-04.
237 In 1998, Form 1040 was used by 62% of U.S. residents filing returns. See
Gale, supra note 9, at 1474. Other individual income tax forms include Form 1040-A
(used by 21% of individual taxpayers), and Form 1040-EZ (used by 17% of
individual taxpayers). Id. Approximately 8% of U.S. residents use the Form 1040
even though they are eligible to use the simpler Form 1040-A or the even easier Form
1040-EZ. Id. This suggests that to some extent, simplification efforts are for naught
- even when easier compliance avenues are made available, a significant number of
taxpayers fail to utilize them, possibly due to a lack of knowledge or simply apathy.
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TABLE TWO
ESTIMATED TIME TO COMPLETE FORM 1040, INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX RETURN 8
(ALL TIMES EXPRESSED IN HOURS:MINUTES)
Record- Learning about the Preparing Copying, Assembling,
Year Keeping Law and the Form Form and Sending Form to IRS Total
1990 3:08 2:33 3:17 0:35 9:33
1991 3:08 2:31 3:23 0:41 9:43
1992 3:08 2:42 3:37 0:49 10:16
1993 3:08 2:47 3:44 0:53 10:32
1994 3:08 2:53 4:41 0:53 11:35
1995 3:08 2:54 4:43 0:53 11:38
1996 3:08 2:32 4:33 0:40 10:53
1997 3:08 2:07 3:59 0:40 9:54
1998 3:34 2:25 4:55 0:40 11:34
1999 3:15 2:39 6:22 0:35 12:51
2000 2:45 3:25 6:16 0:35 12:57
2001 2:46 3:30 6:37 0:34 13:27
2002 2:46 3:45 6:05 0:34 13:10
Table Three also presents time estimates for Form 1120, the basic
corporate income tax return.239
238 The Service's time estimates are set forth in the instructions accompanying
the Form 1040. The data for Table Two therefore was assembled from the
Instructions to the Form 1040 for each year from 1990 to 2002. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS TO FORM 1040
(1990-2002).
139 Other corporate income tax returns include the Form 1120-S for S
corporations, the Form 1120-A (a short form for certain corporations), and the Form
1120-F for foreign corporations. For all corporate taxpayers in 1998, the Form 1120-S
was the most common one used (53.57% of all corporate income tax returns),
followed by the Form 1120 (41.70%), and then the Form 1120-A (4.37%). See
Patrice Treubert & William P. Janquet, Corporation Income Tax Returns, 1998, 21




ESTIMATED TIME TO COMPLETE FORM 1120, CORPORATE INCOME
TAX RETURN24
(ALL TIMES EXPRESSED IN HOURS:MINUTES)
Record- Learning about the Preparing Copying, Assembling,
Year Keeping Law and the Form Form and Sending Form to IRS Total
1990 68:24 39:51 70:38 8:02 186:55
1991 68:10 39:51 70:39 8:02 186:42
1992 68:24 39:51 70:38 8:02 186:55
1993 71:16 40:21 71:13 8:02 190:52
1994 71:16 41:08 72:02 8:02 192:28
1995 71:59 41:58 71:59 7:47 193:43
1996 71:31 41:46 71:46 7:47 192:50
1997 71:31 41:46 71:02 7:47 192:06
1998 71:59 41:10 71:08 7:47 192:04
1999 71:59 41:10 71:08 7:47 192:04
2000 71:30 42:02 72:58 8:02 194:32
2001 71:18 43:29 75:24 8:18 198:29
2002 71:18 43:29 75:24 8:18 198:29
Both Table Two and Table Three show that the average time burden
for both individual and corporate taxpayers has increased since 1990.
Comparing 1990 against 2002, the estimated average time for an
individual to complete the Form 1040 increased by nearly four hours
(more than 40% more time), and the average time for a corporation
to complete the Form 1120 increased by more than 11.5 hours (an
increase of only 6%). It is worth noting that the estimated total time
for individuals has varied over that eleven-year period. The largest
one-year increases in total time for individuals occurred between 1993
and 1994, 1997 and 1998, 1998 and 1999, and 2000 and 2001. Not
241surprisingly, Congress enacted significant tax legislation in 1993,
1997,242 1998, 243 and 2001244 that changed a number of rules affecting
240 As with Table Two, the data for Table Three was derived from the Service's
estimates set forth in the Instructions to the Form 1120 for each of the years 1990-
2002. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
INSTRUCTIONS TO FORM 1120 (1990-2002).
241 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat.
312.
... See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
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many individual taxpayers. The estimated average total time for
individuals dropped in 1995 and again in 1996. This was not the result
of tax law simplification, as Congress made no significant changes to
the Code during those years. Perhaps it was the result of tax laws
being consistent. The ever-shifting nature of federal tax laws may
impose greater burdens on taxpayers than the overall complexity of
the Code does. The limited data available supports such an
interpretation.
Another significant trend reflected in Table Two is the reduced
record-keeping burden on taxpayers. According to the Service's
estimates reflected in Table Two, individual taxpayers need not spend
as much time keeping proper records to comply with federal income
tax laws as they once did. The Joint Committee, however, concluded
that changes in the law have increased burdens to the taxpayers by
245
adding provisions for which taxpayers must retain records.
Perhaps this analysis gives the Service's estimates more weight
than they are due. Even the Service has acknowledged that the
246formulae used to compute the estimates have shortcomings. This is
the only empirical data the government has regarding the time burden
to taxpayers, and it suggests no causal link between complexity and
the time spent completing returns.247  In any event, the Joint
Committee Report was remiss in not considering the estimates over a
period of time and did not credibly support its conclusions as to the
taxpayer compliance burden.
Another point used to suggest an increased burden on taxpayers
243 See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685.
244 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
245 See 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL
STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 103,
106 (Joint Comm. Print 2001).
246 The four general criticisms of the models used to estimate the time burden for
returns are: (1) the taxpayer survey data is old; (2) certain components of burden,
including post-filing burdens, are excluded from the formulae; (3) the determinants of
burden are given "simplistic treatment"; and (4) the estimates have questionable
statistical validity because of poor documentation. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUS., TAX
ADMINISTRATION: IRS IS WORKING TO IMPROVE ITS ESTIMATES OF COMPLIANCE
BURDEN 18-19 (2000); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION
RELATED TO THE SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 75 (2001).
247 Other studies were analyzed in Gale, supra note 9, at 1472-74.
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is that taxpayers are spending more money to retain the assistance of
professional tax advisers. As proof of the increased compliance cost
to taxpayers, the Joint Committee Report cited an Internal Revenue
Service comparison of individual income tax returns filed in 1990 and
1999. Professionals prepared 55% of all individual income tax returns
filed in 1999, compared to only 48% of individual returns filed in
1990. The data also shows a significant increase in the percentage of
returns prepared using computer software programs (46% of returns
filed in 1999 compared to 16% of returns filed in 1990) and in the
percentage of returns filed electronically (17% in 1999 compared to
4% in 1990). 249 The Joint Committee Report suggested that increased
tax complexity may be one reason for the increased reliance on paid
preparers, but it conceded that taxpayers might employ professionals
because the value of the taxpayer's time that he or she would expend
exceeds the cost of the preparer's total fee.2'°
The increased use of computer software programs to complete
individual returns also fails to prove that the burdens on taxpayers
have increased. As the Joint Committee Report has acknowledged,
the use of computer software reduces the time it takes taxpayers to
2511perform calculations and to learn about the law, which hardly
suggests that taxpayers find the law too difficult or too costly for
adequate compliance. The increased use of electronic filing also
suggests that total compliance time is diminishing, leading the Joint
Committee Report to infer that the Service's estimated average
212
compliance times are inflated . Yet all of this data supports a
conclusion completely opposite to the one reached by the Joint
Committee Report: taxpayers are- finding ways to reduce their
compliance burdens and are taking advantage of easier compliance
alternatives. Certainly, the Treasury and the Service should be
248 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 105;
see also Gale, supra note 9, at 1474 ("In 1998, 53 percent of tax filers used paid
preparers.").
249 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 105.
250 Id. Additionally, some individuals might enlist paid preparers to get refunds
more quickly through electronic filing. Gale, supra note 9, at 1474.
251 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 106.
252 Id.
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encouraged to continue providing alternative and increasingly
efficient means for taxpayer compliance, which is not the same as
saying that the Code and regulations are too complex. The ever-
increasing complexity of the federal tax laws has had no distinctly
discernible effect on the costs (time or dollars) of compliance.
E. Complexity Fosters Disputes Between Taxpayers and the Internal
Revenue Service
The argument here is that complexity invites dispute. If the laws
are too vague, disputes between taxpayers and the Service are
inevitable. 53 On the other hand, if the laws are too technical, disputes
may arise as to the applicability of a particular provision to a given254
case. If this argument were true, one would expect to see more
disputes over time, again assuming that the tax laws become more
complex (either more vague, more technical, or both) over time. In
fact, however, the number of litigated disputes between taxpayers and
the Service has been decreasing over the last decade. Data from the
Service's Chief Counsel shows that the total number of tax cases has
decreased from about 57,400 in 1990 to only 23,800 in 1999.2" The
decrease is likely the result of numerous attempts by the Service to
reduce taxpayer disputes through various compromise programs. It
256
may also reflect reduced audit rates over that same period 6. Finally,
the reduced caseload may indicate that statutory solutions to tax
shelter activities have been successful in preventing disputes. One
could argue that, absent these extra measures from the Service to
reach compromise and absent the reduced audit rates, the number of
tax cases would be much higher perhaps due to tax complexity. The
Joint Committee Report offers no such argument, probably due to
the lack of evidence to support it.
Upon closer scrutiny, the purported disadvantages of tax
complexity do not seem very substantial. Tax complexity is not as
harmful as one might think, and, as shown earlier, many of the causes
of tax complexity will not disappear anytime soon. In light of these
2" See Miller, supra note 76, at 20.
2m See Pollack, supra note 4, at 349-50.
" GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM 36-37 (2001); see also 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF
THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986, at 123.
256 See supra note 115 (noting steady decline in audit rates for past few years).
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conclusions, one must wonder why tax simplification is gaining so
much momentum in contemporary policy debates.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR TAX SIMPLIFICATION
Although the analysis to this point seriously questions the need to
remedy tax complexity, the Joint Committee Report and other
advocates have offered various proposals for simplifying the tax laws.
Part IV will analyze three of the more significant proposals made by
the Joint Committee Report: the repeal of the alternative minimum
tax (AMT), the restructuring of the treatment of capital gains, and the
repeal of income-based phaseouts and phaseins.
A. Alternative Minimum Tax
The AMT is a backstop measure designed to ensure that wealthy
taxpayers pay at least a certain "minimum" amount of income tax. 7
258The history of the AMT is an epic saga spanning over thirty years.
Its history not only serves as helpful background but also as an
illustration of increasing tax complexity in action.29
In the late 1960s, Congress became concerned that some wealthy
taxpayers were making what it considered an excessive use of various
exclusion and deduction provisions to minimize tax liability.2 ° The
tax liabilities of taxpayers with equivalent incomes varied significantly
because of these "tax preference items., 261 In many cases, wealthier
257 See S. REP. No. 99-313 (1986); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-426 (1985); JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES RELATING TO THE
INDIVIDUAL ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX (AMT) (Joint Comm. Print 1998).
258 See generally 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE
OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1986, at 2-6.
259 Professor Pollack argues the evolution of the AMT "reflects the worst
tendency of incremental policymaking-tinkering with change at the margins rather
than confronting the underlying problems." Pollack, supra note 4, at 346.
260 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 105 (Joint Comm. Print 1970).
261 The first items of tax preference were: (1) the excess of investment interest
expenses then allowed as a deduction over net investment income; (2) accelerated
depreciation of real property; (3) accelerated depreciation of personal property
subject to a net lease; (4) the excess depreciation deduction then allowed to certain
pollution control facilities; (5) the excess depreciation deduction then allowed for
railroad rolling stock; (6) the difference between the fair market value of a qualified
or restricted stock option and its exercise price; (7) excessive bad debt reserves for
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taxpayers exploited tax preference items, which allowed them to pay
tax at a lower effective rate than taxpayers with substantially less
262income. In some extreme cases, wealthy individual and corporate
taxpayers paid no tax at all.263 A crisis of horizontal and vertical
264
equity occurred 6. Congress had three options in responding to the
crisis: (1) do nothing and accept the disparate tax treatments as a
justifiable departure from horizontal and vertical equity, (2) limit the
benefit of each tax preference item available to wealthier taxpayers
(perhaps by phaseout provisions or flat ceilings), or (3) impose an
additional tax liability on wealthy taxpayers who claim an excessive
amount of tax preference items. Congress opted for the last option,
enacting an "add-on minimum tax" as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969.265 The add-on minimum tax base was the sum of tax preference
items claimed by a taxpayer minus an exemption amount of, in most
cases, $30,000.266  The tax was then 10% of the tax base.261 In
computing the total tax due, the add-on minimum tax liability
268increased the taxpayer's regular tax liability. Of course, the add-on
minimum tax contributed to tax complexity since wealthy taxpayers
had to perform additional computations and plan for possible
application of an additional tax. Again, simplicity took a back seat to
269
equity, but Congress was apparently happy to make the sacrifice.
financial institutions; (8) the depletion deduction for timber, mineral, and oil and gas
properties; and (9) one-half of an individual taxpayer's net capital gain. Tax Reform
Act of 1969, Pub L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487, 581-82 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
262 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 105.
263 Id.; see also Shirley A. Jones, The Evolution of the Corporate Minimum Tax,
20 J. CORP. TAX'N. 351, 351 (1994) (noting a 1969 Treasury study that found "154
returns filed in 1966 reported gross incomes of $200,000 or more on which no federal
income taxes were paid").
2 Indeed, there was also a crisis of efficiency, in the neutrality sense of the term.
Obviously many wealthy taxpayers were altering their behavior to take advantage of
the tax preference items.




269 Others have indirectly argued that imposing an additional tax on those who
legally claim tax benefits to which they are entitled is poor policy. See generally
Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S.
International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 1001 (1997); Pollack, supra
note 4, at 345-46. These scholars would limit each of the tax preference items
separately so that there is no need for an additional tax. As discussed later, though,
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Within a few years, however, taxpayers subject to the additional
270tax found ways to circumvent the add-on minimum tax. In the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Congress strengthened the add-on minimum tax
by expanding the list of tax preference items, increasing the tax rate
to 15%, and reducing the exemption amount.27' By enlarging the
scope of the add-on minimum tax, both in the number of tax
preference items and in the number of taxpayers subject to the tax,
Congress increased tax complexity. Congress found the added
complexity necessary to achieve the equity correction it originally
272
sought.
The reforms introduced in 1976 were short-lived. By 1978,
Congress determined that the add-on minimum tax was adversely
273
affecting market decisions, specifically capital formation 7. In the
274Revenue Act of 1978, Congress created a new "alternative
minimum tax" for the capital gains deduction27 and for excess
itemized deductions.216 Congress did preserve the add-on minimum
tax for all other tax preference items. Under the first AMT,
"alternative minimum taxable income" in excess of $20,000 was
tailoring each tax preference item separately would be less palatable not only because
of the added complexity but also because it would overcorrect the problem by
subjecting more taxpayers to adjustments. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
270 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 105, 107 (Joint Comm. Print 1976) (pertaining to
individuals and corporations, respectively).
271 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301, 90 Stat. 1520, 1549
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
272 In this regard, the 1976 amendments to the Code are examples of Congress
repairing defective legislation. See supra Part II.A.7.
273 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 95TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1978, at 261 (Joint Comm. Print 1979).
274 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
275 Under prior law, individual taxpayers deducted one-half of the net capital
gain in determining taxable income. In effect, then, capital gains were always taxed
at an effective rate of one-half of the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. Thus, capital gains
in the hands of a taxpayer with a marginal tax rate of 40% would be subject to tax at
a rate of 20%. For more on the deduction for capital gains as an alternative to the
preferential tax rates under current law, see supra Part IV.B.
276 Individuals can choose to compute taxable income using either the standard
deduction or by itemizing all other deductions not allowed in computing adjusted
gross income. I.R.C. § 63(a)-(b). As a practical mater, taxpayers should itemize
when the total amount of itemized deductions exceeds the standard deduction
amount. In fact, however, taxpayers may be claiming the standard deduction merely
for convenience. See supra note 223.
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subject to marginal tax rates ranging from 10% to 25%.277 If the AMT
liability exceeded the sum of the taxpayer's regular tax and add-on
minimum tax liabilities, the taxpayer paid the AMT liability instead of
278the other taxes. Congress designed the first AMT to affect the total
tax liability only of those taxpayers with incomes over $50,000.29 By
customizing its reform efforts to impact only wealthier taxpayers,
Congress contributed to tax complexity. Now there were two
surcharge taxes, not one. Although the new AMT only taxed
wealthier taxpayers who made excessive use of two tax preference
items, many had to determine whether either or both the AMT and
the leftover add-on minimum tax applied to them. Mass complexity
increased slightly, and specific complexity for those likely subject to
the AMT increased significantly.280
The two-tax surcharge regime only lasted four years. Congress
repealed the add-on minimum tax for individuals in the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.28' The tax preference items
subject to the add-on minimum tax became subject to the AMT. 2
Congress also increased the AMT exemption amount to $30,000 (or
$40,000 for couples filing a joint return).283 The intent of the 1982
reforms was to reduce the scope of the AMT.284 Again, the tax was
supposed to affect only those with incomes over $50,000.281 Congress
also hoped to simplify taxpayer computations by consolidating two
surcharge taxes into one. 2M Interestingly, the add-on minimum tax
continued to apply to corporate taxpayers, with no explanation as to
why the complexity burden was acceptable for corporations. Since
Congress reduced the scope of the AMT, one would expect the AMT
to be less effective in preventing taxpayers from making excessive use
2'n Revenue Act of 1978 § 421, 92 Stat. at 2871-72.
278 Id. The current AMT liability is calculated in the same manner. I.R.C.
§ 55(a).
279 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE AcT OF 1978, at 262 (Joint Comm. Print 1979).
For a discussion of the trade-off between mass complexity and specific
complexity, see supra Part II.A.4.
28' Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324.
2 Id. § 201, 96 Stat. at 411-12.
283 Id. § 201, 96 Stat. at 416.
2s4 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AcT OF





of exclusions, deductions, and credits.
By 1986, the prediction of limited effectiveness had come true.
Congress had become concerned that the AMT omitted many tax
preference items and allowed many wealthy taxpayers to continue
paying less than a "fair" amount of tax."87 As part of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986,2 Congress added to the list of tax preference items
subject to the AMT"89 and substituted a flat AMT rate of 21%.290
Corporate taxpayers became subject to the AMT (but at a flat rate of
20%291), and Congress fully repealed the add-on minimum tax.292
Only four years after limiting the scope of the AMT to reduce mass
complexity, Congress realized that simplification frustrated the
overall purpose of the AMT. It deliberately decided to restore
complexity in order to advance the equity sought by the AMT.
In the next decade, Congress twice raised the AMT rate for
individuals 2 93 but otherwise left the AMT alone. With the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, Congress made two significant changes to the
AMT.294  First, it modified the adjustment made to depreciation
deductions with respect to property placed in service after December
31, 1998.295  The modification served to curtail AMT liability
attributable to the accelerated depreciation deductions available to
taxpayers because Congress determined that such liability was
296impeding capital formation and business operations. Second,
Congress repealed the AMT for corporations with average annual
M JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 432-33 (Joint Comm. Print 1987).
288 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
289 Id. § 701, 100 Stat. at 2333-35 (adding tax-exempt interest and the fair market
value deduction for charitable contributions of appreciated property to the list of
preference items).
290 Id. § 701, 100 Stat. at 2321.
291 Id.
292 See generally id., 100 Stat. at 2320-39.
293 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 increased the AMT rate to
24% for individuals. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11102, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388. The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 imposed a two-tier rate structure of 26%
and 28%. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13202, 107 Stat. 312, 461-62 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 55(b)(1)(A) (1993)). The first $175,000 of "alternative minimum taxable income"
in excess of the applicable exemption amount was subject to tax at 26%. Id. at 461.
Additional amounts were taxed at 28%. Id. at 462.
294 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 401,111 Stat. 788.
295 Id. § 402, 111 Stat. at 844 (codified at I.R.C. § 56(a)(1)(A)(i) (1997)).
296 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997, at 60 (Joint Comm. Print 1997).
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gross receipts of less than $7.5 million.97  Congress cited
administrative complexity as the justification for removing small
298
corporations from the reach of the AMT. Considering that less
299than 1% of all taxpayers pay AMT, the degree of simplicity
achieved by exempting small corporations is likely minimal. A better
justification for the small corporation exemption is that it furthers the
original purpose of the AMT. From its inception, Congress intended
the AMT to reach only wealthy taxpayers, originally defined as those
with incomes in excess of $50,000.30 By relieving small corporations
of AMT liability, Congress preserved the limited scope while
maintaining an effective deterrent for those taxpayers within its
scope. Justifying the exemption as a simplification measure though
would only serve to open the door to eventual repeal.
Legislation passed in 1999 and then vetoed by President Clinton
would have slowly repealed the AMT for individuals altogether.3'
Remarkably, the 2001 Act did not contain a similar provision. The
AMT saga is apparently an unfinished work. The Joint Committee
Report goes a step further than the vetoed 1999 legislation: it
recommends the elimination of both the individual AMT and the
corporate AMT.3°2 It justifies complete repeal on three grounds.
First, the Joint Committee Report complains of the significant
compliance burden placed on taxpayers, noting Service estimates that
taxpayers annually devote more than 29 million hours in completing
Form 6251, the AMT computation form.3 3 There is no question that
the AMT contributes to tax complexity, but at the risk of redundancy,
the added complexity is acceptable if the AMT is serving important
objectives. Neither the Joint Committee Report nor other advocates
of repeal3°4 question the underlying objective of the AMT. °3
297 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 401, 111 Stat. at 843.
298 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997, at 60.
299 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 17
(Joint Comm. Print 2001).
300 See supra notes 257-63 and accompanying text.
30' Taxpayer Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th Cong. § 121 (1999).
302 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 15.
303 Id. at 13.
304 Richard M. Lipton, Chair of the American Bar Association Section of
Taxation, has called for repeal of the AMT. Richard M. Lipton, To Simplify Code,
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Repealing the AMT solely on complexity grounds is not sufficient.
Second, the Joint Committee Report observes that the AMT, if
unchanged, will reach an increasing number of taxpayers over the
next ten years.306 The Joint Committee Report estimates that more
than 11% of taxpayers will face AMT liability in 2011307 - a number
far in excess of original intentions.30 8 Taxpayers within reach of the
AMT will include many middle-income taxpayers with some capital
gains who also make use of many personal exemptions and the child
tax credit.309 This threatens horizontal equity. The growing number
of taxpayers subject to the AMT is a function of several factors. In
general, regular tax rates are lower now than when Congress created
the AMT.31° The AMT rates, however, have not changed consistently
with the regular tax rates. Also, the AMT exemption amount is not
subject to inflation adjustments, unlike many aspects of the regular
income tax."' Congress can cure these problems without repealing
the AMT. Inflation adjustments can normalize the AMT exemption
amounts, and Congress can structure the AMT rate as a function of
regular tax rates."' Thus, the AMT rate would rise or fall as regular
tax rates rise or fall. Repealing the AMT due to its increased scope in
the future would overcorrect for the problem.
Start by Repealing the AMT, 91 TAX NoTEs 2254 (June 25, 2001).
305 For a justification of the AMT on grounds of "perceptional equity," see
Daniel N. Shaviro, Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 393, 414 (1993).
306 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 17.
307 Id.
308 Id. at 15; see also Gale, supra note 9, at 1469.
309 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 14.
Even for those taxpayers who pay no AMT, there is the added burden of completing
AMT forms and worksheets to determine eligibility for the child tax credit and other
nonrefundable income tax credits. See I.R.C. § 26.
310 In 1969, the highest marginal tax rate for individuals was 70%. I.R.C. § 1,
amended by Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803(a), 83 Stat. 678-82. As a
result of the 2001 Act, the highest such rate for individuals in 2001, the year of the
Joint Committee Report, was only 39.1%. I.R.C. § 1(i)(2).
311 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1(f) (inflation adjustments to tax brackets), 63(c)(4)
(inflation adjustments to amount of standard deduction), 68(a)(2) (inflation
adjustments to overall limit on itemized deductions), 151(d)(4) (inflation adjustments
to personal and dependency exemptions).
312 Gale, supra note 9, at 1470; see also Oskar R. Harmon, AMT: Why and How
to Reform, 91 TAX NOTES 667, 670 (Apr. 23, 2001).
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Third, the Joint Committee Report argues that the AMT is no
longer necessary now that the regular tax system contains specific
provisions that accomplish the same general goal."' It cites the
enactment of the passive loss rules in 1986314 as evidence that the
Code already contains anti-abuse provisions designed to curb taxS• -. 315
shelter activities. Consequently, the Joint Committee Report
concludes that the regular tax base is too similar to the AMT base to
warrant the imposition of a separate tax.316 As the Joint Committee
Report states, "legislative changes since the Tax Reform Act of
1986... have had the effect of more closely conforming the regular
tax base for individual taxpayers to the alternative minimum tax
base., 317 What the Joint Committee Report does not consider is that
even if the respective tax bases are similar, the few differences may be
important in preventing high-income taxpayers from paying less than
an equitable amount of tax. Another interesting aspect of this
argument for repeal is its apparent preference to overcorrect the
perceived abuses by imposing limitations applicable to all taxpayers
(like the passive loss rules) rather than to correct the problem by
imposing an additional tax on the target group of abusers. Scholars
already complain of the complexity of the passive loss rules. 8 The
313 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAX., 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF
THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 15.
314 See I.R.C. § 469. In general, the passive loss rules permit taxpayers to deduct
losses from "passive activities" only to the extent of the taxpayer's aggregate income
from all "passive activities." I.R.C. § 469(a), (d)(1). Any disallowed passive losses
carry over to the next taxable year. I.R.C. § 469(b). A "passive activity," in general,
is any business activity in which the taxpayer does not "materially participate."
I.R.C. § 469(c)(1). A taxpayer is deemed to materially participate in an activity if the
taxpayer meets any one of several tests contained in the Regulations. See Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T (2003). The passive loss rules thus discourage limited
participation in activities designed to generate substantial losses.
315 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 15.
Another example of an anti-tax shelter provision is section 465. See I.R.C. § 465
(disallowing losses except to the extent the taxpayer is "at-risk" with respect to the
loss).
316 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 15.
317 Id.
318 See generally Hymel, supra note 29; Miller, supra note 76, at 18-20; Pollack,
supra note 4, at 339-40; Snoe, supra note 6, at 97-98.
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Joint Committee Report's preference for mass complexity over
specific complexity in the case of the AMT is curious.3 1 9
The arguments of scope and redundancy are flawed. Only the
complexity argument remains. To that, the definitive response is that
the complexity of the AMT is a necessary toll incurred to limit
excessive use of tax preference items. The AMT acts as a watchdog
to make sure taxpayers who make use of tax benefits do not benefit
too much. To the extent the AMT promotes fairness and taxpayer
perceptions of equity at the cost of specific complexity, the Joint
Committee should rethink its recommendation for repeal. If
Congress would rather not limit each tax preference item separately
because such reform would be too complicated, Congress should
welcome the AMT as a simpler vehicle for fairness.
B. Treatment of Capital Gains
321The Code gives preferential treatment to certain gains from the
sale or exchange of capital assets322 by individuals.323 Such treatment
319 The Joint Committee Report offered no simplification proposals with respect
to the passive loss rules, despite the criticisms of complexity. This was probably
because any such proposals would profoundly affect the policy decisions underlying
the Code provision, and the Joint Committee Report tried to avoid discussion of
proposals that would have such an effect. See 1 JOINT COMM. ON TAxATION, 107TH
CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAx SYSTEM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 44. But if the AMT is unnecessary because it
accomplishes the same objectives as the passive loss rules, one wonders why the Joint
Committee felt free to call for repeal of the AMT. Clearly, the repeal of the AMT is
just as much a policy decision as simplification of the passive loss rules.
320 There is no doubt, however, that the AMT is in need of reform. For example,
recommendations for a deduction for contingent fees paid to attorneys should be
enacted. See Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, Judge Posner's Failed Opinion in
Kenseth, 92 TAX NOTES 1227, 1227-28 (Aug. 27, 2001). This proposal advocates
tailored reform, not over-correction.
321 In order to be taxed at a reduced rate, the asset giving rise to the capital gain
must have been held by the taxpayer for more than one year. I.R.C. §§ 1(h); 1222(1)-
(4), (11). Holding periods are determined with reference to special operating rules
set forth in section 1223. See I.R.C. § 1223. For instance, the holding period for
appreciated property acquired by gift includes the donor's holding period. I.R.C.
§§ 1223(2), 1015(a).
322 Section 1221(a) defines a capital asset as any asset other than (1) inventory
and raw materials; (2) property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business; (3) real property used in a business; (4) depreciable personal
property used in a business; (5) certain intangibles created by or for the taxpayer; (6)
accounts and notes receivable from the sale of raw materials, inventory, or property
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is consistent with Congress' long-standing practice of preferential
treatment for these "capital gains. 3 4  The policy justifications for
preferential treatment are hotly debated,3 5 but its track record
suggests Congress is very unlikely to reconsider its capital gains
policy. Assuming, then, that preferential tax treatment for capital
gains is a legitimate policy objective, the question becomes how to
extend such treatment.
The current solution is a combination of exclusions and lower tax
rates applicable to capital gains. Preferential tax rates apply to
held for sale to customers; (7) certain governmental publications; (8) so-called
"commodities derivative financial instruments" held by commodities derivatives
dealers; (9) hedging transactions; and (10) supplies regularly used or consumed in the
ordinary course of business. I.R.C. § 1221(a).
323 I.R.C. § 1(h). Corporations receive no preferential tax treatment for capital
gains. I.R.C. § 1201(a). Still, characterization of gains and losses is important for
corporate taxpayers because capital losses are only deductible to the extent of capital
gains. I.R.C. § 1211(a). Excess capital losses are subject to special carryback and
carryover rules set forth in section 1212. See I.R.C. § 1212(a).
324 Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1921, Congress has provided individual
taxpayers with reduced rates for net capital gains. See Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L.
No. 67-98, § 136, 42 Stat. 227. From 1921 to 1942, capital gains were taxed at lower
rates than those that applied to ordinary income. From 1942 to 1986, the Code
contained no preferential rates, but individuals were permitted to exclude at least half
of all capital gains and losses if the assets sold or exchanged were held for more than
six months. 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL
STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 100.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed all exclusions and preferential tax rates for
capital gains. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, 100 Stat. 2085,
2216. By 1990, however, preferential rates were restored. The Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1990 increased the maximum marginal tax rate on ordinary
income to 31% but kept the rate for net capital gains at 28%. Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388. The capital gains
rate stayed at 28% even when Congress raised the maximum marginal tax rate on
ordinary income to 39.6%. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e).
325 See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital
Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319 (1993); Daniel Halperin, Commentary: A
Capital Gains Preference is Not EVEN a Second-Best Solution, 48 TAX L. REV. 381
(1993); Snoe, supra note 6, at 66-85; Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield, The
Case for the Restoration of a Capital Gains Tax Differential, 43 TAX NOTES 1019 (May
22, 1989); Deborah M. Weiss, Can Capital Tax Policy Be Fair? Stimulating Savings
Through Differential Tax Rates, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 206 (1993); Bonner Menking,
Comment, Making Sense of Capital Gains Taxation, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 175 (1990).
For the argument that a preferential rate for capital gains is inefficient, see
McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1295-96.
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individual taxpayers with a "net capital gain, 326 which by definition
requires a taxpayer to have net gains from sales or exchanges of
capital assets held for more than one year.3 27 For individuals subject
to the top tax brackets, the tax rate for net capital gains is generally
20%;32 for taxpayers in the lower brackets, however, the net capital
gain tax rate is generally 10%.329 If a taxpayer in these lower brackets
held a capital asset for more than five years, the tax rate drops to
8%.330 Any such gain, with a holding period beginning after
December 31, 2000, will even qualify wealthy taxpayers for a reduced
preferential rate of 18%.331 The Code taxes some capital gains at
slightly higher rates, though these rates are still lower than the rates
applicable to ordinary income. These special items are gains from
332
sales and exchanges of collectibles (taxed at 28% 3..) and gain
attributable to unrecaptured depreciation deductions on real
property3 4 (taxed at 25%331).
In addition to preferential tax rates, an individual can sometimes
exclude all or a portion of the gain realized upon the sale or exchange
of a capital asset. For instance, a shareholder can exclude 50% of the
gain from the sale or exchange of original issue "qualified small
336business stock" that he or she has held for more than five years.
The exclusion rate grows to 60% in the case of qualified small
business stock in a corporation doing business within an
"empowerment zone. 337 Moreover, some capital gains are excluded
326 I.R.C. § 1(h).
327 I.R.C. § 1222(1)-(4), (11).
328 I.R.C. § l(h)(1)(C).
329 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B).
330 I.R.C. § 1(h)(2)(A).
331 I.R.C. § 1(h)(2)(B).
332 I.R.C. § 1(h)(5)-(6). For this purpose, "collectibles" include artwork, rugs,
antiques, metals, gems, stamps, coins, alcoholic beverages, and other assets
specifically identified as collectibles by the Secretary of the Treasury. I.R.C.
§ 408(m)(2).
333 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(E).
334 I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(7), 1250.
335 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D).
336 I.R.C. § 1202(a)(1), (c)(1). One-half of the amount excluded (or 25% of the
total gain) is a tax preference item for purposes of the AMT. I.R.C. § 57(a)(7). A
"qualified small business" is any C corporation with aggregate gross assets of $50
million or less before and after the stock issuance. I.R.C. § 1202(d).
337 I.R.C. § 1202(a)(2). The corporation must have been a "qualified business
entity" for "substantially all of the taxpayer's holding period for such stock." Id.
Qualified business entities, in general, perform most of their business activities and
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entirely, meaning that the effective tax rate on such gains is zero.
These gains include sales of capital assets representing stock,
partnership interests, or tangible property used in a business operated
in the District of Columbia Enterprise Zone338 and, with respect to
assets acquired after 2001, those related to a business operated in a
"renewal community. 3 19
As a result of the current hybrid system, there are eighteen
possible tax rates for capital gains. Table Four summarizes the
eighteen rates that were used for individual taxpayers in 2002:
TABLE FOUR340
EFFECTIVE 2002 TAX RATES APPLICABLE TO CAPITAL GAINS
Regular Tax Bracket"'
Type of Capital Gain 10% 15% 27% 30% 35% 38.6%
Short-Term Capital Gain3'2  10% 15% 27% 30% 35% 38.6%
Long-Term Capital Gain34' 10% 10% 20% 20% 20% 20%
have most of their assets within one of the "empowerment zones" identified by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. I.R.C. §§ 1391(b), 1393(b),
1397C(b).
338 I.R.C. § 1400B. The District of Columbia Enterprise Zone is, in essence, the
entire District of Columbia. I.R.C. § 1400(a)-(c).
339 I.R.C. § 1400F. A "renewal community" is one designated as such by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. I.R.C. § 1400E(a). The assets
eligible for the renewal community exclusion are the same types of assets eligible for
the District of Columbia Enterprise Zone exclusion. See I.R.C. §§ 1400F(a) and
1400G.
Table Four is based upon a similar table appearing in 2 JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION
8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 99 (Joint Comm. Print
2001).
34' The six columns on the right detail the applicable capital gains rates for
taxpayers in each of the six marginal tax brackets for ordinary income. Thus, for
example, a taxpayer whose last dollar of ordinary income is taxed at 35% enjoys a
20% tax rate on general long-term capital gains.
342 This term refers to gain from the sale or exchange of capital assets held for
less than one year. I.R.C. § 1222(1).
143 This term refers to gain from the sale or exchange of capital assets held for




Type of Capital Gain 10% 15% 27% 30% 35% 38.6%
Section 1250 Gain" 10% 15% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Collectibles Gain' 10% 15% 27% 28% 28% 28%
Small Business Stock46 5% 7.5% 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 13.5%
Small Business Stock for 4% 6% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8%
Empowerment Zone Business 37
Five-Year Gain (property 8% 8% 20% 20% 20% 20%
acquired before 2001)34 1
Five-Year Gain (property 8% 8% 18% 18% 18% 18%
acquired after 2000)349
D.C. Enterprise Zone Stock and 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Renewal Community Stock"'
The Joint Committee Report finds the current system too complex.35t
Its solution is to eliminate all preferential tax rates and to permit
individual taxpayers to deduct "a fixed percentage" of their net
352
capital gains. The Joint Committee Report recommends retention
of the exclusions for small business stock, D.C. Enterprise Zone
stock, and renewal community stock.353
The Joint Committee Report does not suggest an appropriate
percentage for the proposed reduction. For purposes of illustration,
however, assume that Congress repealed all preferential rates and
3" I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(D), (h)(7). See infra notes 359-67 and accompanying text.
345 This term refers to long-term capital gains from the sale or exchange of
collectibles. See supra note 332 and accompanying text.
W This term refers to long-term capital gains eligible for the 50% exclusion
under section 1202(a)(1). See § 1202(a)(1); see also supra note 336 and accompanying
text.
347 I.R.C. § 1202(a)(2); see supra note 337 and accompanying text.
3" I.R.C. § 1(h)(2)(A); see supra note 330 and accompanying text.
349 I.R.C. § 1(h)(2)(B); see supra note 330-31 and accompanying text.
350 I.R.C. §§ 1400B, 1400F; see supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text.
351 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 102
(Joint Comm. Print 2001).
352 Id. at 103. Other commentators support this proposal. See, e.g., Gale, supra
note 9, at 1470.
353 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 103.
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permitted individual taxpayers to deduct 40% of the net capital gain.
Under the new law, individual taxpayers could face as many as twenty
different effective tax rates for capital gains - two more than under
the current system! This is shown in Table Five, where the 2002 tax
rates for capital gains are recomputed assuming Congress adopted the
Joint Committee Report proposal:
TABLE FIVE
35 4
EFFECTIVE 2002 TAX RATES APPLICABLE TO CAPITAL GAINS,
ASSUMING 40% DEDUCTION FOR NET CAPITAL GAIN
Regular Tax Bracket
Type of Capital Gain 10% 15% 27% 30% 35% 38.6%
Short-Term Capital Gain 10% 15% 27% 30% 35% 38.6%
Long-Term Capital Gain 6% 9% 16.2% 18% 21% 23.16%
Section 1250 Gain 6% 9% 16.2% 18% 21% 23.16%
Collectibles Gain 6% 9% 16.2% 18% 21% 23.16%
Small Business Stock 3% 4.5% 8.1% 9% 10.5% 11.58%
Small Business Stock for 2.4% 3.6% 6.48% 7.2% 8.4% 9.264%
Empowerment Zone Business
Five-Year Gain (property 6% 9% 16.2% 18% 21% 23.16%
acquired before 2001)
Five-Year Gain (property 6% 9% 16.2% 18% 21% 23.16%
acquired after 2000)
D.C. Enterprise Zone Stock and 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Renewal Community Stock
Of course, any one taxpayer will not face more than five different
rates, which under the current system is true only for taxpayers in the
lowest tax bracket. The wealthiest taxpayers in the current system
face up to eight different tax rates on capital gains; under the Joint
Committee Report proposal, the same taxpayers face only five
different rates.355 While the total number of possible rates increases
under the proposal, the number of tax rates facing wealthier
354 The terms used in Table Five have the same meanings as those used in Table
Four. See supra notes 341-50.
355 According to Table Five, for example, a taxpayer in the 35% marginal tax
bracket for ordinary income could face as many as five different rates for capital
gains: 35%, 21%, 10.5%, 8.4%, and 0%. See supra note 354 and accompanying Table
Five. Under current law, however, the same taxpayer faces up to eight different rates
for capital gains: 35%, 20%, 25%, 28%, 13.5%, 10.8%, 18%, and 0%. See supra note
340 and accompanying Table Four.
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taxpayers will decrease.
Although the Joint Committee Report proposal is somewhat
simpler for wealthier taxpayers, it represents a significant departure
from current tax policy since a deduction or exclusion for all long-
term capital gains has been absent from the Code for some fifteen116
years. For example, significant policy implications cause the
different tax rates for collectibles and unrecaptured depreciation
deductions with respect to real property used in a trade or business
activity. When all capital gains were subject to an exclusion,
commentators argued that an equal preference for collectibles
represented bad tax policy.357  They argued that investments in
collectibles were entirely speculative and were economically
inefficient in that they restricted capital mobility and did not promote
growth or employment. When Congress ultimately reduced the
capital gains rate from 28% to 20%, it deliberately retained the 28%
• .• 358
rate for collectibles in light of these criticisms. The Joint
Committee Report proposal, however, would restore the inequity that
stirred commentators.
The need for a higher tax rate on depreciable real property is
compelling. The Code permits taxpayers to depreciate the cost of real
property used in a trade or business activity or held for investment.359
The depreciation deductions offset ordinary income 3W and reduce the
361taxpayer's basis in the subject property. When the taxpayer sells
the real property, at least some portion of any resulting gain will be
362
attributable to the prior depreciation deductions. Yet the Code
356 See supra note 324. An exclusion of a portion of a capital gain is equivalent to
a deduction in an amount equal to the same portion of the gain, assuming the
deduction is available without limitation.
357 See generally DANIEL POSIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
264-65 (1983); Cynthia Blum, Rollover: An Alternative Treatment of Capital Gains, 41
TAX L. REV. 385, 422-27 (1986).
358 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-220, at 382 (1997), reprinted in 1997
U.S.C.C.A.N. 678, 1194-95.
359 I.R.C. § 167(a). Underlying land is not depreciable, but structures on land are
depreciable. This is because depreciable property must be subject to "exhaustion" or
"wear and tear." Id. The Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS)
allows large deductions in the early years of an asset's useful life. For depreciation
methods and operating rules, see section 168.
I.R.C. §§ 161, 167(a).
361 I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2).
362 Suppose, for example, that a taxpayer purchased depreciable real property
for $936,000 and placed it in service on July 1, Year One. Ignoring any special
elections, the taxpayer is entitled to claim an $11,000 depreciation deduction in Year
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provision requiring that portion of the gain to be taxed as ordinary
income applies only when the taxpayer has used some form of
. • .• 363
accelerated depreciation, which has been unavailable to taxpayers
since 1986.364 In other words, taxpayers using the ratable, straight-line
depreciation method on such real property can still claim capital gain
treatment in some cases.16' To permit preferential tax treatment to a
gain caused by the taxpayers taking a depreciation deduction to offset
ordinary income is an unjustified double benefit.366  The Joint
Committee Report proposal would do just that since the gains from
depreciable real property would receive the same treatment as all
other capital gains.16' The current system concedes a preferential rate
but not one as great as the rate applied to most long-term capital
gains. From a policy perspective, the current system is preferable to
One and depreciation deductions of $24,000 in Years Two through Thirty-Nine. See
I.R.C. § 168(b)(3)(A), (d)(2), (d)(4)(B). Thus, at the end of Year Two, the
taxpayer's adjusted basis in the property is $901,000. See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2). Now
suppose the property has increased in value to $1 million. If the taxpayer sells the
property at the beginning of Year Three to an unrelated purchaser for $1 million,
only $64,000 of the resulting gain represents real economic gain (the difference
between the amount realized on the sale and the original purchase price of $936,000).
The rest of the gain, which in this case would be $36,000, is attributable to the
depreciation deductions in Years One, Two, and Three. There is a small depreciation
deduction of $1000 in Year Three because the Code requires the sale of the property
described in this example to be treated for deduction purposes as if it were sold at the
middle of the sale month. See I.R.C. § 168(d)(4)(B).
363 I.R.C. § 1250(a).
36 I.R.C. §§ 168(b)(3), 1250(b)(1).
365 Although real property used in a trade or business activity is not a capital
asset, I.R.C. § 1221(a)(2), gain from the sale of such property qualifies as "section
1231 gain" if the taxpayer held the property for more than one year. I.R.C. § 1231(b).
If the taxpayer's "section 1231 gains" exceed the taxpayer's "section 1231 losses" for
the taxable year, the gains and losses are treated as long-term capital gains and losses,
meaning any net gain will qualify for preferential tax treatment. I.R.C. § 1231(a). If
the subject real property is held as investment property, however, it is a capital asset
to begin with, and the resulting gain is automatically eligible for the preferential tax
rates if the subject property was held for more than one year. I.R.C. § 1221(a).
366 Consider supra note 362. Ideally, $36,000 of the $100,000 realized gain should
be treated as ordinary income because that is the portion of the gain that the taxpayer
already recovered in the form of deductions against ordinary income. If the entire
gain is treated as long-term capital gain, the taxpayer receives a double benefit.
361 See 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL
STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 103




The Joint Committee Report recommendation is a curious one
because the Joint Committee staff deliberately refused to consider
other simplification proposals that would alter the policy objectives of
the subject Code provisions.3 69 Since the proposal does not address
the policy concerns that led to the multiple tax rates in the current
system, Congress is unlikely to adopt the recommendation in its
present form. If Congress did codify the proposal, however, one
would expect that Congress would eventually tinker with the system
to preserve higher tax rates, for unrecaptured real property
depreciation deductions and collectibles gains. At that point, the
number of tax rates would grow even further, and from a
simplification standpoint, the proposal is for naught.
There is another important objection to a deduction for capital
gains. Professor John Lee observed that a capital gains exclusion - a
functional equivalent of the Joint Committee Report deduction
proposal37° - unfairly benefits wealthier taxpayers and unfairly
311burdens poorer taxpayers. Such a benefit occurs because capital
gains of wealthy taxpayers usually represent real economic gain and
not just inflation.17 By excluding half of the gain, some real gain goes
3W Repealing the special depreciation recapture applicable to real estate in favor
of applying the depreciation recapture rules currently limited to tangible personal
property would be even simpler than the current system and might better achieve the
recapture goal that is desired. But this idea warrants consideration because it might
better serve the goal of recapture, not just because it is simpler.
369 See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
370 For individual taxpayers, an exclusion of half of the net capital gain from
gross income is the functional equivalent of a deduction equal to 50% of the net
capital gain so long as the deduction is used to compute adjusted gross income. That
way, all individuals could claim an identical benefit. For example, if an individual has
a net capital gain of $10,000, a 50% exclusion would cause the taxpayer to include
only $5000 in gross income. Under the Joint Committee Report's deduction regime,
the taxpayer would include the full $10,000 gain but immediately deduct $5000. In
either case, only $5000 of the gain is subject to taxation. The Joint Committee
Report recommends that the proposed deduction be made available to all individuals
no matter whether they itemize deductions or claim the standard deduction, so the
proposed exclusion analyzed by Professor Lee is the equivalent of the Joint
Committee Report's proposed deduction. See 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH
CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 103.
371 John W. Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains Contentions, 15
VA. TAX REV. 1, 4 (1995).
372 Id. at 35-36.
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untaxed. The capital gains of less affluent taxpayers, however, occur
mostly due to inflation and not to real economic gain.3 73 Excluding
half of the gain still subjects poorer taxpayers to tax on inflation.
Professor Lee believes that indexing a taxpayer's basis would be more
equitable for poorer taxpayers, but he concedes that indexing is a
poor proposal because wealthy taxpayers would have an added
incentive to refrain from realizing gains.374 He concludes that the
current use of preferential rates is preferable to an exclusion or
indexing system.3 75  Under Professor Lee's analysis, the Joint
Committee Report's proposal would prove to be an unjustified
windfall to the wealthy and an unfair tax burden shift to the poor.
The current hybrid system is certainly complex, but the policy
gains achieved under this hybrid system outweigh the benefits of
simpler systems. The proposal will likely fall on deaf ears anyway, but
in this case, that is a good result.
C. Income-Based Phaseouts and Phaseins
The Code contains nearly twenty provisions that serve to limit tax
benefits to taxpayers with certain income levels.376 Recent estimates377
373 Id.
374 Id. at 4.
375 Id. For the argument that indexing a taxpayer's basis in assets for inflation is
the superior result, see Arthur P. Hall, Issues in the Indexation of Capital Gains, 67
TAX NOTES 675 (1995); Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 TAX L. REV. 537
(1993); Snoe, supra note 6, at 71-72.
376 See I.R.C. §§ 21(a)(2) (limited phaseout of dependent care tax credit), 22(d)
(partial phaseout of credit for elderly and disabled taxpayers), 23(b)(2) (phaseout of
credit for adoption expenses), 24(b) (phaseout of per child tax credit), 25A(d)
(phaseouts of both the Hope Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit),
32(b) (phasein and phaseout of earned income credit), 55(d)(3) (phaseout of AMT
exemption amount for individual and corporate taxpayers), 68 (overall limitation on
itemized deductions), 86 (phaseout of exclusion for social security and railroad
retirement benefits), 135(b)(2) (phaseout of exclusion for interest from education
savings bonds), 137(b) (phaseout of deduction for employer-provided qualified
adoption expenses), 151(d)(3) (phaseout of personal and dependency exemptions),
219(g) (phaseouts of eligibility for deductible contributions to individual retirement
account), 221(b)(2) (phaseout of deduction for student loan interest), 408A(c)(3)
(phaseout of eligibility for Roth IRA and restriction on ability to convert IRA to
Roth IRA), 469(i)(3) (phaseout of rental real estate offset from passive loss
restrictions), 530(c) (phaseout of eligibility for education IRAs), 1400C(b) (phaseout
of credit for first-time homebuyers in the District of Columbia).
377 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES, at 17 (Joint Comm.
Print 1998).
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claim that these so-called "phaseouts ' '378 affect about one-fourth of all
taxpayers. Phaseouts can significantly impact a taxpayer's effective
rate of taxation. Suppose, for example, that a married couple with
two dependent children has an adjusted gross income3 79 of $250,000
and regular itemized deductions38° of $120,000 for the 2003 taxable
year. Absent any phaseout provisions, the couple could claim two
personal exemptions of $305081 and two dependency exemptions of
382$3050, which would generate an additional deduction of $12,200.
Their taxable income would be $117,800 ($250,000 less $132,200 in
itemized deductions and personal exemptions), and their tentative
federal income tax liability would be $25,606.50. 383 The couple would
also be entitled to total child tax credits of $1200 (again assuming no
phaseouts). 384 Assuming no other credits apply, the final income tax
liability would be $24,406.50. Note that the couple's effective tax rate
385is only 9.76%.
The couple in this simple example is, however, subject to three
phaseouts that will increase the effective rate of tax. First, since their
378 Use of the term "phaseouts" is simplistic, of course, because some provisions
are "phased-in" as a taxpayer's income increases. See I.R.C. § 32(b) (phasein of
earned income tax credit). In other cases, the tax benefit is not phased out but rather
repealed immediately. See I.R.C. § 221(b)(2) (eliminating student loan interest
deduction completely once "modified adjusted gross income" of unmarried taxpayer
reaches $65,000). Nonetheless, this article uses the term "phaseouts" to refer to
phaseouts, phaseins, and immediate income-based limitations.
379 For individuals, "adjusted gross income" means a taxpayer's gross income less
eighteen enumerated deductions. I.R.C. § 62(a). The concept of "adjusted gross
income" is meaningless for corporations. See I.R.C. § 63(a), (b).
380 A special phaseout applies to so-called "miscellaneous itemized deductions":
they are allowed only to the extent that they exceed 2% of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income. I.R.C. § 67(a). All itemized deductions (those deductions not taken in
computing adjusted gross income) that are not miscellaneous itemized deductions can
be described as "regular itemized deductions." The hypothetical example in the text
assumes that all of the deductions are regular itemized deductions so as to avoid
application of the section 67(a) phaseout provision. If the deductions in the text
example were miscellaneous itemized deductions, a fourth phaseout would apply.
381 See I.R.C. § 151(a); see also Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.R.B. 845, § 3.15(1).
382 See I.R.C. § 151(c)(1); see also Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.R.B. 845,
§ 3.15(1).
383 See I.R.C. § 1(a); see also Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.R.B. 845, § 3.01. The
couple's "marginal tax rate," the tax rate applicable to the last dollar of taxable
income, is 27%.
384 See I.R.C. § 24(a).
385 The effective rate of tax is determined by dividing the final tax liability,
$24,406.50, by the couple's adjusted gross income, $250,000.
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adjusted gross income exceeds $139,500, 386 their itemized deductions
will be reduced to $116,685 . Second, the exemption amount for the
two taxpayers and the two children will decrease from $3050 to
$2013.388 Finally, since their adjusted gross income exceeds $110,000,
the child tax credit amount is reduced to zero.18' As a result of these
three phaseouts, taxable income increases to $125,263, 390 and the final
tax liability increases to $27,845.40,"l an effective tax rate of 11.14%.
Policymakers design phaseouts to enhance vertical equity.392 As a
396 See I.R.C. § 68(b); see also Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.R.B. 845, § 3.10.
387 See I.R.C. § 68(a). Three percent of the excess of adjusted gross income
($200,000) over the threshold phaseout amount ($139,500) is $3315. This is less than
80% of total itemized deductions ($120,000 x 80% = $96,000), so the 3% reduction
applies.
3M See I.R.C. § 151(d)(3). The "threshold amount" under section 151(d)(3)(C) is
adjusted for inflation. I.R.C. § 151(d)(4)(B). For 2003, the threshold amount for a
married couple filing a joint return is $209,250, the same threshold applicable to the
overall limitation on itemized deductions. Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.R.B. 845,
§ 3.15. In this example, adjusted gross income exceeds the threshold amount by
$40,750. $40,750 divided by $2500 is 16.3, and this number is rounded up to 17. See
I.R.C. § 151(d)(3)(B). Seventeen times 2 percentage points equals 34 percentage
points. Thus, the exemption amount is reduced by 34%, or $1037. The exemption
amount is therefore $2013 ($3050 minus $1037).
389 See I.R.C. § 24(b)(1)-(2). The statute refers to "modified adjusted gross
income," meaning adjusted gross income as computed without regard to certain
deductions otherwise allowable in computing adjusted gross income. I.R.C.
§ 24(b)(1). The deductions in this case are those authorized under sections 911
(foreign earned income and housing costs of U.S. citizens and residents living
abroad), 931 (income attributable to sources or activities in Guam, American Samoa,
or the Northern Mariana Islands), and 933 (income attributable to sources or
activities in Puerto Rico). Id.; see also I.R.C. §§ 911, 931, 933. Assuming, then, that
none of these deductions applies in this example, "modified adjusted gross income"
($250,000) exceeds the applicable threshold amount ($110,000) by $140,000. $140,000
divided by $1000 equals 140, and 140 times $50 is $7000. Thus, the amount of the per
child tax credit is supposed to be reduced by $7000. Since the credit amount is only
$600 per child, of course, the adjustment serves to eliminate the credit entirely.
390 Taxable income is the excess of adjusted gross income ($250,000) over
allowable deductions ($116,685) and personal and dependency exemptions ($8052, or
4 times $2013). See I.R.C. § 63(a).
391 See I.R.C. § 1(a); see also Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.R.B. 845, § 3.01.
392 Charles S. Hartman, Missed It By That Much: Phase-out Provisions in the
Internal Revenue Code, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 187, 192-93 (1996). With regard to the
section 68 limitation on itemized deductions, for example, the legislative history
merely states that the provision is intended to limit itemized deductions and makes
no reference to vertical equity or progressivity. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-964, at
1030-33 (1990). But commentators at the time observed that enhanced progressivity
was indeed in the minds of many legislators when section 68 was enacted in 1990.
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result of phaseouts, marginal tax rates for the wealthiest taxpayers
can exceed 40%, 391 while the maximum statutory marginal rate - the
rate that taxpayers see in the tax tables - is only 38.6%. T9 It is
politically unappealing for Congress to increase tax rates, and the use
of phaseouts allows Congress to reduce marginal tax rates while
generating equivalent revenues.395 In addition, phaseouts can reduce
the revenue loss from a tax benefit because the benefit is limited to
lower-income taxpayers, thus increasing the efficiency of the federal
income tax.
Despite these advantages, the Joint Committee Report
recommends the repeal of several phaseout provisions (including the
three described in the above example) on the grounds of• .396
complexity. The phaseouts targeted for repeal contribute to a
See, e.g., J. Andrew Hoerner, "Pease Plan" Emerges as Key Issue in Debate Over Tax
Progressivity, 49 TAX NOTES 498, 498-99 (Oct. 29, 1990); Gene Steuerle, Budget Act
1990: Revival of the Progressivity Debate, 49 TAX NOTES 1251, 1252 (Dec. 10, 1990).
For more on the virtues of vertical equity, see infra Part V.A.
393 See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES 4-9 (Joint Comm. Print
1998). Suppose, for example, that an unmarried taxpayer has an adjusted gross
income in 2003 of $400,000 and otherwise allowable regular itemized deductions of
$50,000. Because the taxpayer's adjusted gross income exceeds $139,500, the total
itemized deductions will be reduced to $42,185. See I.R.C. § 68; see also Rev. Proc.
2002-70, 2002-46 I.R.B. 845, § 3.10. Further, the taxpayer's $3050 personal exemption
is completely phased out. See I.R.C. § 151(d); see also Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46
I.R.B. 845, § 3.15(2). Thus, the taxpayer's taxable income is $357,815, placing the
taxpayer in the highest marginal tax bracket (38.6%). If the taxpayer in this example
earns an additional $1000 in 2003, the taxpayer's itemized deductions will be reduced
by another $30, increasing taxable income from $357,815 to $358,845. The extra
$1030 of taxable income will be taxed at 38.6%, resulting in additional tax of $397.58.
Thus, the marginal rate of tax on the last $1000 of gross income is really 39.758%.
The section 68 phaseout alone increased the marginal rate by more than 1%. If the
taxpayer in this example was subject to additional phaseouts, it is easy to see how the
marginal tax rate can increase to above 40%.
394 I.R.C. § 1(i)(2).
395 Professor Peroni describes the section 68 phaseout of itemized deductions
and the section 151(d)(3) phaseout of the personal exemption deduction as
"gimmicks" for increasing tax rates without explicitly increasing the rates in the
statutory tax tables. Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in
the Individual Income Tax System, 92 TAX NOTES 1415, 1433-34 (Special Supp., May
28, 2001).
396 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 88
(Joint Comm. Print 2001). The phaseouts subject to the recommendation for repeal
are the overall limitation on itemized deductions (I.R.C. § 68), the phaseout of
Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 22:645
taxpayer's compliance burden because they require taxpayers to
locate and complete additional worksheets, perform more
calculations, and compute special figures like "modified adjusted
gross income."3 7 The Joint Committee Report also concludes that
these phaseouts impede the ability of taxpayers to take advantage of
398tax benefits intended for them. It offers the following illustration:
For example, a taxpayer who files as a head of household
with $40,000 of income and has a child in the first year of
college would be eligible for a HOPE credit of up to $1,500.
However, if the taxpayer recognized a $10,000 capital gain to
pay tuition, the taxpayer would no longer be eligible for the
credit. The well-advised taxpayer who needed the funds to
pay tuition might be able to avoid such a result by doing the
capital gain transaction in a tax year prior to the year tuition
will be paid.399
Finally, the Joint Committee Report states that the phaseouts make it
difficult for taxpayers to estimate their total tax liability, which can
cause taxpayers subject to estimated tax payments to face penalties.4W
personal and dependency exemptions (I.R.C. § 151(d)(3)), the phaseout of the child
tax credit (I.R.C. § 24(b)), the limited phaseout of the dependent care tax credit
(I.R.C. § 21(a)(2)), all phaseouts related to IRAs (I.R.C. §§ 219(g), 408A(c)(3),
530(c)), the phaseout of the Hope Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning
Credit (I.R.C. § 25A(d)), the phaseout of the deduction for student loan interest
(I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)), the phaseout of the exclusion for interest on education savings
bonds (I.R.C. § 135(b)(2)), and the phaseout of the adoption credit and the exclusion
for employer-provided qualified adoption expenses (I.R.C. §§ 23(b)(2), 137(b)). Id.
With respect to the other phaseout provisions, the Joint Committee Staff does
not advocate repeal because "these phase-outs serve purposes other than, or in
addition to, achieving progressivity." Id. at 89 n.137.
311 Id. at 87.
398 Id. at 88; see also Reed Shuldiner & David Shakow, Lessons from the
Limitation on Itemized Deductions, 93 TAX NOTES 673, 689-92, 694 (Oct. 29, 2001)
(proving that the section 68 overall limitation on itemized deductions causes 5% of
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes between $500,000 and $1 million to claim the
standard deduction).
399 2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 88.
400 Id. Under section 6654, an underpayment of estimated taxes results in an
addition to tax computed by applying the interest rate prescribed in section 6621 for
underpayments of tax. I.R.C. § 6654. The penalty does not apply if the total tax due
(after application of the credit for income tax withheld in section 31) is less than
$1000 or if the taxpayer had no income tax liability for the prior taxable year,
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Some commentators contend that phaseouts enhance simplicity
because high-income taxpayers subject to the phaseouts can dispense
with the recordkeeping requirements associated with such benefits.40 1
Even if phaseouts contribute to tax complexity, the result is
acceptable considering the extent to which phaseouts enhance vertical
equity.4°2 Further, reform can mitigate the alleged complexities cited
by the Joint Committee Report - repeal is another over-correction.40 '
Conforming many phaseouts to the same thresholds and
computations can simplify to some extent the many computations
facing wealthy taxpayers subject to multiple phaseouts. With little
sacrifice of revenue, Congress could adopt unifying definitions of
"modified adjusted gross income" or other terms commonly used in
• 404
phaseout computations. Consistent definitions would do a lot to
assuming that year lasted for twelve months and the taxpayer is a U.S. citizen or
resident. I.R.C. § 6654(e)(1)-(2). Most taxpayers are not required to pay estimated
taxes because the income tax withheld on wages is treated as an automatic payment
of estimated taxes. I.R.C. § 6654(g)(1). Thus, estimated tax penalties apply mostly to
taxpayers without wages and to those taxpayers with significant income from other
sources on which estimated taxes were not paid.
401 See Pollack, supra note 4, at 356-57; see also C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX
DECADE: How TAXES CAME TO DOMINATE THE PUBLIC AGENDA 136-37 (1992).
4- [T]he attempt merely to create a statutory definition of economic net income
contributes complexity to the income tax. Given the tremendous complexity
involved in trying to achieve a fair measure of net income, the complexity
attributable to progressivity seems minor. Add to this the many tax expenditures
accomplished through deductions, and the complexity from brackets is barely
visible.
Byrne, supra note 29, at 748-49.
403 Nevertheless, the 2001 Act calls for the gradual repeal of the overall
limitation on itemized deductions. I.R.C. § 68(f). Beginning in 2006, taxpayers must
reduce the total amount of itemized deductions by only two-thirds of the amount
required under current law. Id. In 2008, taxpayers only have to reduce the total
amount of itemized deductions by one-third of the amount required under current
law. Id. Finally, as of 2010, the overall limitation on itemized deductions is fully
repealed. I.R.C. § 68(g). In other words, Congress has decided to phaseout one of
the major phaseouts.
404 There are several different meanings for the term "modified adjusted gross
income." For purposes of the child tax credit and the Hope Scholarship and Lifetime
Learning Credits, the term means adjusted gross income plus amounts deducted for
certain foreign income. I.R.C. §§ 24(b)(1), 25A(d)(3). For a more detailed
description of modified adjusted gross income for purposes of the child tax credit, see
supra note 389. With respect to the earned income credit, however, modified
adjusted gross income means adjusted gross income plus amounts allowed as a
deduction under four other Code sections plus amounts excluded under two other
Code sections. I.R.C. § 32(c)(5). And for purposes of computing the amount of
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reduce the tax complexity of phaseouts.
Some have argued that phaseouts have problems beyond
complexity. One common argument is that phaseouts impede
efficiency by distorting taxpayer choices, but this argument is based
on unproven theoretical assertions. One such assertion is that
phaseouts may affect a taxpayer's decision to work. For example, 405
suppose an unmarried taxpayer has an adjusted gross income of
$139,500 in 2003, the highest adjusted gross income possible without
application of the personal exemption phaseout.4°6 Now suppose that
the taxpayer has the opportunity to accept additional work that will
increase the taxpayer's adjusted gross income by $3000. The extra
income serves to increase the taxpayer's tax liability by $937, $900
from the additional tax attributable to the extra $3000 of income
407
plus $37 due to the applicability of the personal exemption
phaseout.4°8 The net benefit of taking on the additional work is $2063
($3000 less the $937 in additional tax). The taxpayer may conclude
that the extra work and the opportunity cost of lost relaxation are not
worth $2063 so the taxpayer may choose to forego the additional
work. If so, the argument goes, society loses the benefit of the
taxpayer's extra labor. As the example shows, the additional cost
attributable to the phaseout will always be minor compared to that
portion attributable to application of the taxpayer's statutory
marginal rate.4°9 Further, some studies question the effect of marginal
Social Security benefits included in gross income, modified adjusted gross income
means adjusted gross income computed without regard to three exclusion provisions
and five deduction provisions. I.R.C. § 86(b)(2). Other phaseouts also use the term.
See I.R.C. §§ 135 (education savings bonds), 221 (student loan interest deduction),
408A (Roth IRAs), 1400C (District of Columbia first-time homebuyer credit).
405 This example is loosely modeled after the one set forth in JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL
EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES 94 (Joint Comm. Print 1998).
406 See Rev. Proc. 2002-70,2002-46 I.R.B. 845, § 3.15(2).
The taxpayer in this example is in the 30% rate bracket for 2003. See id.
§ 3.01; see also I.R.C. § 1(i). Thus the extra tax created by an additional $3000 in
taxable income is $900.
The exemption amount for 2003 is $3050. See supra notes 381-82 and
accompanying text. The personal exemption phaseout requires the taxpayer in this
example to reduce the exemption amount by 4%, or $122. See I.R.C. § 151(d). For
more detail on the computation of the reduction, see supra note 388 and
accompanying text. Before the phaseout, the taxpayer could deduct the $122
amount, and the tax attributable to that amount is, after rounding, $37 (30% of $122
is $36.60). Thus the tax liability is increased by $37 because of the phaseout.
40 The Joint Committee has concluded that the personal exemption phaseout
only increases the effective marginal tax rate by 2.16% for each exemption claimed.
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tax rates on incentives to work.41°
A second assertion is that taxpayers may alter timing decisions
due to phaseouts. 4" In the head of household example excerpted
above from the Joint Committee Report , the taxpayer has an
incentive to recognize a capital gain in an earlier year to avoid the
Hope Scholarship Credit and/or Lifetime Learning Credit phaseouts.
Incentives to recognize gains earlier, however, are efficient for the
government. In other cases, taxpayers may choose to defer gains or
other forms of income to avoid a phaseout. If Congress eliminated
phaseouts from the Code, taxpayers will still consider timing in
structuring transactions. Repeal of phaseouts will not change this
inefficient behavior.
Another common argument is that phaseouts violate horizontal
equity, but this argument too is flawed. In another report, the Joint
Committee staff explained that phaseouts generally do not affect
horizontal equity:
For example, two married couples may have identical
modified [adjusted gross incomes] of $85,000, the same
number of children, and other identical economic
characteristics. However, if the Smith family has a daughter
in college while the Jones family daughter forgoes college,
the Smiths and the Jones will have different Federal income
tax liabilities. The Smiths will be able to claim a tax credit for
a portion of their daughter's college expenses. The Jones
family will not. The Smiths will have a smaller tax burden.
However, the family income of $85,000 puts the Smith family
in the phase-out range for the HOPE or Lifetime Learning
credits, so the Smith family will have an effective marginal
tax rate greater than that of the Jones family, but will be able
to claim some education credits against their income tax
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING
TO INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES 5; see also supra note 393. Only in
the case of very large families could the added tax from the phaseout meaningfully
affect a taxpayer's decision whether to perform additional work.
410 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE:
MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 10-12 (1997); Charles L. Ballard et al.,
General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the
United States, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 128 (1985); Robert K. Triest, The Effect of Income
Taxation on Labor Supply in the United States, 25 J. HUM. RESOURCES 491 (1990).
411 See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND
ANALYSIS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES 96.
412 See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
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liability. Some observers find it unfair that the Smith family
has a higher effective marginal tax rate than does the Jones
family, but, in fact, the Smith family has the lower aggregate
tax burden. Other observers would find it unfair that the
Jones family has a higher aggregate tax burden because they
are not treated equally to the Smiths. This would appear to
violate the concept of horizontal equity. However, the
apparent horizontal inequity is not created by the phase-out
provision. If, in the example above, Smith and Jones had
each had incomes of $60,000, beneath the phase-out range, it
would remain the case that Smith's tax liability is less than
Jones's by reason of the credit.
One rationale for creating the education credits was a
belief that the burdens of paying for a college education
imply that two families cannot be considered to be similarly
situated if, though all else is equal, one is paying college
expenses while the other is not. Advocates of this position
would aver that horizontal equity is not violated. They would
note that the education credits apply equally in the sense of
horizontal equity to all taxpayers incurring college education
413
expenses.
Whether any Code provision violates horizontal equity is a question
414
of scope. From a very broad perspective, the Smith and Jones
families in the quoted excerpt appear to receive different treatment
despite their many similarities. Upon closer examination, there are
differences between the two families - one is paying for higher
education and the other is not. In Congress' eyes, that distinction
makes the two families sufficiently dissimilar so that disparate tax
treatment in the form of an education credit does not violate
horizontal equity. If one maintains that the education credit violates
horizontal equity, however, then one should also recall the other
important point made by the Joint Committee staff in the above
excerpt: the phaseout provision does not cause the inequity - the
underlying credit does. At most, phaseouts only slightly compound
pre-existing horizontal equity violations.
The Joint Committee Report recommendation for repeal of
certain phaseouts has merit, but not because of cries for
413 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS
RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL EFFEcrivE MARGINAL TAX RATES 98-99 (footnote
omitted).
414 See Byrne, supra note 29, at 759-63.
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simplification. Congress should eliminate phaseouts when they
contravene their intended purpose. While phaseouts generally do
enhance the progressivity of the federal income tax, phaseouts also
make the tax rates more regressive for some taxpayers. For example,
assume that Taxpayer A has an adjusted gross income of $350,000 and
otherwise allowable itemized deductions of $25,000 for the taxable
year ending in 2003. Ignoring personal exemptions, A's taxable
income for 2003 would normally be $325,000. Since A's adjusted
gross income exceeds the $139,500 "applicable amount" under section
68,415 A must reduce A's total itemized deductions by 3% of the
$210,500 excess, or $6315.416 Thus, A's itemized deductions would
decrease to $18,685. If A earned an additional $100 of income, the
section 68 phaseout would require A to reduce A's itemized
deduction by another $3.4.7 Since the additional tax on the $103 of
taxable income would be $39.76, the phaseout actually increases A's
marginal rate of tax by 1.16%.418
In comparison, suppose that Taxpayer B has an adjusted gross
income of $1,000,000 and otherwise allowable itemized deductions of
$25,000 for the taxable year ending in 2003. Since B's adjusted gross
income exceeds the "applicable amount" by $860,500, B might have
to reduce B's itemized deductions by $25,815 (3% of the $860,500
excess over the "applicable amount"). The maximum possible
reduction to B's itemized deductions is $20,000, 80% of the otherwise
allowable total.4 9 If B earns an extra $100 of income, therefore, there
is no further reduction to B's itemized deductions, meaning that B's
marginal rate of tax on that extra $100 (capped at 38.6%) will be less
than A's marginal rate of tax on the extra $100 (39.76%). The 80%
cap on the reduction provided in section 68 detracts from the
progressivity intended by the phaseout. These marginal tax rate
"bubbles" are inappropriate because the marginal tax rate should
never decrease as taxable income increases.
Due to these bubbles, the Joint Committee Report's
recommendation deserves consideration. Repealing the section 68
415 See I.R.C. § 68(b); see also Rev. Proc. 2002-70,2002-46 I.R.B. 845, § 3.10.
416 See I.R.C. § 68(a); see also I.R.C. § 68(b); Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.R.B.
845, § 3.10; supra note 387 and accompanying text.
41? See supra note 393.
418 Taxpayer A is in the 38.6% maximum rate bracket. The tax on $103 at this
rate is $39.76. That represents 39.76% of the $100 additional income that A earned.
The 39.76% marginal tax rate on the $100 of additional income is 1.16% higher than
the 38.6% marginal rate found in the statute.
419 See I.R.C. § 68(a).
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phaseout and similar provisions solely in the name of simplicity is a
mistake. Other commentators are offended at the backhanded or
tricky way in which phaseouts enhance vertical equity. Congress
appears deceitful when it announces an across-the-board "tax cut"
and simultaneously adds income-based phaseouts to the Code, as it
421did with the Tax Reform Act of 1986. In an ideal world, Congress
would have the courage to confess to taxpayers that it will limit
certain tax benefits in the hands of wealthy taxpayers and that, as a
result, the effective marginal rates of wealthier taxpayers may exceed
the applicable marginal tax rate stated in the tax tables. Ultimately,
however, phaseouts can be an effective means to enhance vertical
equity at a relatively low revenue cost.
V. SIMPLICITY AS A TAX POLICY OBJECTIVE
422
Of the three traditional criteria for evaluating a tax - equity,
efficiency, and simplicity - the latter is the hardest to define and the
421hardest to apply with any meaningful precision. Scholars basically
agree that an income tax is equitable when it imposes the same tax
liability on two persons with equal incomes (horizontal equity)424 and
when the tax liabilities of persons with higher incomes exceed the tax
liabilities of persons with lower incomes (vertical equity). They also
generally agree that an income tax is efficient if it raises substantial
426
revenues at relatively low costs to taxpayers and the government,
and some believe that efficiency increases if the income tax has little
427
or no effect on taxpayer decisions. No consensus exists as to what
makes a tax simple. To determine whether simplicity is a legitimate
420 See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Simplification: Replacement of the Section 68
Limitation on Itemized Deductions, 78 TAX NOTES 89 (Jan. 5, 1998); Peroni, supra
note 395, at 1433-34; Shuldiner & Shakow, supra note 398, at 674.
421 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 101, 501, 701, 1122, 1201,
100 Stat. 2085.
422 See Sneed, supra note 29.
423 See Bittker, supra note 23, at 1; see also McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1269.
424 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 25-26 (4th ed. 2001).
42 Id. at 30-33.
426 See Kornhauser, supra note 61, at 483-85; see also Zelinsky, supra note 32, at
978-1012; infra Part V.C.
427 See, e.g., GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 424, at 26-27; Butler, supra note 29,
at 72-73; Shimon B. Edelstein, Note, Indexing Capital Gains for Inflation: The
Impacts of Recent Inflation Trends, Mutual Fund Financial Intermediation, and
Information Technology, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 783, 787 (1999). See also infra Part V.C.
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criterion for evaluating a tax, one must at least attempt to define the
term.
A. Defining Simplicity and the Unique Impact of Tax Complexity
In defining simplicity, one might start by defining its opposite -
complexity. 428 The federal tax laws are "complex" because: (1) they
contain a large number of rules; 29 (2) those several rules are highly
detailed;4 10 (3) they relate to concepts that are difficult to reduce to
rules;4 1 (4) they reflect many principles, some of which may conflict;3 2
(5) they require technical expertise to comprehend fully;433 (6) they
428 Other commentators categorize different types of tax complexity. See, e.g.,
DAVID BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266-67 (1986) (describing
"compliance complexity" as the burden imposed in keeping required records and
completing required forms, "transactional complexity" as the extra measures one
undergoes solely to minimize taxes, and "rule complexity" as the difficulty in
understanding and applying the law); McCaffery, supra note 5, at 1270-72
(distinguishing "technical complexity," the understandability of a law in isolation;
"structural complexity," the conduciveness of the law to tax planning; and
"compliance complexity," the recordkeeping burden imposed by the law); Paul, supra
note 63, at 157-63 (describing tax complexity in terms of "complication," the number
and detail of authorities; "intractability," referring to the fact that an income tax
relies upon concepts difficult to apply; and "incoherence," the complexity resulting
when the tax laws embody inconsistent purposes); Joel Slemrod, Optimal Tax
Simplification: Toward a Framework for Analysis, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTY-
SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION (1984) (distinguishing only between
"compliance costs" to taxpayers and "administrative costs" to the government). This
article refrains from making similar distinctions, for as Professor Miller said, "[a]ny
attempt to characterize or categorize tax complexity is likely to be fundamentally
arbitrary." Miller, supra note 76, at 12. But Miller himself ultimately identifies two
types of tax complexity - "elaborative complexity" (the amount of material that must
be absorbed to answer a tax question) and "judgmental complexity" (the
"intellectual, moral and philosophical burdens a tax question may pose for one who
has mastered the rules"). Id.
429 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
430 See supra Parts II.A.4, II.B.1.
431 Paul, supra note 63, at 159-61 (noting the "intractability" of the Code because
of its reliance on difficult concepts like "realization," "dividend," and "business
purpose"); see also supra Part II.A.6.
432 Paul, supra note 63, at 161-63 (noting inconsistencies such as exemptions for
imputed income, gifts, and unrealized appreciation from the comprehensive gross
income base and the different treatment of various savings mechanisms like
retirement plans versus ordinary interest-bearing bank accounts); see also supra Parts
II.A.1, II.C.1.413 See generally supra Part II.B.1.
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frequently change;434 and (7) several decision-making institutions,
each with distinct authority, apply them .4 " These same qualities could
436describe nearly every body of law. The federal bankruptcy laws, for
example, are similar in that they consist chiefly of intricately detailed
437
statutes, which, as a practical matter, require nearly all persons
facing bankruptcy to retain specialized counsel. There is even a
special federal court for bankruptcy matters,438 as there is the United
States Tax Court for taxation matters.
Complexity is not unique to those areas of the law based
primarily on statutes, like taxation and bankruptcy. Tort law is also
complex. Again, the average plaintiff or defendant needs the advice
of counsel to navigate through the substantive law, leaving aside the
procedural rules that will govern the process of dispute resolution.
Although there are few federal tort law statutes,439 there is the
functional equivalent in the Restatement of Torts. Like taxation, tort
law is constantly evolving, as plaintiffs advance new theories for
recovery and defendants offer new theories for defenses.
434 See supra Part II.A.2.
435 Binding tax authority can come from Congress (the Code and tax treaties),
the Treasury Department (regulations), the Internal Revenue Service (private rulings
and revenue rulings), and the courts (including the specialized United States Tax
Court).
436 Miller, supra note 76, at 50-54; see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental
Law and Three Economies: Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and
Societal Governance in Which Everything is Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 359 n. 7.
Environmental law is now technically more voluminous than tax law. The
Internal Revenue Code and its regulations add up to something on the
order of 6000 pages. The cumulative statute and regulatory pages for just
three of the major federal regulatory statutes - the CWA, the CAA, and
the RCRA - total more than 11,546 pages.
Id.
437 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2003).
438 A bankruptcy case brought to a federal district court is automatically referred
to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the district. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2003).
Bankruptcy judges serve fourteen-year terms and are appointed by the United States
Court of Appeals having jurisdiction over the district. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2003).
For a general overview of the structure and function of the bankruptcy courts, see
ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 823-85 (5th ed. 1999).
439 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522 (federal action for telephone tapping); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (federal tort action against anyone who under color of state law
deprives another of a federally secured right); 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-23 (repealed 1994)
(Federal Safety Appliance Act); 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (Federal Employers' Liability
Act).
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Where are the voluminous cries for simplification of tort laws?
Where are the demands for bankruptcy laws that "normal" people
can understand? In this regard, tax complexity is unique - it seems to
be the legal field with the most enemies. The popular sentiment
against tax complexity is hardly surprising when one considers three
unique aspects of the federal tax laws. First and foremost, taxation
affects more people than other areas of law. Fewer individuals
encounter tort laws because they are less likely to be plaintiffs or
defendants in a tort action than they are to be taxpayers. Even fewer
people ever come into contact with the federal bankruptcy laws.
However, more than 125 million individuals file federal income tax
returns every year.44  Even those wage-earners who do not file
returns still sense the effect of taxation because of tax withholding. 441
Of course, the vast majority of taxpayers have never read any
provisions of the Code. Their experience involves only the individual
income tax return and the corresponding set of instructions. In the
forms and instructions, taxpayers encounter the tax laws directly.
Moreover, the requirement to file an income tax return forces most
individuals to interact with the federal tax laws. Individuals come into
contact with other areas of the law only by choice. The only choice
involved in federal income tax laws is the choice to earn income -
hardly an option. Since taxation regularly interjects itself into the
lives of millions, more individuals will have opinions about tax
complexity than they will about antitrust complexity, securities
complexity, or even tort complexity.
Second, unlike virtually every other area of the law, the tax laws
rely upon taxpayers to police themselves. There is no federal tax
collector who knocks on the doors of taxpayers on April 15
demanding tribute (and maybe a convenience charge). Instead,
"0 For 1998, a total of 124,770,662 individual income tax returns were filed.
David Campbell et al., 20 STAT. INCOME BULL. 8, 26, tbl.1 (2001). This represented
an increase of 1.9% over returns for 1997. Id. at 8. The data from the 1998 returns
does not indicate how many of these returns were joint returns filed by husband and
wife, but one would think that a very substantial portion of the total returns were
filed by two taxpayers. Thus the figure of 125 million expressed in the text is very
conservative.
441 Sections 3401-3404 generally require employers to withhold prescribed
amounts from an employee's "wages" and to remit such taxes directly to the federal
government. I.R.C. §§ 3401-3404. Employees then credit amounts withheld against
the federal income tax liability associated with their taxable incomes. I.R.C. § 31.
For a general discussion of the meaning of "wages" and the many exceptions to the
withholding rules, see BITTKER ET AL., supra note 35, 1 44.4[2].
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taxpayers begin the assessment process by filing a return 4 2 and either
paying additional tax, claiming a refund, or showing that any tax
already withheld exactly matches the amount the taxpayer owes.
Voluntary assessment is one of the signature features of our federal
income tax, but it also fuels the calls for simplification. The federal
tax laws require individuals to assess their own annual tax liability,
but we do not provide sufficient technical training that allows all
taxpayers to feel at ease in complying with the tax forms and
instructions. Some high schools may teach students how to complete
a Form 1040-EZ, the short form for wage earners with very little
investment income, but this education is both non-uniform and
incomplete. Accordingly, most taxpayers feel ill-equipped to tackle a
daunting, two-page tax form with forty or more lines and instructions
that exceed seventy pages. This experience is inevitable in any system
where self-assessment is the paradigm for enforcement.
Much of the furor over tax complexity would disappear if the
federal government computed each taxpayer's annual liability and
sent either a bill or a refund.443 Of course, there would still be
disputes between taxpayers and the government over the amount of a
bill or refund (as there are now), but individuals would not have to be
involved in the computation of tax liability unless they chose to
dispute the amount of tax paid. While the elimination of self-
assessment would do much to calm the storm surrounding tax
complexity, it is not a viable option. Voluntary assessment invites
participation in the taxation process. By letting taxpayers make the
initial determination of tax liability, the government accords them
dignity. It also fosters some sense of trust; taxpayers would likely be
suspicious of a post card notifying them of tax liability without some
evidence of the computations supporting the final determination.
Finally, voluntary assessment is more cost-efficient for the
government than government assessment. By making a tax return a
statement subject to perjury and other penalties,4" the government
can generally rely upon the information supplied by a taxpayer. The
government need not incur the expense required to obtain the
information from or about the taxpayer. The taxpayer must incur
costs to obtain, assemble, and report the information required to
442 See generally I.R.C. § 6011(a).
443 Gale, supra note 9, at 1471 (noting that thirty-six countries already use a
comparable system of billing taxpayers instead of relying on self-assessment).
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6065 (requirement that all documents required to be filed
under federal tax laws must contain declaration that they are made under penalties of
perjury), 6662 (accuracy-related penalty), 6663 (fraud penalty).
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complete the tax return, but generally the cost to the taxpayer will be
less than the cost would be to the government because the taxpayer
already has access to much of the information required to complete
the return. Voluntary assessment is a highly desirable characteristic
of our tax system. The price of greater confusion among the public is
acceptable.
Third, the federal tax laws are an unusual amalgamation of laws
designed to serve mutually exclusive objectives. Congress designed
some tax laws to have little or no effect on taxpayer behavior. For
example, the Code defines gross income as "all income from whatever
source derived." 45  By using this broad definition, which (not
coincidentally) matches the definition supplied in the Sixteenth
Amendment, 46 the Code gives no ostensible preference for the means
by which taxpayers derive income. In other words, there is no
incentive for an individual to produce income from one type of
employment activity over another. Consequently, taxation is not a
criterion for choosing one's career path. The tax expenditure
provisions in the Code instead influence taxpayer behavior in a way
that produces some positive externality. 447 Congress, in its wisdom,
grants a deduction for home mortgage interest so that taxpayers have
an incentive to own (rather than to rent) a home.4" If more taxpayers
own homes, more individuals will build homes, more individuals will
work as real estate brokers, and more individuals will work for title
and insurance companies. By foregoing the revenues attributable to
the mortgage interest deduction, Congress hopes to maintain its
overall revenue base through steady employment and high
consumption rates.
The impact of tax expenditures on the uniqueness of tax
complexity is undeniable. Tax expenditures routinely violate basic
principles of the federal income tax. This breeds confusion among
45 I.RC. § 61(a).
446 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
,7 For more on tax expenditures and their effect on tax complexity, see supra
Part II.A.1.
See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 263-64 (Joint Comm. Print 1987). Under prior law,
the Code allowed individuals a deduction for all interest paid during the taxable year,
regardless of whether the related debt was associated with a business, investment, or
personal activity or expenditure. When Congress limited the interest deduction only
to debts associated with business activities or expenditures or, to a lesser extent,




taxpayers. An individual, for instance, might know of the home
mortgage interest deduction and reasonably extrapolate from this rule
that all home-related expenses are deductible. Of course, this
extrapolation is wrong, but the mortgage interest deduction
reasonably leads taxpayers into thinking other, related expenditures
may be deductible. Some taxpayers will likely claim such deductions
without checking for authority. Those that do check, however, soon
realize that their instinct is wrong. In their case, they will perceive
that the Code lacks any coherent principles because the exception to
the rule (the mortgage interest deduction) was their starting point. In
other areas of the law, general principles are easier to discern.
Thus, tax complexity is probably not much more difficult, if at all,
than tort complexity, bankruptcy complexity, securities complexity, or
antitrust complexity, to name but a few. Unlike other fields, tax
complexity affects most persons directly, it relies on voluntary
compliance, and its general principles are harder to discern than those
in other fields. For these reasons, tax complexity is at the forefront of
the simplification debate.
If we define tax complexity as that pervasively unique
combination of features previously identified, a workable definition
of simplicity is possible. With respect to the federal tax laws,
simplicity measures the extent to which a rule: (1) reduces the number
of other rules, (2) reduces the overall degree of detail, (3) reduces
concepts to workable rules, (4) reduces conflict among two or more
applicable policy principles, (5) requires minimal technical expertise
to comprehend fully, (6) remains unchanged for a long period, or (7)
is able to be applied by the several decision-making institutions
without variance. No doubt, many specific rules adopted in the name
of simplicity have fulfilled their role. The current exclusion of gain
from the sale of a principal residence,"9 for example, collapsed two
Code provisions into one. Since prior law conferred exclusion at the
cost of a carryover basis in a new residence, the new law allows
taxpayers to dispense with the need to keep track of their investments
in their residences. On the other hand, the new law allows all
taxpayers to exclude such gains even where they do not reinvest the
proceeds in similar properties, which represents a further departure
449 See I.R.C. § 121. Under prior law, the Code provided for nonrecognition of
the gain from the sale of a residence if the proceeds were rolled over into a new
residence within two years of the sale. I.R.C. § 1034, repealed by Taxpayer Relief Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312(b), 111 Stat. 839 (1997). Additionally, former
section 121 provided sellers age fifty-five and over a one-time forgiveness of a limited
amount of gain. I.R.C. § 121, amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 312(a).
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from the general rule that the Code recognizes all gains not
reinvested in property of a like kind. 5 On balance, however, there is
no question that the current rule is much simpler than the old rule.
B. Simplicity as a Means to Other Ends
While simpler laws may have superficial appeal to taxpayers, the
simpler rule is not always the better rule. For example, Congress
could fundamentally simplify the Code by enacting a flat tax on all
realized accessions to wealth, together with laws requiring the tax to
be withheld at the time of realization. This regime would be simpler
than the current one because it would eliminate many exclusions,
deductions, and credits that complicate the assessment of tax liability.
It would also allow for centralized assessment that has proven to be
effective in the context of income tax withholding for wages. Just
about the only complexity to this alternative tax system is determining
what constitutes a "realized accession to wealth." As long as
Congress provided sufficient parameters in defining the tax base, the
complexity would relate to the application of a single rule. The total
complexity of the alternative tax system would certainly be less than
the aggregate complexities in the current system. Yet such a simple
system has no real constituency, largely because it violates accepted
notions of equity and efficiency. The flat tax component of the
proposal violates vertical equity. Taxing all realized accessions to
wealth violates horizontal equity. Instituting comprehensive tax
withholding sacrifices the benefits of voluntary assessment. While the
alternative tax system seems appealing at first blush due to its
simplicity, a closer look soon reveals its unacceptable flaws.
As the preceding example demonstrates, Congress should reject
simple rules that thwart equity or efficiency. Accordingly, the
criterion of simplicity should not be on an equal plane with equity and
efficiency. Unlike equity and efficiency, simplicity lacks inherent
virtue. Equity is good. 451' No one argues that an equitable state is
450 I.R.C. §§ 1001(c), 1031, 1033.
451 Because the tax application of equity embraces notions of both horizontal and
vertical equity, the term should not be interpreted to mean that a state where all
individuals have equal incomes, assets, and status is superior to a state where
incomes, assets, and status vary. Instead, an equitable tax state is one where
individuals with the same amount of the tax base (whether income, assets, or some
other base) are taxed equally and where individuals with a greater amount of the tax




morally or functionally flawed . Likewise, efficiency in the law is
good. As with equity, there is no discernible drawback to pursuing
efficient laws, except perhaps to the extent that a more efficient law
comes at the cost of equity. When equity and efficiency conflict,
policymakers must seek a balance between these two important
values. Equity and efficiency may be as impossible to achieve as
simplification, but advances in equity and efficiency are intrinsically
good. Simplicity, on the other hand, is not inherently good. As this
article has shown, simple tax laws may be good or bad, depending
upon their effect on equity on efficiency. To the extent simple tax
laws enhance equality and efficiency they are good. They are not
good strictly because they are simple - they are good because they
promote the other, more important objectives. No one would argue
that equity is good because it is simple; nor would anyone contend
that efficiency is good because it promotes simplicity. Simplicity,
therefore, is a means and not an end. If simplicity were more often
than not a helpful means to the ends of equity and efficiency, one
could at least argue that simplicity was generally a good thing. Again,
however, the propensity for simplicity to do just as much damage to
these core values, as much as it might help them, cuts against this
argument. For all of these reasons, simplicity should not be held in
the same regard as equity and efficiency when evaluating a tax. If it
were, we would risk sacrificing the inherent virtues of equity and
efficiency in the name of a more questionable goal.
Although simplicity is not an inherent virtue, we should not
warmly embrace tax complexity either. Indeed, complexity too is but
a means to an end. In general, this article has shown that complexity
can be helpful (sometimes necessary) in enhancing equity and
efficiency. Of course, tax complexity can also interfere with these
453
core values. If one adopts a mindset that simplicity is just as
important as equity and efficiency, then it becomes hard to resist the
temptation to cut wide swaths through the thicket of complex Code
and regulation provisions. Just as one ought not perform
microsurgery with a hatchet, one should not reform the tax laws solely
452 With respect to vertical equity, of course, scholars have debated the
philosophical underpinnings of the instinctive preference for progressive tax rates.
See, e.g., WALTER BLUM & HARRY KALVIN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION (1953); Byrne, supra note 29. But these scholars conclude that vertical
equity is still desirable, even though an articulate justification of its desire may prove
elusive.
453 For an eloquent argument on this subject, see McCaffery, supra note 5, at
1284-91 (with respect to equity), 1292-98 (with respect to efficiency).
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on the basis of simplification.
C. Simplicity as a Component of Efficiency
Simplicity is a component of efficiency, not a separate criterion
for evaluating a tax.454 There are several components to the efficiency
criterion, including neutrality, capital allocation, compliance and
opportunity costs, and administrabilty. Under the neutrality
standard, a tax should interfere as little as possible with taxpayer
456behavior. While every tax will affect behavior to some extent, both
the government and the taxpayers have an interest in keeping a tax as
neutral as possible.457 For the government, a neutral tax means that
the government can rely upon a steady flow of tax revenues. If the
tax does not interfere with behaviors that exist in a tax-free market,
454 See Butler, supra note 29, at 72-73; see also Lustig, supra note 29, at 267-68.
Professor Graetz similarly contends that simplicity is a component of the equity
criterion. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 18 (2d ed. 1988).
455 One commentator measures the efficiency of the tax laws by the extent to
which they encourage savings. See John S. Nolan, The Erwin Griswold Lecture, 12
AM. J. TAX POL'Y 207, 214-15 (1995). This standard clearly contradicts the neutrality
standard for efficiency. As many more commentators refer to the neutrality
standard, one understandably concludes that this "pro-savings" standard merits little
consideration herein. Other commentators measure efficiency in terms of economic
growth. Under this standard, a tax that stimulates overall economic growth is
efficient. See, e.g., Edward Yorio, The President's Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the
Right Direction, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 395 (1987). Again, however, this standard for
efficiency violates both the neutrality standard and the capital allocation standard, so
it is not developed herein.
The contradictory standards used to measure efficiency suggest that efficiency
ought not be given the same deference as equity in evaluating a tax. The problem, of
course, is that reasonable minds can (and do) also disagree as to the meaning of
equity. See, e.g., Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy
in Tax Policy Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501 (1997). However one defines equity or
efficiency, there is at least a consensus that these criteria are legitimate goals of
federal tax policy.
456 See Butler, supra note 29, at 73; see also GRAETZ, supra note 454, at 17; J.
Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case
for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 350-51 (2001); Richard
Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in
Horizontal Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509, 526-28 (1984); Victor Zonana, International
Tax Policy in the New Millennium: Developing an Agenda, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
1253, 1255 (2001).
457 Judge Sneed contends that the perfectly neutral tax would have the broadest
possible base and no exclusions. Sneed, supra note 29, at 587-89.
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the government knows that the behavior it is taxing will continue,
thus assuring the government of predictable revenues from the tax. A
neutral tax is also optimal for taxpayers because the pain of paying
the tax is not as sharp. By definition, the neutral tax will not
discourage taxpayers from engaging in the activity subject to tax.
Thus, the tax must not be so painful as to alter behavior. Neutrality is
but one component of efficiency. As evidenced earlier, Congress
intentionally violates the neutrality standard from time to time
specifically because it wants to encourage behaviors that are not
occurring in the free market or discourage behaviors that are or
458
would be present in the free market.
The allocation of capital in the market also impacts efficiency.
An efficient tax should not prefer one allocation of capital over
another.9  If the income from one sector of the market is subject to
tax at a higher rate than other market sectors, capital will flow away
from the high-tax sector toward the low-tax sectors. 46° This standard
is akin to the neutrality standard in that it values nondiscrimination,
but it is unique in that it does not necessarily accept the free market
biases as superior. If the tax-free market prefers one sector over
another, the neutrality standard would seek to preserve this bias. The
capital allocation standard would be more concerned with treating all
sectors equally if there were no rational basis for the free market bias
for or against a particular market sector. Even if one thinks of capital
allocation as a redundant restatement of the neutrality standard, one
would accept that capital allocation is an important aspect of
efficiency.
An efficient tax also requires fewer compliance and opportunity
costs than an inefficient one.461 If a tax requires taxpayers to maintain
separate records that would not exist but for the tax, or if the tax
diverts resources away from the production of income and toward
compliance with the tax (thus representing foregone income), it is less
efficient. A more efficient tax requires less compliance time. If the
tax is an income tax, the cost standard is especially relevant because
presumably the taxpayer could apply the time and resources lost to
compliance toward the production of additional income, which would
458 See supra Part II.A.1.
459 This point is developed in Razeen Sappideen, Imputation of the Corporate
and Personal Income Tax: Is It Chasing One's Tail?, 15 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 167, 192
(1998).
460 Id.
461 See Jay A. Soled, A Proposal to Lengthen the Tax Accounting Period, 14 AM.
J. TAX POL'Y 35, 47-50 (1997).
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enhance revenues., . ..
Finally, an efficient tax should be one that the government can
enforce relatively easily.462  Government resources dedicated to
collection and enforcement strains the tax base to produce additional
revenues to cover these additional costs. A tax that requires more
resources to administer is less profitable and thus less efficient for the
government.
The desire for simplicity is in essence a reflection of the cost
standard to taxpayers and the administrability standard to the
government. A simple tax in theory is more likely to present fewer
compliance and opportunity costs for taxpayers, and fewer
enforcement costs for the government.463  Thus, the benefit of
simplicity is its advancement of the standards of efficiency. It is a
mistake to distinguish simplicity as a tax policy criterion distinct from
efficiency. Simplicity is part of what scholars mean by efficiency,
nothing more.
If simplicity is merely a substitute for the cost standard for
efficiency, it is wrong to treat simplicity as an additional tax policy
criterion. By doing so, one devalues the neutrality and capital
allocation standards that also contribute to an efficient tax. An
example illustrates the mistake of treating simplicity as a separate
criterion. Assume that Congress is debating a particular proposal that
would amend the Code. There is universal consensus that the
proposal would significantly enhance the overall simplicity of the tax
laws by reducing compliance and enforcement costs, but there is also
a universal consensus that the proposal violates neutrality because it
will cause taxpayers to engage in behaviors that would not normally
occur in the free market and are not otherwise desirable. Assume
further that everyone agrees the proposal will afford a small benefit
for a certain class of taxpayers with incomes equal to those of other
taxpayers outside of that class for no legitimate policy reason. The
proposal thus violates horizontal equity, but the violation is not very
significant. Illustrated numerically the hypothetical proposal scores
as follows:
462 Several commentators refer to this standard as "administrability." See, e.g.,
Patrick B. Crawford, Analyzing Fairness Principles in Tax Policy: A Pragmatic
Approach, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 155, 186 (1998); John S. Nolan, The Merit of an
Income Tax Versus a Consumption Tax, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'y 207, 218 (1995); Soled,
supra note 461, at 50.
463 But see supra Parts III.B., III.C. (finding arguments calling for tax
simplification based on the compliance and enforcement costs of tax complexity
unpersuasive).
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Enhanced Simplicity + 4
Diminished Neutrality - 3
Diminished Horizontal Equity - 2
From an efficiency standpoint, the proposal has a net score of +1
because the enhanced simplicity more than offsets the diminished
neutrality. The efficiency gain, however, is itself more than offset by
the loss in horizontal equity. The proposal should not pass, assuming
one has an equal preference for the efficiency and equity criteria.
Those who consider simplicity a separate criterion would adopt the
proposal. By double-counting simplicity, the proposal scores a net +3
(+4 for simplicity, +1 for efficiency, and -2 for equity), meaning it is
net beneficial.
One might counter that such double-counting is not necessarily a
result of elevating simplicity on a par with equity and efficiency. One
could simply strip the efficiency criterion of its compliance costs and
administrability standards, measuring efficiency solely with reference
to neutrality and capital allocation. 464 While that avoids the double-
counting problem in the illustration, it implicitly gives more weight to
the four efficiency standards, making equity a less important criterion.
Consider a separate tax proposal that scores as follows:
Diminished Simplicity - 1
Diminished Neutrality - 1
Enhanced Equity + 2
If one treats efficiency as consisting only of the neutrality standard
and does not double-count the diminished simplicity, the proposal is a
push - one should neither favor nor disfavor the proposal. Of course,
the same result follows even if one considers simplicity to be a
component of efficiency - the net result is still a push because the +2
gain in equity is offset by the -2 loss in efficiency (again assuming that
both criteria count equally). The danger of considering simplicity
separately lies in the temptation to treat criteria equally. If one thinks
there are three equal criteria (equity, efficiency, and simplicity) and
not just two (equity and efficiency), then the right answer is to reject
the proposal. While the literature is usually careful to proclaim that
This approach has been used. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Rudnik, Who Should Pay
the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 1200-01 (1989).
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one should not necessarily weigh the tax policy criteria equally,465 the
natural inclination is to do so. By separating efficiency into two
separate criteria, one devalues the equity criterion. This result is
acceptable only if one universally considers efficiency to be more
important than equity, which again is contrary to the cautions against
equal weighing.
Since simplicity is a component of tax efficiency, it does not
deserve its accustomed status as a separate and distinct policy
criterion. By doing so, policymakers are tempted to devalue other
components of efficiency or even the equity criterion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tax complexity is neither bad nor good, and tax simplicity is
neither bad nor good. The current political paradigm denouncing the
Code as "too complex" and lauding reforms that will "simplify" the
tax laws is misguided. In evaluating the Code and any proposed
reforms to the Code, more attention should focus on promoting the
core values of equity and efficiency. If complexity is necessary to
have more equitable and efficient laws, that complexity should be
acceptable. Crusades to simplify the Code should be suspicious
because simplicity is not always the best way to advance the core
values.
The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation deserves credit for
identifying the many expired provisions that still exist and
unnecessarily clutter the Code.4 The Joint Committee should also
receive commendation for questioning the complexity of many Code
provisions. It is important to revisit complicated provisions from time
to time to make sure that the equity and efficiency objectives sought
by Congress advance. As the Joint Committee staff concedes, one
cannot simplify the Code without altering fundamental tax policy
positions. If a simplification proposal furthers legitimate objectives of
tax policy, the proposal merits serious consideration. Simplification
merely for the sake of simplification, however, is not productive.
The Code is a carefully crafted work of political compromise.
Like all of us, it contains some fat that could be trimmed, an organ or
two that could be severed without damage to the body, and maybe
465 See supra note 29.
2 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION,
PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 579-
93 (Joint Comm. Print 2001).
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some features that are less appealing to look at than others. It also
has an inner beauty and an intricate structure that generally works to
raise revenues for the many programs that benefit the taxpayers from
whom it collects. While there are many exceptions to the basic
themes, the Code is generally predictable to one who understands the
themes and the political pressures that shape the exceptions. We
could easily have a simpler tax regime, but the resulting inequities and
inefficiencies would likely outweigh the compliance burdens placed
on taxpayers under the current tax regime.
